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In 
The Supreme Gourt 
of the 
State of Utah 
ST~-\.TE OF LTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
\S. 
E. B. ERWIX, HARRY FIJ\-CH 
~TJ) R. 0. PEARCE, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Appeal From Third District Court, Salt Lake County 
Hon. Oscar W. McConkie, Judge 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
None of the defendants in this case have attempted 
to make a statement of the facts introduced in evi-
dence in the trial court. Instead they have con-
tented themselves with taking the testimony of each 
witness individually and without considering such 
testimony in the light of the other evidence have 
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.... 
merely said that such testimony is inadmissible 
and proves nothing. Counsel for the ·8tate will 
attempt to make a rather comprehensive statement 
of the facts and will, as near as possible, place th& 
facts in their chronological order .. 
During the year 1935, E. B. E.rwin beca1ne a can ... 
didate for Mayor of Salt Lake City. Erwin first 
met Harry Finch between the primaries and final 
election of that year in the office of A. S. Brown. 
The supporting of Ervvin was di~cussed and Finch 
testified on cross examination that he believed he 
said at that time that he would give Erwin sonH~ 
help in that election. (188). (Although on direct 
examination he stated he had not Rupport.ed Erwin, 
but had suworted his opponent). (171). 
Between- the election in N oven1 her and the 15th of 
December, 1935, Finch was contaeted by Ralph 
Stewart, Er,vin 's campaign director, and \Vas asked 
"rho would make a good Chief of Police. .1\.. sub-
S'equent conversation was had 'vith Ste·wart on the 
same subject, but in neither conversation "\Vas a.ny-
thing said about Finch being Cnief. (205 and 206). 
ErV\rin~ having been eleeted in November, J 935 tool{ 
the oath of office on the first Monday of January, 
1936, and on tha.t day V\Tas by the Salt Lake City 
Commission assigned to ti1e Department of Pul1lic 
Safety. Under the Ordinanc~s nf Salt T_jake City, 
Exhibit (a), one of the subordinate dcpft.rtments 
"rithin the· said D'epartment of Public Safety was 
the Police Department. Said ordinances further 
provided that the Commissioner of Public Safety 
had sole executive and administrative po"rers and 
authority in such department and under the direc .. 
tion of the Board of Commissioners had charge 
and control of the Police Department. The said 
CommiRRionPr ,, .. as re~ponsihle to th0 Board of Com-
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missioners for the proper e .. onduct or each Depart~ 
ment under his supervision. (See Instruction 11). 
Under the authority granted by the Ordinances, 
Erwin appointed ...:\.ustin Smith his seereta.ry on 
Janua.ry 6, 1936, and at about the same tiine John 
S. Early was appointed Office Manager of the 
Department of Public Safety on the reeonunenda-
tion of Erwin. 
In January of 1936, Finch was asked by Mr. 
Gardner, a friend of his, to come to his house, that 
he thought Austin Smith and ~Ir. Pinney \Yanted to 
talk with him about his being appointed Chief of 
Police. Mr. Pinne, at that time was a reporter on 
the Tribune and later became Er,rin 's secretary. 
Finch "Went to Gardner's home and discussed with 
Smith his appointment as Chief of Police. (188). 
The latter part of January or the first part of 
February, Finch discussed his appointment as Chief 
of Police with Erwin. On February 18, 1936, Finch, 
on the recommendation of Erwin, was appointed 
Chief of Police. Said appointment to become 
effective ~{arch 15, 1936. Payne was the Chief of 
Police at that time and Finch was to succeed him. 
Parenthetically it might be here said that Finch 
from 1925 to 1934 was a Commissioner of .Salt 
Lake City in charge of parks and public property. 
During this time there was considerable difficulty 
on many occasions with the Police Department and 
such matters were discussed in the Commis~on. 
From this he came to know something of the affairs 
of the Publir. Safety Department. Also, through 
these difficulties and discussions in these meet-
ings he learned something about part of the under-
~orld conditions. (Sup. Ab. 19). Also. during this 
time he knew that the Commission had trouble with 
men in Ben Harmon's place. ~Ir. Finch also had 
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operated a restaurant on Second South for thirty-
five or thirty-~even years and before Prohibition 
was in the liquor business and during such time be-
came acquainted with Ben Harmon and Abe Rosen-
blum. He had heard of Bill Browning by reputa-
tion and knew he \Vas a bookmaker. He had heard 
by repu~~tion that Cliff Jennings was a bootlegger 
and bookmaker. 
After J::tjs appointment and until March 15, ~.,inch 
spent .~t _ _least part of each day at the Police De-
partment, familiarizing himself with the police work 
and routine. Under the Ordinances of Salt Lake 
City, the Police Department is under the manage-
ment of the Chief of Police, except as_ otherwise 
provided by law or ordinance. The Chief of 
Police had the control, management, and direction 
of all members of the Department in the la~ful e:t-
ercise of his functions, with full power to suspend 
any subordinate officer or employee for a period 
not exceeding fifteen days \vhcn in his judg1nent 
the good of the service required jf. T'he Chief. had 
in the discharge of his duties like po,yers and was 
subject to like responsibilities over sheriffs and 
constables in similar cases. He was, nnder th~ 
duty of his office, required to suppress riots and 
disturbances and breaches of the peace and appre· 
hend any persons committing· any offense . against 
the laws of the State or the ordinances of the City, 
a~d at all times he "\vas to diligently and faithfully 
discharge his duties and enforce all ordinances and 
regulations of the City for the preservation of 
peace and good order and the protection of the 
rights and property of all persons. Said ordi-
nances further provided that be should consult and 
gdvise with the Commissioner of Public Safety 
and act with his approval on all rna tters pertain· 
ing to the Police Department and was to make 
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such reports as the Connuissioner of Puhlie Safety 
should require. ( Tht\se Ordin~u1ces a l'l' eontnined in 
Exhibit (a)). 
In the latter part of February or the en rly part of 
March, 1936~ Erwin talked "~ith l~arly and 8tated, 
to him that he had heard therl• "·as a pny-off 
through the Police Departnll~nt; that he \Yns dl)~ 
sirous of finding out to ''hat extent the pay-off was 
and who "Was making it, if pos:3ible. Er"in fur--
ther said, '·Jack. get all the inforn1ation that you 
can with reference to it.·' (Sup. ~\b. 4). In the 
latter part of ~larch he asked Early \Yhat he had 
been able to find out. Early told him that he had 
discu~sed the matter cith nlnnerou:3 of the officers 
and was unable to get any information \\hatever 
and that he had discu~sed it \t.-ith another party 
who had said that there "as a pay-off of approx-
imately $2,000 per month. He told Erwin that this 
party claimed that it "Was a pay-off on prostitu-
tion, Chinese lotteries, card games, and horse 
racrng. 
On March 19, 1936, R. 0. Pearce, was trying a law .. 
"uit. the name of "-hich was Pearson v. the Erwin 
1fotor Company. ::.rr. P2-arce was acting as coun-
sel for the defendant. En,in \\ras there and took 
the witness stand. 
On March 23rd, Ben Hunsaker and his son Clif-
ford, c.alled on Er,vin in his office in the City and 
County Building for the purpose of settling a 
husines~ trrnsaction with Erwin involving an auto-
mobile business deal between the Hunsakers and 
Erwin. In the course of their conversation Erwin 
~tated that he had been assigmed to the Public' 
Safety Department; that he had his Chief of P'olico 
and expected him to bring him in good money. 
Erw·in stated th3.t he wanted to get the financial 
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end of the· thing and still had hopes that he would 
get the financial end of the City. He said that if 
he did,, he would make a lot of money out of it. If 
he got the financial end of the City he was sure he 
would be able to p·ay the- note off in a very short 
time. This was a $10,000 note. Hunsaker told him 
that he, Hunsaker, wanted him to 1nake the pay-
ments on that note and that he knew Erwin could 
pay it out of his salary and not out of graft. Erwin 
stated he could pay the note off. rrhat he could 
make a payment of $200 per month out of his salary 
and that he didn't 'vant more than eighteen months. 
Er'\Vin stated that he was sure that he would have 
it paid before that time. The note was for a little 
more than $10,000. Erw.,.in again said that he ex-
pected to get the financial end of the city and that 
if he did he would be able to pay this note off. 
Hunsaker told Erwin that he had better go straight 
in the future, although he hadn't in the past. 
Erwin replied that they all do it and that hr was 
going to get his while he bad a ehance. Erwin 
asked that if he could pay this note off before it 
was due if he would refund the interest and Hun-
saker said that he would. A memorandum .\vas 
signed up to that effect. 
About two weeks· after the Chief took office, ,, ... bich 
\\.,.ould be about April 1st, E.arly had a conversation 
with Finch in which he told Finch that· he had 
heard rumors that there had been graft going on. 
Finch stated that he hadn't heard anything about 
it and ha.d ha.d no reports from any one in the 
Department. (25). On the first of April, Finch re-
organized the Anti-Vice Squad and placed Golden 
Holt in charge of that squad. H. K. Record at the 
time Finch became Chief had headed this squad 
and did so up until the first of April. Holt wa~ 
g'iven t'vo men to work with. The duties of the 
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.. .\.nti-Yice Squad "~ere to take eare of all forn1~ of 
·nee, 8uch as gambling and prostitution. Holt 
talked "·ith ::b-,ineh just prior to his appointnH\nt nud 
also afterwards. ~\. few day8 after the first of 
April, Finch and Holt had a eonversa tion in "Thich 
they talked over the YiCl.' ~ituation. The Chief 
stated . that he didn't particularly object to vice, 
but he didn't want them to get the best of the De-
partment, that is, not to let them run too openly. 
Mter this change in the vice squad, a nu1nber of 
persons came into the Public Safety Building to 
see Early about operating in Salt Lake City. These 
men included ~Ir. Bro\\lling, a Chinaman named 
Wong, Cliff J ennin g:s, 'Yilliam Ca~~ias~ Ben Har-
mon and A.be R.osenbllml. These conversations ex-
tended possibly into )fay of 1936. (25). Mr. 
Browning came in at one time and talked with 
Barly and then 1\ent over to the secretary's office. 
There was no other 1\ay of getting into Finch's 
office. Harmon was in Early'~ office on several 
occasions and on one occasion went into the sec-
retary's office. He also sa-\v Abe Rosenblum 
around the Public Safety Building and on one 
occasion saw him go toward the Chief's office. As 
stated above: these convPr~ation~ probably covered 
a period of time from April to the latter part of 
May and that ~oJne time afterwards Early had a 
conversation with Finch in which he stated that 
there were rumors that there had ~en consider-
able pay-off and Finch stated that these people 
know their own business and would have to oper-
ate their own business. That it 'vas his duty to 
operate the Police Department_ and he proposed to 
operate it. 
About a month after Finch was appointed, which 
would make it about April 15th, Austin Smith went 
to Finch's home about 7:00 or 8:00 o'clock at 
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night a.t the request of Finch. Smith asked Finch 
how he liked his job and Finch stated that it was 
alright. Thingts generally pertaining, to: the (De-1 
partment were discussed, and in that conversation 
Smith asked Finch approximately what the pay-
off 'vas as it existed at the time, and Finch an-
swered that it was- approximately- $2,00(} a month. 
Smith asked him who was getting it or who col-
lected it and what became of it and ],inch said that 
probably Abe Rosenblum would collect it as he had 
had experienee along ~hat line. (29} .. 
At about this time A. H. Ellett, Judge of the City 
Court also had a conversation with Finch. On the-
day of this conversa~tion, Judge Ellett wl1o wias 
then at the Police Court in the Public Safety Build-
ing, indicated in open court that certain charges: 
agains.t keepers of gambling games were felonies 
and that he would not take jurisdiction of them and 
that these felony cases would have to be taken to 
the County Attorney's office. Immediately after 
Judge Ellett got off the bench, within about 15 or 
20 minutes Finch called him on the teirnhone and 
' . 
stated that he would like to come up and talk about 
these gamblers. Judge Ellett told him to see him 
in the morning at 9 :00 o'clock. At about 5 :30 or 
6:00 o'clock of this same day Judge Ellett saw 
Finch on the first floor of th~ P'oliee Station. 
They went into vvhere tl1e captain Ri h; and were 
looking at some cleaning or painting work that was 
being done and they walked into the Chief 'R office. 
Toward the end of the conversation, the Chief said, 
"Judge, why can't "re get together on the sen-
fencing of these gamblers, let them pay tl1e fine, let 
t.he City get the revenue." Judge EIIett said the 
re:.u;;on thev couldn't do that WR s ''because my 
friends tell. mP von are taking $2,500 per month in 
your hand hehind your back and I am not going t.o 
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)Je a party to iL \Ye ean·t get together on iL'' 
Finch said notl1ing and after a bout a 1ninute or two 
made some remark and the meeting broke up right 
thereafter. 'l'nat during the 1uinute or two re-
ferred to Flnch was looking do\\·n at his· shoes. 
(Under the State eharge of kt_\eping a g&nbling 
game, the penalty is i1nprisonment in the State's 
penitentiary. Gan1bling under the City Ordin-
ances carries mth it a fine or jail sentence, or 
uoth). {75 to 17; Sup. _\b. 9 to 11). 
In June of 1936 .3..ustin Smith had a conyersation 
' mth a newspaper man in Salt Lake City and after 
this con\ersation he re.cei\ed a memorandum at his 
office. This memorandum was placed on the 
!Iayor 's desk and later a conversation \Yas had by 
Smith "ith Erwin. This memorandum contained a 
list of the supposed pay-offs in town, the gambling 
houses and houses of prostitution and opposite 
each one of them "-as set aside a supposed amount 
that was being paid by those houses. In this con-
versation with the !fayor, Smith stated that the 
persons who had talked t{) him about it said that 
unless these things were taken care of the lid 
·would be blown off. The :Jfayor to]d Smith that it 
would immediately be investigated, that he did not 
know anything about it. 
During this same month Austin Smith went to 
Captain Taggart's office and there mPt Mr. Holt 
and had a conversation with him. H{? went there 
at Holt's request. A couple of days arter this 
Smith vYent to the Police Station and talked with 
Erwin, telling him he had had a conversation with 
some one who apparenily knew conditions first 
hand. Smith did not use the man's name because 
he had· been requested to withhold it. Smith told 
Erwin that there was a pay-off and vice conditions 
were being- talked about all up and down the street. 
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E·rwin told Smith he would investigate the n1attcr .. 
(31). About two days later Smith had a conversa-
tion with Erwin in Erwin's office. Erwin acted 
very upset and he informed Smith that he felt that 
Smith had talked to p.eople that he should not have 
talked to and had said something that he should 
not have said pertaining· to the Department and his 
particular affairs. ( Sn1ith '·s testimony 32). 
A meeting was then arranged between Erwin,. 
Finch, Holt and Smith. At this conversation Smith 
a.sked Holt to relate the conversation that he had 
had with him in Taggart's office; he was asked to 
give the gist of this conversation. Holt said that 
he had informed Smith of the vice conditions etc.,. 
' and that he had called Smith over because the in-
formation should he given to Er\vin and that Holt 
also asked Smith to 'vithhold his n~une \Vhen he 
gave Erwin the information. H.olt sa.]d that thera 
was a pay-off going· on from the houses of pros-
titution and gambling houses a11d other vice con-
ditions; that it was rampant all over town. That 
nearly everyone knew about it up and do"rn 1\fain 
Street and Holt stated he had informed Smith of 
that fact. After Holt was through V\rith his con-
versation, which was rather brief and was to the 
same effect as Smith had prPviously told the 
{Mayor, Smith asked Erwin again if there was any 
misunders.tanding-; if they were satisfie<l \vith what 
Holt had said and jf it was alrig·ht and there was 
no further remark. Finch made the remark that 
they should not he "\Vashing their dirty linen in 
the enemy's camp. (31 and 32). Holt's version of 
this conversation \vas that he stated therein that 
he had hea.rd a pay-off was going on and that ''they 
were accused of participating in it." (98). The day 
after this conversatjon, Holt had a1 conversation 
with Finch in which Finch told him to close every-
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thing up, • ~Just close the town up.'' After this 
conversation with Fineh Holt "·ent all around town 
' to the places of prostitution, gantbling- phu.~l\8 and 
lotteries and gaYe them orders to close up. Holt 
testified that it appeared to him that they 'vere 
. closed up '~through about the 1nonth of July" (99). 
Smith was released as secretary to the ~layor about 
July 1, 1936. On or about July 3, 1936 in Ben Hun-
sacker's field in Box Elder County, Erwin 
appeared. He had $200 in currency. He offered 
Hunsaker the money as payment on the note and 
Hunsaker told him that he needn't haYe come up 
and that Erwin knew that Mr. Lowe, Hunsaker's 
attorney, was the man he should have paid it to 
because Lowe had written Erwin and declared the 
whole note due. (The note which "~as introduced as 
evidence called for the first payment on ~fay 15, 
1936 and Erwin had not made such payment).· Hun-
saker stated that he was not going to take this 
payment because it was up to Mr. Lowe to settle 
it. Erwin stated that he had had one hell-of-a-time 
down there getting things lined up and th!at he 
didn't think Hunsaker would mind for a short time. 
Hunsaker told him that when the note was made 
he had told Erwin he was not going to play .around 
and that he expected the payments " 7ould be made 
on the due dates. Erwin stated that he had been 
having a lot of trouble and only had a few gambling 
joints and a few bootlegging places running. Erwin 
stated that he was then getting the women of the 
underworld pretty well lined up and that he ~x­
pected quite a lot of money to be coming in. Erwin 
told Hunsaker that if he would take this money. he 
would promise Hunsaker that he would not be· be-
hind another time and that he would make pay-
ments when due. Hunsaker ag-ain told him that 
when the note was made out he had wanted him 
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to· figure paying it out of his. salary and that there 
was nobody to biame but himself~ Hunsaker said, 
''Now you come to me and say that you have had 
a hell-of-a-time to make your collections from the 
different joints and there is nobody to blame but 
yourself." (82, and Sup. Ab .. 11). 
During the latter part of July, Holt had a con-
versation with Finch in Finch's office. At that 
time Finch mentioned Mr. Rosenblum and told 
Holt to go and see him. Nothing wa.s said about 
the places of vice. Holt went to see Abe Rosen-
blum and Rosenblum told him to go and collect 
from the women. He told Holt the pJaces that 
Were operating- and the amounts to collect. Before 
Holt made the collections he talked with the oper-
ators of the places of prostitution~ He told them 
what was exp,ected of them and told them he would 
be around about the first of each month. lie fur-
ther told them the payments they were to make; 
gave them certain amounts he was going to collect 
from them. Rosenblum had given him · these 
amounts.. Holt started to make the collections about 
the first of August. Holt name-d the houses of 
prostitution which he visited at this time and 
w·hich are mentioned in the Bill of Particulars, giv-
ing their names and addresses. Holt stated that he 
collected from thPse places from the first of 
August until the first of January, 1937, on about 
the first of each month. He stated that he col-
leeted $125.00 from Sadie Alde-n's place, ·$125.00 
from Kitty Spiegel's place, $100.00 from Tillie 
Allen's place, $50.00 from Margaret Newman'~ 
place and named the various amountR from other 
places. 
About the first of August and after hjB conversa-
tion with RoHenblum, Holt had a conversation with 
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Finch. Finch ~ta.ted that tht• hl:\at '"as oYer and to 
let them reopen and not to let then1 run too opt\nly. 
No specific .places "~ere n1entioned. Holt testit'il\d 
that after that ti1ne he ju~t let then1 run up until 
the first of January "~ith thl~ exception of the lot-
teries. (99 and 100). 
After the places had been permitted to open up, 
Finch had a conYersation "~th Holt in '"hich Finch 
stated tha.t Ben Harmon "~as making complaints 
about Abe R-osenblum ·s place, and Finch said that 
he didn't see """hat Ben Harmon had against hin1. 
Either in this conYersation, or one just shortly 
after it, Finch told Holt that they couldn't tolerate 
Abe's place, and that Holt was to put a man there 
and to keep him there to see that they didn't in-
dnlgte in infractions of the law. This was along 
the latter part of A.ugnst or first of September. 
The pl&e wasn't opened up any more by Abe 
Rosenblum that Holt knew of. Some other fellow 
opened it up. This conversation was not in con-
nection with the closing up Jof any other place. 
This plaee bad the reputation of being a gambling 
place, and it 'Yas a licensed card room. This was 
during the time that Holt was making collections 
and taking the money to .... ~be Rosenblum. 
Some time in the later summer or fall of 1936, and 
at the time Erwin was making a payment to Hun-
saker in Ogden, another conversation was had be-
tween them. It might be well to point out that 
Erwin made trips to Ogden to make the payments 
on the Hunsaker note, and in each instance, ex-
cept one, the payment was made in currency. In 
this conversation Hunsaker asked Erwin why he 
didn't sit down and write out a check and mail it 
to him. Hunsaker said that then Erwin wouldn-,t 
r.~vf' tn come 11p, and Hunsaker wouldn't even have 
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to answer, and that the check would answer as a 
receipt. Hunsaker ·pointed out that this would 
save Erwin a trip, and also pointed out that Hun-
saker was not home all the time~ Erwin stated 
''Y d ' ou on 't think I am crazy enough to take two 
hundred dollars in currency and take it to the hank 
and get a check for it each month~ I don't intend 
to let those fellows know what I am doing. I don't 
mind the trip up here at all. I will take care of 
paying the note in my own way." (84). 
About the month of Oetober, 1936, Early had a 
conversation with Erwin in which he stated to 
Erwin that there were rumors of a vice pay-off, 
and at this time the Mayor said that the matter 
was in the jurisdiction of the Chief of Police and 
' that the Chief of Police was operating the Depart-
ment. (27). 
Along in the fall or -vvinter of this san1e year 
A. M. J. Pritchard talked with Erwin. Pritchard 
was the sexton at the City Cemetery. Before hold-
ing that position he had been a detective, and was 
appointed sexton on April 1, 1936. He knew E1·win 
and used to bring plants do\Vn to his office, ctnd 
would go in and pass the time of day. At this 
mentioned conversation he told Erwin that there 
was a pay-off in town, and that the \i\T omen's Or-
ganization had a list of all the pay-off- the names 
of the partie:s p~ay1ng off, and the- aJ.nonnt they 
were p-aying. He stated that these organizations 
were going to have a. me-eting in t""o \Veeks an.~ 
cive it to the paperR. Erwin asked Pritchard 1f 
he could get hjm a cony of that list. About three 
days later Pritchard brought him a full copy of the 
Jist of the names of the people that were supposed 
Ito be paying off, their addres.se·s. and the amount 
they we·re paving. Erwin stated that it was· nn-
hPJieveahJe. Er"rjn never mentioned the matter to 
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Pritchard after that, althoug-h l')ritchard had been 
in his office a number of tinlL'S since then. ( 7~, •~n. 
On another occasion in the la t.ter part of 193G nt 
~Ir. Hunsaker· s ho1ne~ ~lr. Erwin had paid ~1rs. 
Hunsaker the $~00 paynH~nt. Ben Hunsaker ra1ne 
into the house and he and Er\\in had another con-
versation. Ermn asked Hunsaker \Ylll'ther he was 
making a report on his incon1e of this $~00 a month 
lfuat he -was paying Hunsaker. Hunsaker stated 
that he was not; that it -wa.s merely a repayment of 
an old account. Erwin stated that he thought that 
if Hunsaker -were reporting it that he would have 
to report it. "but being as you are not, I will not 
have to report it.'' Hunsaker told him that he had 
better go strai~ht with L"ncle Sam and the State, 
and Erwin said, "Well, I won't have to report it." 
At another occasion in the latter part of 1936 at 
Hunsaker's home in Ogden Erwin made another 
payment. He had two hundred dollars in currency, 
handed it to Hunsaker and Hunsaker signed the re-
ceipt. Erwin on this occasion stated that he had 
his Chief of Police in there, that he "~as bringtng 
him in very good money, but not enough; that if 
he had got the financial end of the city he would 
have been taking plenty of money. Hunsaker 
said, ''E. B., they are going to get you as sure as 
hell.'' Erwin replied, ''They can't get me. Some-
body has got to see me take the money. They have 
got to ·prove I take the money, and they can't do 
that because I don't collect. Finch is the man they 
will get, but I don't think they '11 be able to get 
Finch hecause he doesn't do the collecting him-
self. He hag his men collecting for him.'' (8R). 
About the month of January, 1937, Mrs. Earl Van 
.Cott, }frs. Lee Wright, and Mrs. W. T. Runzler 
called on Erwin. At that time Mrs. Runz1er was 
the State Director representing the Salt Lake Dis-
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trict in the Utah Federation of Women's Clubs. 
Mrs. Van Cott acted as spokesman for the group 
and stated ''that according to information she had 
received it was eharged that Mr. ]j}rwin was re ... 
ceiving a pay-off of $750 a month, and the Chief 
$350, and other operators of gambling establish-
ments $2.50.'' Erwin flushed considerably and 
·stated, "Oh, I am accused of that too, am l'J" 
Erwin then took a cigarette and asked if he might 
smoke. None of the ladies present said anything 
~fte.r he asked if he might smoke; they had no ob-
Jection and Erwin changed the subject to parking 
meters. ( 7·3, 7 4) . 
Around the middle of January, 1937, Holt had an-
other conversation with Finch. ],inch told Holt to 
close everything up, that he was going to give Holt 
another man on the squad, and he also told Holt 
to see that there was absolutely no n~ore pay-off. 
(100). 
Some time before the 1937 licens.es were to be 
issued, according to Finch, (17'7) because they had 
had trouble with card clubs, he told Holt to tell 
theS'e people tha.t they had had more or less com-
plaints and arrests. Holt suggested that ].,inch call 
them in. There were ten or fifteen of them., and 
so far as F'inch knew all of then1. Finch told them 
that he had had mo;e or less trouble and that he 
vva.nted it definitely understood that when he 
okeyed theRe licenses they wouJd run their places 
according to hnv. Finch did all the talking and 
the applic:a.nts did not say or do anytl1ing. 
Close to the middle of February, 1937, .Ho1t had an· 
other conversation· with Finch. F1nch told Holt. 
'that he thought Holt was the one who wa.s making 
the town too hot, and that if he moved Holt things 
'~rould calm down. (10). 
Holt WaR removed the f; rs.t o.f Ma.rch 'by Chief 
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Finch, and li. I~. l{l'(lOl'd \Ya:s put in hi:s place a~ 
Chief of the .Anti-Yiee Squad. (100). 
Holt w~ promoted oy .b 'inch to the ranking oi de-
tective. · , 
In connection with this shift on the .... \uti-Yice Squad, 
Finch testified (177) that there had been a g·ood 
deal of complaints, Hand the ne\\-spapers were rid-
ing us over the \Yomen's Clubs.'' Finch thought 
it was adTI.sable to make a change, and he told Holt 
he was going to make it. Also, according to Finch 
(181), after he removed Holt from the Anti-Vice 
Squad, the \\omen's Organization which had been 
taking quite an active part in vice conditions came 
to Finch and wanted to know why he had removed 
Holt. They felt that Holt was doing a good job. 
They stated they had never made complaints or 
words to that effect, and felt that Finch had made 
a mistake in taking Holt off the \Tice Squad. 
AB pointed out above, the removal of Holt and the 
placing of H. K Record on the Vice Squad took 
place the first of ~Iarch. Around the middle of 
April and while H. K. Record was Chief of tbe 
Vice Squad, R. 0. Pearce called Record on the 
telephone and asked Record to come over to his 
office. in the Continental Bank Building. On his 
arrival at the office M.r. Pearce and Ben Harmon 
were there. Pearce told Record that he had been 
responsible for havin!! him placed as head of the 
Vice-Squad and that Erwin had instructed him, 
Pearce,· to make collection~ from gambling houses, 
and other. forms of vice. Record asked them how 
much they wanted, expooted to · g1e;t, and Pearce 
replied~ $1700 a. month. Record then asked Pearce 
where he exnectecl to e-et t.hat much~ and Pearce 
stated~ '' $()00 from +hP lotteries. $n00 from the book-
makers, and $400 from the card rooms.'' Record 
told Pearce tnat he wouldn't be a party to a thing 
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of that kind. Pearce replied,. '' Alrigjht, if you ·will 
string along with us, keep things in line,. I will give 
you $165 a Inonth of it.'' Record told him that he 
didn't want to be·a party to such a thing,, and Pearce 
said, ''Alright, we will get somebody else to handle 
it.'' (96). 
Some time in the latter part of April, 1937, Holt 
went to see Ben Harmon at the Mint 27 East Sec-
?nd South. Harmon stated to Holt that he was go-
lng to put Holt back on the Vice Squad. He told 
Holt that he would work under Captain Thacker; 
that Thacker was going~ to be head of it. At the 
time of this ·conversation Holt hadn't heard from 
Finch. ( 101). 
On the first of l\tlay Finch again reorganized the 
Anti-Vice Squad, removed Record, made Captain 
Thacker the head of the Vice Squad and placed Holt 
under him. During the first few days. of May 
Holt had a conversation with Thacker at the police 
station. Thacker told Holt he was to take charge 
of the prostitution, and that he, Thacker, would 
take charge of the gambling. ( 101, 102). 
About a vveek or ten days later, and in May of 1937 
Ben Harmon called Holt on the telephone and told 
him to come over. Harmon told Holt that he 
wanted him to collect from the places of prostitu-
tion and told Holt the amounts to collect. He 
wanted Holt to pick up the money on the first of 
the month. Harmon then named the places of pros-
titution which were substantially the same as those 
mentioned to Holt by Abe Rosenblum, and after 
naming the places Harmon told him that thesr were 
the plaef\R frnm \vhich collections should be made. 
Dar Kempner had known Abe Stubeck for about 
eight or nine years. In March or Anril, it ''mig11t 
have been a little earlier or a little later,'' Kemp-
ner Sfn"\.,. s+n h(l('k R t Stnl~0ek 's -r 1HC0 of bnsine~~ 
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which is under the l>olitz Cafe at 8econd South 
and Main Street. It "~as a pool hall and eard roou1. 
Kempner had a conYersation thL\re 'vith Stubeck. 
It was some"rhere in the neig·hborhood of three 
o'clock in the afternoon. .After this conversation 
Stubeck and Kempner "~ent ~traight do"~ ~lain 
Street to the Ace BilliarLl~, loeated at 248 South 
¥all Street. Kempner "-ent in the Ace Billiards 
with Stubeck, and ~tubeck went up to a man that 
was racking pool balls on the pool tables, and asked 
that man if he had the money ready. This man 
stated that he didn't hav-e quite all of it. Stubeck 
then said, '• You had better get it in a hurry or you 
know the result.'' This man left the place and 
said, ''I -will be back right away,'' and he left the 
pool hall. When he carne back he had some cur-
rency in his hands. Stubeck just said, ''Alright,'' 
and put the money in his pocket. They then went 
out on to :llain Street, and went to the Peter Pan, 
located at 222 South Main Street. Stubeck and 
Kempner went down stairs and Kempner went to 
the fountain and got a coca-cola. Stubeck went 
into the card room. Stubeck spoke to several men 
in the card room and ':\~hen he came out he said, 
"Come on, let's go.'' As Stubeck and Kempner-
came upstairs from the Peter Pan, Stubeck took 
some currency out of his right pocket, then took 
some out of his left pocket, and put both packages 
of the currency together and folded them and put 
it all back in hjs other pocket. At that time Stu-
beck told Kempner that all card games were paying 
·off, and that some of them were trying to chisel by 
trying to give him less money than they should do. 
Kempner asked him who was paying off, and Stu-
beck said all card clubs are paying off. Kempner 
then said, "Well. what's the matter~ Who gets 
thi~ monPy~" 3}ld Stubeck said~ "Well, I take it 
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~veT to Ben Harmon's place .. " Kempnt .. : asked, 
"Well, does Ben Harmon get that money'1" ~tu­
beck replied, ''Well, he s;plits it with .bJrwin and his. 
erowd. '' These two then went to another card cluh 
·on East Second South which was in the close vicinity 
of the Wilson Hotel. The two of them entered this 
place and Stuheck walked up and started talking 
to a fellow an~ Kempner stood there watching· 
some of' the fellows playing cards. From the Wil-.. 
son Card Room Kempner and Stubeck went across. 
the street to the Mint.. As they went in Kempner 
saw Ben Hannon. Stu.heck took the money out of 
his pocket, and just as. he did that Harmon said, 
''Hello, Abe.'' Harmon was standing perhaps six 
or eigh1J ,feet from Stu beck and Kempner. Stu beck 
replied, ''Hello, Harmon,'' and took the money out 
o.f his pocket and laid it on the counter by the· 
. cashier. The nian by the cash register picked the\ 
money up and put it under the counter. 
About a month after this occurrence Ke·mpner went 
on another trip with Stubeck, but they just stopped 
at the one place, the Ace Billiards. 
On the first of June1 1937, Holt \vent around to the 
various places of prostitution mentioned in the 
Bill of Particulars, and collected sums of money 
similar to those he had collected in 1936. He took 
this money to Mr. I-Iarmon at the Mint and Harmon 
told him to take it to Pearce's office. This latter 
happened a.hout the third or fourth of June. Thct.t 
same day Holt s.aw Harmon in the Continental 
Bank Building in Mr. Pearce's office around six 
o'clock. ~Then Holt got to that office, Mr. Harmon 
and Mr. Pearce were there. The door was open 
and Holt entered the lobhv of the offire and Pearce 
'told him to come in. Holt laid the money on 
Pearce's desk Ft.lld Pearce asked him if that ''ras all 
of it. Holt replied that it 'va.R. Pearr,r then pickeo 
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up the money and put it in the dra.\YL\1' on the left 
hand side of hi~ desk. Pearce \\~as sitting behind 
the desk, and Har1non \\~a~ ~i tting in a chair to the 
left of it about. ~1x fL)et from .Pl\~u·et). 'rhere was 
about $500 in currency. Holt continued to n1ake 
collections from all of the~L) places of prostitution 
on the first of each month up until January 1, 1938. 
After this June collection, the money \Yas delivered 
to Ben Harmon, and in one or two instances 
amounts -were changed, and ne"~ plac.es for collec-
tions added. 
In the middle of the summer of 1937 at Ben Hun-
saker's home Erwin told Hunsaker that things had 
tightened up and he was hanng a hard time, es-
pecially with the \\omen's Betterment League in 
Salt Lake. He stated that they were after him and 
were ginng him a lot of trouble. ( 85). 
About the 25th of August, 1937, 0. B. Record and 
Officer Burt made an arrest in the basement of the 
Atlas Building. R.ecord did not know at that time 
who operated this place, but at the time of testify-
ing he stated that he knew that Bill Browning had 
operated it. He and Officer Burt were in full uni-
form. His attention ~.~as called to this place when 
he saw people going down and coming out of the 
basement. When he went down he saw around 
fifty to seventy men in the basement ''horse 
racing.'' He sa\\7 horse racing sheets tacked upon 
the partitions, four or five tables with horse racing 
sheets upon them, and some money on the tables. 
There was a blackboard there with t'venty or thirty 
~beets on it. He got two fellows, the keepers, and 
Rurt .!rot two tables. This arrest took place about 
1 P. M. No attention wa.s paid to Record or Burt 
until ·they got inside the building and the arrests 
were made then. Record and Sergeant Pearce, a 
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police- officer, made an arrest in the basement of 
the New Grand Hotel of some bookmakers at 32 
East F·ourth South. About the 3oth of August, 
0. B. Record had a conversation with Finch ctnd 
Finch asked him if he had complaints about these 
~particular places which he had arrested, and Record 
·said that he didn't. Finch then suggested that he 
let Thacker handle the arrests and not to interfere;. 
~that if there were any complaints of gambling to 
il.et Thacker know or Finch,- and he would see that 
it was taken care of or these places taken care of. 
(15, 16). 
In the latte·r part of the summer of 1937 Erwin had 
another conversation with Hunsaker in Ogden on 
the occasion of another payment in currency by 
Erwin to Hunsaker. Erwin said that he thought 
\the Chief of Police was. taking in a lot of money, but 
that he didn't knovv vvhether he was getting his 
right split. Erwin stated that he couldn't go down 
to Finch's office, watching him, knowing what he 
was doing, and also tending his o'vn office at .the 
same time, and Erwin stated, ''I have to take JUSt 
what he hands me and be satisfied.'' (83). 
About the latter part of Se·ptember or the first part 
of Q!ctoher, 1937, Ho:It had another conversation 
with Harmon. Harmon called him on the telephone 
and after this conversation Holt went to the Mint 
and there saw Harmon. He told Holt that Pearce 
had accused him (Holt) of holding out on him, and 
Harmon told Holt fo go to Pearce-'s office and see 
him. Holt went there and no one was there but 
Pearce. Pearce had a slip of paper with a. list of 
places on it, and Pearce asked him the amounts he 
had been collecting from the different places of 
prostitution. Pearce had some other addresses 
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and asked Holt 'Yhy there \Yas no colleetion made 
at these place~. Holt told hun tl1at these other 
addresses "-ere rL~sidences, and that the girls 
weren't making· a living out of it, and Holt told 
him that he wouldn •t collect ironl them. ...:-\.fter they 
had talked a while Pearce said that it \Yas alright, 
and that he thought Holt \Yas doing a fine job and 
llolt left. (103, 104). 
During the summer of 1937 and in the fall of that 
year, Early had conversation mth both Erwin and 
Finch, in which he ~tated to them that there were 
rumors of a rice pay-off. Both of them asserted 
that they had not heard anything about it, Finch 
saying there had been no reports from the Depart-
ment. In connection with these conversations and 
the others which Early had had with Finch and 
Erwin, he had advised them that they were in-
volved. However, in the summer of 1937 nothing 
was said as to who was involved when Early talked 
to Erwin. (27, 28). 
D. L. Hnys. about Xovember, 1937. had a conversa-
tion with Finch in Finch's office. Hays said to 
Finch, ''Yon must know that gambling is going on 
in these places, either under -r;rotection or without 
regard to law." Finch state.d ~'Yes, I know that 
gambling is goin~ on here.'' Hays then a~ked him 
what he was going to do about it and Finch replied 
that he was not ~oing to do anything about it. 
In Dec.Pmbr?:r of 1937, in a conversation with Hun-
saker, Erwin stated that if Hunsaker pressed him 
for this money he would take bankruptcy, and on 
this occasion Erwin also said that if they g1ot hot 
on his trail because of the things he was doing in 
Salt Lake, he would resign as Mayor. This. con-
versation was on the last occasion of Mr. Erwin 
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paying Hunsaker In currency on the note hereto-
fore mentioned. 
·Also in a conversation with Hunsaker in Deceruuer,. 
Erwin stated that he didn't think any of the com-
missioners were getting any money; that he didn't. 
think Finch w.as getting anything,_ and he stated,. 
"I don't think I am getting .anything myself.'' 
Erwin also stated at that time that he didn't think 
that at that time there was .any graft going on in 
Salt Lake City.. ( 89, 91, 92). 
,The festimony of Hunsaker also was to the effect 
'that ErWin, during every month from July of 1936 
(to December of 1937, traveled to Ogden to make the-
$200.00 payments on the note, and these payments 
were made in currency on each oecasion. 
E. A. Hedman was Captain of Polir:e and in chargP 
of the Detective Bureau at the Police Station dur .. 
ing the years 1936 and 1937. Soon after Christmas 
of 1937, Captain Hedman was called to Finch's. 
office. When he arrived Finch, Thacker, 0. B. 
Record, and another officer were there. Finch 
stated that Mr. Thacker seemed to have a griev.-
ance. Thacker said that he wanted to know why 
Hedman had ordered a raid on a ga1nbling place 
at an address West on Fourth South. Hedman re· 
plied that he hadn't ordered the raid but that it 
had been made by the Detective Bureau, but 
couldn't see what difference it made 'vho ordered 
the raid. Thacker then replied that he had to know 
about these raids. Hedman then wanted to know 
'vhat Thacker expected him to do. Thacker told 
him to write it down and leave it on hi~ desk; that 
is, any information relative to gambling-. Hedman 
stated "What if the condition come~ un such as 
' thiR c:1.me up, that you ·w·cren 't here' The natur(' 
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of it \Yas that it had to be taken care of immediate-
ly. \Yhat 'vill I do then~" '.L.llal'l\.l'l' r~..:plil\d, · · 1 ou 
still put it in an tnYeLJlH-\ <Uld ll\aYt\ u. on 1uy lll\~k 
and I "ill take care of it.'· Heilluau then told him 
that if there "·ere a robbery or burg'lary going on 
he wanted Thacker to take care of it, and 1'hacker 
replied that that \\-as a differl:~nt 1uatter. . ..\.11 during 
this con\er~ation, Finch didn "t say anything at all. 
Holt had a conversation ''ith Ben Harmo1.1 about 
the 20th or December, 1937. and Harmon "·anted 
Holt to collect from Sally Bennett at 123 \~Vest 
Third South, which. "-a~ a house of ·prostitution. 
Holt told him that he thought he had enough to do, 
and that he didn't "\\ant to collect from there. 
Harmon told him that he -would get somebody else 
to do it . 
. A.t this point it might be well to point out the fact 
that the -witnesses, D. L. Hays, \\~illiam Scott, and 
Henry \. Gosling testified that during practically 
all of the years of 1936 and 1937, gambling~ places 
were running wide open. The witness Hays de-
scribed the operation of the card rooms known as 
the Pastime Club, Bank Sn1oke Shop, \~.,.jlson Card 
Room, Peter Pan, The Horseshoe, The Mint, Abe 
Stubeck's place, and the P.~ce Billiards. Thjs wit-
ness testified as to the method of operation, stat-
ing that there was generally a man with a money 
~pron on in thePe rlac~~ and that chips "vYere bought 
from him, and afte-r a player was through, .he 
would cash tl1~m in and receive the money for them. 
He testified that no identification cards were ever 
required for a.dmittanee to these p~laces. 
\\i11iam Scott testified to the operation of certain 
dice games, one located at 351~ West Second Soutn. 
He told of a.n incident in 19-37 in which Thac~er 
went into this place 'vhile the game was in opera-
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tion and the players continued to play. He also 
testified to seeing gambling conducted at The Mint. 
Scott testified to visiting the basement of the Atlas 
Building in the spring of 1937 ; that he there saw 
equipment apparently used for horse race betting, 
heard announcements over the loud-speaker of dif-
ferent races at different tracks; that he saw bet-
ting and described the operations there rather 
fUlly. H testified that all of these pl.aces were 
running wide open and that it required no identi-
fic.ation card for admittance. 
The witnesses Margaret Newman and Sadie Alder 
testified to conducting houses of prostitution here 
in Salt Lake City. They also testified to making 
payments to Officer Holt. Bobbie Carlton testi-
fied to serving as an inmate in various houses of 
prostitution during the year 1937. 
Holt also testified that all these houses which were 
mentioned in the Bill of Particulars furnished by 
the State had the reputation of being houses of 
prostitution. 
It should be kept in mind by the Court that all of 
these illegal activities were being~ conducted in Salt 
Lake City in the manner described by thes.e wit-
nesses while the defendants were performing the 
acts and ;making the clecJarniion~ heretof'ore re-
lated. Also attention is here called to the fact that 
Fisher Hnrris, vvho \vas thr- City Attorney for Salt 
Lake City
1 
eommP,nrinQ· n hn,,t in Aug11st, 19~7 was 
conducting- an investig'a.tinn in which he visited lof .. 
teries, card games, and other places of vice. 
Returnin~ to thP chronological statement of fartR. 
Holt teRHfied that he m.a.de the rounds of the 
houses of prostitution on January 1, "1938, and 
turned t>ver tl1e p~roePeds to Ben Harmon. Around 
n bont. the lOth of' .January, 1938, Fishrr Harris 
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Galled Pearce for a. nH'l'ting in Harold B. LA\l\ 's 
office. ....\ convers-ation ensnl''d at w·hieh wc..'rc..\ pre..\~~ 
ent Fisher Harris. l\':l,rre and Lc..\e. ..::\..t'ter ~unH~ in-
consequential Or preliininary IUattc..'l'S of g1.•l\eting, 
etc., Harris said, ":Jlr. Pearee. I haYc..' been 1naking 
an in\esti~tion of the illeg:n.l a.ctixities in Salt 
Lake City and the official connection "i th then1 
and the pay-off that I have found existed.'· Harris 
further told him that he had made an investigation 
and had found certain illegal acti'i. ties and a pay-
off situation. He then told Pearc~ that he knew 
of his relationship with it and told Pearce that the 
principal thing he wa~ interested in was the offi-
cial connection -with thi~ situation; that is, the per-
sons in the official body of the city who were con-
nected with it. He then told Pearc€ that he knew 
of his relation with this situation; that he was in-
volved in it with }Ir. Harn1on and others and that 
·he thought it would be to his interest to make a full 
and complete di~losure of all he knew about it. 
When Harris first said this ).Ir. Pearce sat there 
and said nothing; "he sat there licking his lips.'' 
He did this for two or thrr-'e minutes or more and 
then ultimately said, "\\~ho says I am involved in 
this thing~'' Harris s~id, ''Dick, I am not at liberty 
'to tell you precisely, but I vrill tell you the names 
of some of the persons \Ybo say you are involved.'' 
Harris went on to erumeratP. the names of about 
15 different persons, and among them and about 
in the middle of those mentioned was the name of 
H. K. Record. Pearce said, ''Wen, Mr. Record 
might say this about me because he has it in for 
"Mn." Harr1~ t"!l~n nointed out to Pearce that he 
had not said that H. K. Record was one of them 
and asked Pearce whv he picked him out .. Pearc(} 
~tated that it was because he had it in for him. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
28 
Pearce then said "Well, maybe I can help you 
stop this pay-off situat,ion. '' Harris wanted to 
kno)V how he could do this, and. Pearce said that 
he could do it by talking to Ben Harmon· that he 
was his attorney. Harris then asked J!ear~e not to 
s·peak to Ben Harmon about thi8 conversation. 
(142, 143). 
Around about the middle of January, 1938,, Harmon 
called Holt on the telephone and asked him to pick 
him up on First South and Regent Street. Holt 
picked ·him up at the appointed place and Hanuon 
asked him to drive over to the west side of town, 
~hich Holt did. Out along 4th .or 5th North and 
down by the Union P.acific tracks~ Holt stopped 
the automobile and parked there for a minute. 
Harmon said, "For God's sake, don't take any n1ore 
collections whatever, hecau8e l\1r. Harris and Mr. 
Lee have ~ot hold of Mr. Pearce and accused hin1 
of being in the pay-off. ~:-or God's sake, see that 
there is no more of it. Don't take anything fron1 
anybody because it might blow over.'' (121-123). 
The day after the conversation between Pearce and 
Harris, Harris called Pea.rce on the telephone and 
said, ''Dick, I am sorry you have taken the attitude 
that you have in regard t.o this thing. You 1nay 
think it is clever to say nothing, hut I think it is 
not to your interest to take . tha.t attitude. I think 
you ought to make a full and complete disclosure.'' 
Pearce replied, ''Why should I talk to you~'' 
Harris said, '' Becaus.e if yon don't. you a.re going' 
to be indicted a.s sure as hell.'' Pearce then said 
he would call Harris in the next day or two. A 
few days :after this, Pearce not having called, 
Harris called him again and Prarec sn i d, ''I tolrl 
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you some other ti1ue.'' 
At about this same time, .Fi~her Harri~ had a con .. 
rersation "ith Frank rrhacker. This conversation 
with Thacker \Ya~ limited to the dL:\fendant present 
and will not be here set out, although it becomes 
important in one of the a~sigmnents of miscon-
duct made by the defenda11ts. On the sa1ne day of 
the conversation with Thacker. Harris also had a 
talk with Finch. Finch telephoned Harris and told 
him that he understood that Harris had been 
accusing him of all sorts of crookedness, and an 
appointment was made for ~- o'clock in the after-
noon on that same day. ..:it the appointed time 
Finch appeared in Harris' office and stated that he 
understood Harris had accused Thacker of all sorts 
of crookedness. Harris replied that he had told 
Mr. Thacker that there was all kinds of illegal 
activities in operation running in Salt I..ak:e City, 
in connivance with the Police Department. Finch 
replied that he thought the town was being run 
pretty well. Harris told him that he wouldn't 
have any argument with him on matters of judg .. 
ment as to how the town should be rnn, but he di~ 
not think anybody would claim that public officials 
~hould personally profit from jlll'}gal activities. 
Finch replied that for the last 30 years he had been 
hearing stories about pay-off in Salt Lake City, 
and didn't know how to pre-vP-nt such sto· i:")~. Harris 
stated, ''Harry, in regard to that, maybe the least 
that anyone can do, or maybe the most, is to see 
that those stories are not true, but in this case the 
stories are true and public officials are p:rofiting 
from illegal activities in Salt Lake City.'' Harris 
then went on to enumerate the illegal activities 
which were being carried on, including dice games., 
pool ga .. mes, houses of prostitution, bookmaking 
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~stablishments and Chinese lotteries.. Finch re-
plied that he didn't see how anything of that sort 
could be done. He told Harris that they· had col-
lected $2,000 in fines from gambling in Salt Lake 
City during the past year. Harris 1·eplied, "Mr .. 
Finch, one man pays graft protection money of 
$3,600 a year, one man alone, and you talk about 
getting $2,000 for Salt Lake City. Here is one· 
group of peo·ple who pay $6,000 a year for protec-
tion money and you talk about getting $2,000 for 
Salt Lake City. Here is another group that pays 
$7,200 a ye:ar. Here are card rooms - I haven't 
figured it up exactly - but they pay thousands of 
dollars, a year; and here are the pr<?stitution houses. 
paying thousands of dollars a year, and you talk 
about getting $2·,ooo for Salt Lake City, when a11 
this money is going 'into the hands of puhlic offi-
cials and peo:pJe interested in them in the under-
world." Mr. Finch replied that he thought the 
town was run pretty well and that was about ali 
of that conversation. !Ir. Finch did not at any 
time ask the name of any p,erson involved and did 
not ask Harris to give him the name of any person 
that was involved during any of this ronver~ation. 
(135-137). 
On J anua.ry 15, 1938, Harris prepared and deliYerrd 
to Erwin's office a letter which was marked Ex-
hibit R, but because of the obje-ction of the defend-
ants this letter was not admitted in evidence and 
was not read to the jury. January 15th was, on a 
Saturday and the letter "\vas delivered at abont. ~2 
o 'clork. Abont 1 or 2 o 'elork that nfter11oon, Erwin 
called Harris by p.hone and stated that he had re-
ceived the letter which bad been left. n t his offirr 
and that it presented an intereRtin~· situation; tha.t 
he had never heard anything likP. that before. 
Er,vin said that pPrhaps th0~,. Rhould discuss the 
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letter, and Harris replied that he "·ould be g~lad to 
confer with Erwin at any tin1e. Er,Yin fixed the 
meeting at 1:30 on Monday and Harris said he 
would be there. ~\.t thi~ n1eeting on Monday, Jan-
uary 14th, certain routine matters of city business 
were discussed, and finally Erwin said, ''Now, 
about this letter of yours. You sny all these places 
are operating.'' Harris replied that there was no 
doubt about it. Erwin then asked if Harris thought 
they ought to pay Salt Lake City for the privilege 
of operating. Harris replied that he did not, but 
that if they were permitted to operate at all, and 
if anything was paid on account of them, he would 
suppose that the amount should be paid to Salt 
Lake City as a part of the expense of their regula .. 
tion. Erwin then asked what Harris supposed they 
should pay in that event. At that time the letter 
was in front of them. 
Harris pointed out that the lotteries then paid 
$500.00 a month protection money and that he 
would assume they would be willing to pay some-
thing less than that, and he named some figure 
less than $500.00. He then pointed out that the 
bookmakers were then paying $600.00 a month and 
that he supposed they would be willing to pay 
$500.00. Harris next enumerated the card rooms 
and said that t.hey were paying from $50.00 to 
$100.00 a month each, and that the houses of 
prostitution were naying from $50.00 to $1'25.00 
a month, and that the dice ·games were then paying 
$300.00 a month. He enumerated all of the illegal 
activities which "\Yere mentioned in his letter. As 
he was enumeratinP-" these various placs and these 
various amounts~ the Mayor was making notation~ 
in pencil on the letter. After completing this 
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enumeration Erwin stated that these amounts came 
to $19,000 as Harris remembered it. Erwin said, 
''They s.ay all these people pay off~'' Harris re-
plied, ''Yes,'' .and Erwin said, ''You don_'t say.'' 
Erwin then wanted to know if Harris thought it 
would be right if he should ask the Chief of Police, 
Mr. Finch, to hereafter collect the amounts from 
each of these places which Harris had mentioned. 
Harris replied that he didn't believe that anybody 
who knew anything about the work he had done 
which had resulted in this report would be willing 
to have Finch continue in office, and E.r"'"in said 
as he left, ''Well, we will talk about· that some 
other time.'' During this conversation Erwin uid 
not at any time inquire a.s t.o who ulti1na.telr re-
ceived this money and did not ask Harris where 
he had obtained the information. 
On January 18th Erwin appeared in Harris' office 
and said, ''There were questi6ns I ought to have 
asked you yesterday.'' Harris told him that he 
would be glad to answer any question which . he-
cared to ask him concerning the matter of thi~ 
discussion. Erwin then stated, ''You say in your 
letter that you _know who collects this money, this 
pay-off." Harris replied that he did, and Erwin 
asked who it was. Harris then enumerated certain 
na1nes and Erw1n made some notations in a little 
note·~)ook which he had. As Ervrin started ta 
leave, he said, ''You say all these places pay off, 
p~ay pro1:e~ction money~" Harris told l~i1n. there 
was no question about that at all, and Erwin re-
plied, ''·Well, they wouldn't feel natural if th~Y 
weren't paying off to somebody, and what dif-
ference does it make who gets it~" Erwin left 
the office. In f.his conversation Erwin did not 
ask who ultimately g:ot the pay-off. (130, 131). 
On January 20, l93R, a conference "rR ~ held at t~e 
Alta Club, at 'vhich were present Finch, Erwin, 
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H. B. Heal, editor of the ~alt Lake Tribune, Le .. 
Roy Bourne, eltitvr ot the ~alt. Lake 'l'elegr<un, l\l r. 
A. L. Fish, newspaper nuu1, und l1'i~hL~r liarris. 
Harris "'"as the L.l~t to c.u·l.-i,·e and he arrived 
there at about 2 o'clock. ...\11 of the other gentle-
men were seated at a table about three feet in 
width and six or seven feet long. Mr. Fish sat 
at one end of the table a.nd :llr. Er,\·in at the other. 
Harris sat at the eorner of the table by Fish. 
Bourne was on Harris' right, Heal was at Erwin's 
right, and Finch "W"as on the other side of the table 
f1om the corner "W"here Harris sat. nlr. Fish stated 
that he had heard rumors of an investig-ation made 
·in regard to underworld activities and official- cor-
ruption reh1.ting to them, and he demanded to know 
what it was }lll about. He made this demand par-
ticularly upon Hartis and asked hiln if he had made 
such in\estigation. Harris answered that he had 
and that he had made a complete report of the 
matter to Erwin in writing. 
Fish then asked Harris if he knew what illegal 
activities were in operation and he said that he 
did. He asked Harris to enumerate them, and Harris 
did, enumemting those placels whieh h'ave here-
tofore been mentioned in the conversations of 
Harris, giving the amount that each kind_ of activity 
paid. Fish then asked, ''Do you know who gets this 
money and to whom it is finally distributed~'' 
Harris replied that he knew and u-pe>n being asked 
who it was, replied, ''E. B. Erwin gets $750.00 a 
month; Harry Finc11 gets $500.00 per month, the 
amount collected.'' At this time Finch and Erwin 
were both at the table, Finch being about two and 
one-half feet distant and Erwin five feet from 
Harris. Neither one of them said anytbing at the 
time this statement was made. At various times 
during the conversation both Erwin and Finch re-
marked that this was the first time they had ever 
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.heard of any pay-off situation in Salt Lake City .. 
After Mr. Finch had said this at least three times~ 
I-Iarris turned to him and said,, "Harry, don't say 
that ag1ain." Finch said, 4 'Why not~" And Harris 
replied, '''Because it isn't so.'' Mr. Erwin suggested. 
1that Finch should resign and :F'inch said that he 
would resig1n the next day. 
During this conversation Fish asked Harris how 
long this situation had been going on and Harris 
said to his knowledg;e that it had been going on 
lsince the last of 1937 and that it had been going 
·on before that, but that was the scope of his then 
investiga.tion. A suggestion came from Harris that 
Mr. Finch be allowed to resign under such cir-
cumstances; that it v1ould not publicly appear 
that it was on account of these charges that he 
ha.s just made. No one opposed the idea. (144 
to 146). 
From the testimony oi Finch .and 0. B. Record, it 
is submitted that it can he safely said that after the 
meeting at the Alta Club Finch returned to thr 
' . Police Station and called in various persons, 111 .. 
cl uding Hoi t and Thacker, and asked them certain 
questions with a view of their bein[! witnesses for 
Finch. On January 21st, Mr. Harris attended a 
meeting of the City Commission at which Erwin 
was pres.ent .and the other City Commissioners, 
George B. Keyser, P'a.t Goggin and Mr~ Murdoch .. 
During this meeting Commissioner Keyser, at 
the time when they were discussing the subject 
matter of the letter, Exhibit R, said, ''You received 
from the City Attorney s.everal days a~o a letter 
addressed to the Board of Commissioners in re-
gard to this m"atter. '' Keyser demanded that Er· 
·win produce this letter and Erwin thereupon pro-
duced it. This. particular meeting 'vas the fift}t 
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meeting since the letter had been given to Erwin. 
(131 and 13~). 
On this same day F'inch sent his attorney, :b""'red-
erick C. Loofbouro"? to the City Commission to 
inform them that he, Finch would not resign. 
After being so informed the City Conuuission dis .. 
charged Chief Finch and the following is contained 
in the minutes of the City Commission for J·an .. 
uary 21, 1938: 
4 ~ Hesolved that the good of the service will 
be subserved by the immediate remo'Val 
from office of Harry L. Finch as Chief of 
Police of Salt Lake City; and accordingly 
Mr. Keyser moved that his employment 
as such be and is hereby terminated, effect- · 
ive this date, which motion carried; all 
members present \oted 'ayes' except Mr. 
Erwin, who voted 'n3:y'. '' (Sup. 2). 
On January 22, 1938 ~Ir. Erwin's attorney, Ralph 
Stewart, delivered to Fisher Harris a letter signed 
by Erwin which was marked as Exhibit S and 
admitted in evidence. This letter was dated March 
15, 1938 and was addressed to the Board of City 
Commissio,ners. It stated that Mrs. Erw·in had 
been in ill health for some time, necessitating Er-
win taking her on various occasions to California 
and that he could not devote his time to city busi-
ness. It also stated that there had been a failure 
of harmony in the Commission and Erwin felt un--
able to contend with the problems of the Publie 
Safety Department to which he was assigned and 
that his resignation and the appointment of some 
one else would result in more hannony and he 
hoped his successor would have the Commission's 
support. This was a letter in which Erwin re .. 
·signed as Mayor and City Commissioner. This 
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letter w.as not delivered to the City Commission, but 
was delivered to the Uity Recorder in a Stealed en-
velope and put in the safe for Harris. 
At a later date another res1g:nation from Erwiu was 
received by the City Commission. J'rhis letter was 
admitted in evidence and marked Exhibit T. It 
was dated February 5, 193~ at Los Angeles, Cal-
ifornia and was addressed to the City Commission 
and was signed by Erwin. '11his letter called atten-
tion to the fact that in his campaign the reorganiza. 
tion of the financial department was an issue. In 
this letter Erwin stated that his experience was 
:along business lines of that kind and that if he 
had anticipated app-ointment to the Public Safety, 
he would not have sought election; that he had 
tried to avoid this appointn1ent. He said that 
recognizing the rumors attendant on previous. admin-
istrations 'in that department he had disregarded 
political pressure and selected Mr. Finch as a man 
\Vell known to the Commis.sion and recognized as 
above rep1roach and in whom he had confidence and 
felt that he could leave that department to those in 
·charge and devote himself to other and more im-
portant problems of the city. He said that he had 
tried to procure reorg1aniza.tion so that he could 
he relieved of the depa1·tmen t. That his services 
on the Commission had not heen pleasant, but had 
'been made difficult. HP ~aid that the Commis-
sion had abolished the office of manager and had 
removed the Chief and tha.t he felt he should re-
sign. Fisher Harris stated that he demanded the 
resignation of Mayor E. B. Erwin. (146 to 148). 
IThe facts he-retofore stated by counsel for the 
State are facts vvhich apnea.r in ~vidence and which 
the jury con 1 d have hf•lieved beyond a reasonable 
doubt. We havr not presented in this statement of 
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fact much of the eYidL\nee \Yllieh wa8 iutrodnl'ed 
_by the re~pectiYe ttell\lH:i.ants. ~nl'll t\\ iden~e 
would only create a eonrllcc ~o 1a1· a:::; the eou-
sideration of thi~ ea:::;e 1~ eoueelnt\d l}Y this Court. 
The conflicts in eYldence mu~t be re~olYeli in t'avor 
·of the State. 
Counsel for the State has not attenlp,ted to argue 
the inferences which might be dra.\Yn from the fore-
going evidence and has not made a comparison be .. 
tween certain facts which would be helpful in de-
termining the guilt of these defendants. A.s an ex-
ample of this latter, "-e call attention to the fact 
that before Holt "Was discharged from the Anti-Vice 
Squad in lrarch of 193 7, ~'inch called him in and 
told him he ''as going to remove him. Also, in 
January, according to Finch he had told Holt 
of certain rumors about Holt to the effect that 
Holt had been collecting money. \\:hen it came to 
the discharge of H. K. Record from the Anti-Vice 
Squad, Finch stated that he had been told by anum-
ber of individuals that Record was interested in a 
dice game. Finch, ho\\ever, in this instance, did 
not communicate with H. K. Record and advise him 
of these rumors or tell H. K. that he was going to 
remove him. Such notification only came from a 
notice which was posted on the Police Bulletin 
Board. 
To look at one fact alone, one might say that it 
meant nothing, bnt when considered with the back-
ground of the other facts introduced in this case, 
Finch's actions with respect to the removal of these 
two men point to the fact that he was involved in 
the conspiracy alleged in the indictment. 
Two briefs have been :filed in this case by the de-
fendants. One on behalf of the defendants Pearce 
and· Finch, and the other on behalf of the defendant 
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Erwin. The matters contained in the two briefs 
are in most instances upon different subjects. 
Counsel for the State will attempt to meet each of 
the points raised by these b·rief s, starting with the 
questions relating to the pleading:s, then the admis-
sibility of evidence, then the sufficiency thereof, and 
then the claim of misconduct on the part of the 
State's attorneys .. 
STATE1MENT OF POINTS INVOLVED 
·,The State has followed very closely the subdivisions, 
contained in the briefs of the defendants herein~ 
~The following is the order in which they are here 
:pres en ted : 
1. The indictment is this case states facts 
sufficient to constitute a public offense, 
both under the common law and the stat-
utes in this State previous to 193.5, and also 
within the provisions of the Code of Crim-
inal Procedure found in the Laws of Utahr 
1935. 
2. The Bill of Particulars. 
3. Overt .act~ were alleged and proved .. 
4. Admissibility of Evidence. 
(a) Classification No. 1. 
(h) Classification No. 2. 
(c) Classification No. 3. 
(d) Classification No. 4. 
5. The testimony of the accomplice Holt 
,,ra.s sufficiently corroborated. 
G. Even though evidence was admitted of· 
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different and sn1nller eonspirnciL)s, no error 
w-as committed. 
7. The doctrine of rL\s judicata is not ap-
plicable to this ease. 
S. There were no improper statenH?·nts 
or conduct of the District ~-\..ttorney per-
mitted or allowed, and eYen though such is 
found to exist they were not. prejudicial 
error or re\ersible. 
9. The court did not admit improper mat-
ters of endence. 
10. The court did not err in refusing re-
quests and in giving certain instructions. 
11. Sufficiency of 'the evidence. 
12. In order to justify a reversal the error 
~;.1ust actually prejudice the defendants. 
I 
THE L'DICT}IE~T IX THIS CASE STATES 
FAC.TS SlJ~FICIEXT TO CONSTITUTE A 
PUBLIC OFFE)~SE, BOTH lJNDER THE 
CO:JIMON LA\r _) .. '·;D STATL'TES IN THIS 
STATE, PREVIOUS TO 1935, AND ALSO 
WITHIN THE PRO\:~SIOXS OF THE CODE 
OF CRlltfiXAL PROCEDURE FOUND IN 
THE I .. .L~ \\ .. S OF UTAH, 1935. 
The indictment in this case was based upon the 
indictment found in the case of 
People v. Tenerswicz, 266 :\fich. 276; 253 
N. ·w. 296. (1934). 
A comparison of the two indictments will show that 
they follow each other very closely. In that cas.e 
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the- defendants on appeal contended that said ill 
dictment did not state a public. offense and thf 
court overruled such contention and upheld thr 
sufficiency of the indictment. This indictment a.l 
leges a violation of 
Section 103-11-1, Revised Statutes of Utah~. 
1933. 
rfhe material parts of which section provide: 
''If two or more persons conspire: ( 1) To 
conunit a crime or . . . . (5) To commit 
any act injurious to public health, to pruh-
lic morals, or to trade or commerce or for 
' the perversion or obstruction of justice or 
the due administration of the laws; --- they 
are punishable by imprisonment in the 
county jail not exceeding one year, or by 
fine not exceeding $1,000. '' 
;This indictment clearly alleges the violation of this 
statute. It alleges that the appealing defendants, 
together with Ben Harmon, Frank Thacker, and 
other p,ersons to the Grand Jury' unknown, conspired 
to pennit, ,allow, assist and enable hous~s of ·ill .. 
fame and lotteries, dice games, slot machines, book-
making and other gambling devices, and games of 
chance to be kept, maintained and operated at var1 .. 
ous places in Salt Lake City, the defendants then 
and there knowing that such places were be,ing 
kep,t, maintained and opera.ted in Salt Lake City in 
violation of the ~tatutes of the State of Utah and 
the O-rdinances of Salt Lake City. This contains 
an allegation of the agreement betvveen the defend· 
ants. Certainly no argument is necessary to sus· 
tain the proposition that they conspired to com· 
mit crimes and to commit acts injurious to publio 
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morals and for the pervL\rsion or obstruction o1 
justice or the due administration 01 the la.ws of the 
State of utah. 
\Y e also respectfully call the attention of thi8 Court 
to the provisions of 
Section 105-:21-S~ Chapter 11~. La,ys of 
l~tah, 1935, 
which provides that an indictment 1nay charg;e, and 
is valid and sufficient if it charges the offense for 
which the defendant is being prosecuted by using 
the name gi\en to the offense by the common law 
or by a statute, or by stating so much of the defini .. 
tion of the offense~ either in terms of the common 
law or of the State defining the offense or in terms 
of substantiall, the same meaning, as is sufficient 
to gi\e the court and the defendant notice of what 
is intended to be charged. This section further 
provides that the indictment may refer to a see-. 
tion or subsection of any statute creating the 
offense charged therein, and that in determining tlie 
validity or sufficiency of such information or 1 n-
dictment regard shall be l1ad to such reference. 
The indictment in the present case accuses the de-
fendants of the crime of '' Criminal Conspiracy in 
Violation of Title 103, Chapter 11, Section 1, Re 
vised Statutes of Utah, 1933." See alf~o reference 
to Section 105-21-47 of said Chapter 118, wherein 
certain forms are· suggested and the statute proJ 
'vides that such forms may be used in cases in whici1 
they are applicable. The following is there~'P 
contained: 
. ''Conspiracy --- A. B. and C. D. conspired 
together to murder E. F. (or to steal the 
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property of E. F. or to rob E .. :b'., as the 
case may be). 
In the case of 
State v. Smith, 56 R. I .. 168; 184 Atl. 494 
(1936}z 
the. defenants were convicted of conspiracy. The-
indictment in the case charged that the defendants 
/On July 1, 1932 .and on divers other dates between 
then and Frebruary 30,. 193.3 ''did fraudulently and 
unla vv!ully conspire together to steal the property 
of the National Providence Worsted Mills, a Rhod~ 
Island corporation . . . . '' Defendants contended 
that this indictment did not advise them of thfr 
nature and cause of the accusation agains,t them 
and that it failed to charge any crime sufficient to 
enable them to plead their conviction or acquittal 
thereon as a defense to any subsequent prosecution. 
The statutes of Rhode Island in relation to criminaJ 
pleadings are similar to thos.e found in the Laws 
'Of U ta.h, 1935, and they set out the identical sug· 
geRted form for conspiracy. The defendants con-
tended that this indictment and also the statutes 
violated rights secured to them by both the U. S. 
Constitution and the Constitution of the State of 
Rhode Island. The Rhode Island constitutional 
provisions are set forth and are similar to thos~ 
found in the Utah Constitution. The Court up-
held the sufficiency of the indictment and held that 
there was no constitutional violation either by thP 
.indictment or the statutes relating to criminal 
p1leadings. 
The Court recognized the power of the !_legislature 
to change, modify or prescribe the forms or man-
ner of s,tating a cha.rge. The State Constitutional 
:provisions reqU!ire ih~ n;atUJre \and ·cause o~ the 
accusation and a sufficient identification thereof 
to prevent a subsequent prosecution. The court 
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points out that charging the defendants with con-
spiracy inforn1s then1 of the nature l)f the- erinlP and 
that alleging- that tlll)Y ron~~pired to stl'al sufficiently 
sets forth the cause of the accnsa tion, and points out 
that the great weight of an thori ty is that an indict-
ment need not set forth the obj(:~et of the conspiracy 
with the particularit:- required "~hen the ind!ict-
:ment charges the collllllission of the crime. This 
Court also holds that where the object is unlawful, 
neither the n1E~1ns intended to accomplish the object 
of the conspiracy nor its ~uccpssful accomplishment 
need be alleged. 
Counsel for the State has been unable to find any 
case which holds the so-called short form indict-
ment statutes unconstitutional or indictments com-
plying theremth insufficient. See 
People '· Brady, 272 ill. 401; 112 N. E. 
126; Ann. Cs. 1918 C. 540 ( 1916). 
People v. Bocdanoff, 254 K.Y. 16; 171 N.E. 
890; 69 A. L. R. 1378 (1930). 
State v. Roy, 40 :K. 11. 397; 60 Pac. (2d) 
646. 
· State v. Engler, 217 _Iowa 138; 251 N. W. 
88. 
State v. Keturokis, 224 Iowa 491; 276 
N. W. 600 (1937). 
Hurd \. Commonwealth 159 Va. 880 · 165 
' ' S. E. 536. 
))ealy v. United States, 152 TJ. S. 539; 38 
L. Ed. 545; 14 Sup. Ct. 680 (1893). 
State v. Continental Purchasing Company, 
Inc., 119 N. J. L. 257; 195 .A.tl. 827 
(1938). 
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People v. Busiek,. 32 Cal. App .. (2d) 315; 89 
Pac. (2d) 657 (1939). 
State v. Don1anski, 57 Rhode Island 500;. 
190 Atl. 854 ( 1937). 
State v. Capaci, 179 La. 462; 143 So. 417. 
Rosenberg v. State, 212 ·Wis. 434; 249 N. W. 
541 (1933). 
,Counsel in no place points out any essential allega-
tion which is not co-ntained in the inldictment and 
so we are left in the dark as to what it is that should 
have been alleged in the indictment, but was. left out. 
In one place in their brief they indicate that the~ 
indictment contains no allegation of the means, by 
which the defendants were to effeet the object of 
the conspiracy. As pointed out in the Smith case 
above, and the following cases, it is clearly the la~w· 
:that the allegation of means is unnecessary nuder-
the facts as alleged in the present indictment. 
Froberk v. United States, 249 U. S. 204; 
63 L. Ed. 561; 39 Sup. Ct. 219 (1918). 
Archer v. State, 145 Md. 12B; 125. Atl. 744 
(1924). 
Commonwealth v. Donaghue, 250 Ky. 343; 
63 s. w. (2d) 3 (1933). 
People v. Schneider, 345 Ill. 410; 178 N. E. 
84 (1931). 
It is submitted that under the foregoing authorities 
that both under common law and under the short 
form indictment statute of this State, the indict-
ment states a public offense, that is, an offense in 
violation of 
Section 103-11-1, Revised Statutes of Utah, 
193it 
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u. 
THE BILL OF P ... \R.TICUL.A.RS 
No contention has beeJl made by the State that the 
indictment "-as, or could be cured by the Bill of 
Particulars. The indictment in this case under the 
foregding authorities ,,-as sufficient. Th~ State 
· also concedes that the Bill of Particulars is not a 
part of the indictment. 
Section 105-21-9, Chapter 118, Laws of 
Utah, 1935, 
provides that upon demand of the defendant, the 
court may order the "prosecuting attorney" to fur-
nish a Bill of Particulars. This procedure was 
followed in this case. Counsel states on Page 9 of 
the ErWin brief that the order that a Bill of Par-
ticulars be furnished was an admission on the part 
of the court and the State that the indictment was 
insufficient. A. contention such as this can only be 
characterized as silly. 
The conspiracy in this case was an agreement to 
enable and assist houses of prostitution and gamb-
ling games to be operated. The means that were to 
be used in effecting this conspiracy are not an 
essential element of the conspiracy charg2d, accord-
ing to the authorities heretofore cited. Defend-
ants, however, demand to know the means and that 
the State set them forth in the Bill of Particulars. 
Such Bill of Particulars did not attempt to aid the 
indictment by furnishing an essential alleg1ation. 
It merely set forth evidence which the State would 
introduce to establish the commission of the crime 
of conspiracy a~ charged in the indictment. 
The same thing may be said of the particularizing 
of the houses of ill-fame, gambling establishments 
and the names of those making collections. Allega-
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(ions of such evidence are not required to be in the 
indictment by any of the authorities which we have 
been able to find. rrhe conspiracy alleged was not 
to enable a certain house or establishment to oper-
ate, but generally to permit all such houses or estah .... 
lishments to operate. The defendants desired to. 
know what evidence the State would rely upon with 
respect to particular houses that were permitted to 
operate and upon order of the court, the State fur-
nished such particulars. The State furnished par-
ticulars of the crime alleged in the indictment. 
The p~osition of the State is simply this: The in~ 
dictment charged a conspiracy to enable and assist 
houses of ill-fame and gambling es.tablishments to 
operate in violation of law and the Bill of Partic-
ulars particularized some of the evidence requested 
by thP defendants, upon which the State would 
rely to prove the commission of the crime charged 
in the indictment. In the case of 
Peop1le v. Bogdanoff, supra, 
the indictment merely alleged tha.t the defendant 
committed the crime of murder. A Bill of Partic-
ulars was then furnished alleging the name of .the 
victim and that he had been shot and killed by the 
defendant on a certain date in a certain county. 
The defendant contended that the attornev for the 
State could have charged any murder ~nd could 
have proven a different crin1e than that contained 
in the indictment. It is submitted that the indict .. 
1nent in this case did away \\rith any such conten-
tion. Ho,vever, in the Bo§rdanoff case thP Court 
held tha.t it was apparent from the evidence tha.t 
there was only one crime intended to he charged 
by the Grand Jury and that was the one set fortl1 
]n the Bill of Particulars. The Court referred to 
the evidence in determining this case. In the case 
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at bar an examination of the evideuee will ~ho\V 
that the crime charged in the indictluent., the par-
ticulars of which 'Yere set forth in t.he Bill of 1 >a r-
ticulars and of 'Yhirh eYidenet.~ was introduced "·a~ 
one and the same crin1e and the only c.riine that the 
Grand Jury could haYe had in its n1ind. In 
State Y. \\~hitmore, 126 Ohio State 381; 
185 N. E. 5-!7 (1933), 
the defendant contended that it "~as not the legis-
lative intent to authorize n prosecuting attorney 
to provide a Bill of Particulars describing the 
offense and to permit the prosecutor to inject into 
the indictment allegations according to his ''whim 
or caprice." It was held that such contention was 
groundless and that the accused could test the Bill 
of Particulars in connection with the indictment 
and that there was no possibility of the results 
which the defendant pointed out. 
These cases cited by defendants in no way aid them 
in the contentions which they make. For In-
stance, in 
Wright '· People, 104 Colo. 335; 91 P. 
{2d) 499 (1939), 
a different offense was set out in the Bill of Par-
ticulars than that contained in the indictn1ent and 
this difference was apparent upon the face of the 
two papers. In 
People v. Westrup, 372 Ill. 517; 25 N. E. 
(2d) 16 (1940), 
the Court in making th·e statement ·set forth on 
P1ge 23 of Erwin's Brief was merely consid(~ring 
a variance between the evidence and the Bill of 
Particulars. 
Defendants state on Page 25 of Erwin's Brief that 
other and different means than the failure to arr-est 
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and enforce the laws may have~ heen in the min.ds. 
of the Grand Jury and that they may have had ih 
mind that defendants enabled_ these places to oper-
ate by furnishing the oper.a,tors with money, fix-
tures, buildings and customers.. r~rhe simple ans·wer 
t.o this is that the crime was for conspiring to en-
able these :places to operate and if that is ultimately 
shown, the means used are entirely unessential and 
need not he contained in any pleadings·. Also de-
fendants claim that it was not stated in the indict-
ment that Golden llo1t and Ben Harmon aided in the, 
making of collections. Of course, it was not. Such 
an allegation would meTely have been an allegation 
of evidence which has never yet been required ta 
be placed in an indictment. The Grand Jury in the 
indictment need only allege the crime committed 
and in the trial of the case any evidence which 
tends to p,rove that charge is admissible whether 
the Grand Jury knew of the particular evidence 
or not. If this were not so, before any evidence 
'v011ld br admissiblP against defendR.nts it would 
h~ -necessarv to determine a~ a condition precedent 
f" its admi~s,ibility that the Grand Jury had known 
nf ~nch evidence ~nd had it in mind at fhe time the 
indietment Viras rPfurneiL 
I IT. 
OVERT AC.TS WERE ALL~E·GED AND PROVED 
In contending that the acts as alleged \vere not 
prop1er overt acts in this case, the defel!ldants con~ 
tend, first, that tile overt acts must be separate 
and apart from the agreement and that the acts 
to enable houses to operate, 'vas, if anything, a part 
of the agreement, and second, that the collection 
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4:9 
of money fron1 operator~ \Yt.\rt\ not net~ done to 
effect the object of the ag·reement. 
In its final analysi:3, a con~piraey eon~i~ts of the 
mental acts of t\YO or more per~on~ con1ing to an 
agreement. Keeping this in mind, it cannot be 
said that the agreement to pern1it houses of vice 
to operate is the same as permitting the houses of 
vice to operate. The agTeement con$ists of the n1en-
tal activities of the parties. The accomplishment 
of the object of the conspiracy may tend to prove 
the fact that there was an agreement, but its 
accomplishment is different from the agreeme.nt 
itself. It is "\\ell established that the overt acts 
aile~ may be the accomplishment of the object 
of the conspiracy . 
. Liberato v. United States, 13 Fed. (2d) 
564 (9th Circuit - 1926). 
Allen v. "Cnited States, 89 Fed. (2d) 954 
(4th Circuit - 1937). 
This latter Court states: 
''An overt act was necessary to com pletP 
the crime, but this overt act might be the 
very crime which was the object of thP 
conspiracy. "Cnited States v. Rabinowieh, 
238 "C. S. 78; 35 S. Ct. 682; 59 L. Ed. 1211 ; 
Heike v. "Cnited States, 227 U. S. 131; 33 
S. Ct. 226; 57 L. Ed. 450; Anno. Cases 
1914-C 128. '' 
Hence, the fact that the indictment alleged the 
accomplishment of the act, does not thereby in-
'Validate it. 
Cobb v. Corn, 242 Ky. 424; 46 R. \V. ( 2 J) 
776 (1932). 
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In People v. George, 7 4 CaL App. 440; 241 
P. 9'7, (1925), 
the Court discusses the rule mentioned by defend-
ants herein and very clearly points out that an overt 
act only need be some act other than the mental 
activity of reaching an agreement. Overt acts 
may be and often are used in determining whether 
or not a con8piracy actually existed,_ and it may 
be that from a series of such overt acts an agree-
ment may be inferrd to exist. 
Rich v. United States, 62 Fed. (2d) 638 
(1st Circuit - 1933), 
Safarik v. United States, 62 Fed. (2d) 892 
(8th Circuit - 1933}. 
The Court in 
Rich v. United States case, supra, states: 
''It is further contended in effect that the 
overt acts, if proved, could not be con-
sidered as proof of the conspiracy. The-
presiding judge ruled that the doing of the 
overt acts alleged, or some of them, must 
he proved, that the acts if proved, might 
he considered on the question whether 
there was such a, cons.piracy as was charged. 
·we think this was correct. An overt a.ct 
is by definition something1 done in the 
eause of the- conspiracy. The allegation 
of it as an overt act does not takr. it out 
of its place in the chain of evidential far+.'' 
The seeond contention of the defendants is that 
the collection of money is. not in furtherance o~ the 
agreement, but in effect placed a tax upon the oper-
Htion of these establishments of virP and would 
prevent them from operating. This contention 
overlooks thP ohvions. It is just common sense 
that in order for places of vice to operate under 
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the protection of public of!icials, so1ue form of 
profit ordinarily it' or n1ust be n1ade by the offi-
cials. The 1noney i~ paid to tht~ offieials in order 
that they "ill not enforc.e the la\Y and \Yill not 1uake 
arrests. In the case at bar 1noney \\·at' paid by 
these establishnH~~nts in order that the san1e could 
operate and the officials receiYed ~ueh n1oney upon 
the understanding· that theY w·ould per1nit and en-
able these establiShments t~ operate ''ithout hind-
rance. In 
Cook '· l!nited States, :2S Fed (2d) 730, 
(1928), 
the indictment charged that Cox, a Justice of the 
Peace, and Cook, a Constable, conspired with Jim-
erson to manufacture, transport and sell whiskey, 
that Cook and Cox conspired that Jimerson should 
manufacture and sell whiskey and beer on his farm 
and that Cox and Cook should afford Jimerson pro-
tection from criminal prosecution for manufactur-
ing, transporting and selling sueh liquor and that 
Jimerson should pay $40 per month to Cox and 
Cook for such protection. The indictment charged 
as the first overt act that Cox and Cook received 
$10 from Jimerson on )Ia' 31 1925 and as a second 
.. ' 
overt act, that on June 8,1925, Cox and Cook received 
;from Jimerson $5 in accordance 'vith said agree-
ment. On appeal counsel for Cook contended that 
the indictment was insufficient because it failed 
to allege overt acts to effect the object of the con-
spiracy. The Court says: . 
"They say that the payment and receipt 
of the sums of money were a part of the 
agreement and conspiracy and were in no 
~ense overt acts in furtherance of the ob-
ject of the conspiracy.'' 
''It is true that this money was paid by 
Jimerson and received by Cox in compli· 
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ance with the unlawful agreement there-
tofore entered into by the co-conspirators, 
but such fact does not prevent it from be-
ing an act done to effect the object of the 
conspiracy. rrhe unlawful agreement con-
templlated that J-imerson should perform 
the physical acts constituting a violation 
of the National Prohibition Act and that 
Cook and Cox should afford him protection 
from arrest and prosecution therefor and 
that Jimerson should pay Cox and Cook 
the sum of $10 per vveek from the monies 
realized from the sale of the intoxicating 
liquor and from the dice garae. It is our 
opinion that where an officer agrees t~) 
afford a person criminally inclined, pro-
te'ction from arrest and prosecution for 
the commission of crime, such officer is 
as much an actor in the commission of such 
crime physically committed by the person 
to whom the protection was afforded, as 
one who aids by standing guard while an-
other physically commits a crime." 
In H~Il'v~ United States, 109 Fed. (2d) 97G 
(lOth Circuit- 1940), 
the defendants were charged with conspiracy to 
transport non-tax ·paid vvhiskey through the City 
of Hugo. The defendants are those who trans· 
ported the whiskey and c.ertain officers vvho per· 
mitted such whiskey to be transported. One of 
the overt acts was that a conspirator gave another 
$10 with instructions to deliver the same to one of 
the officers in order to allow the giver to haul non, 
tax paid whiskey through the city. The Co11. rt helcl 
that this was ·properly an overt act and in further. 
ance of the conR:piracy. The Court said: 
" . . . If the act of a. conspirntor be rlonr 
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"~ith the purpo~t.~ of putting an unlawful 
agree1nent into effect, it i~ sufficient al-
though it ha.s no tendeuey to aeeon1pli8h 
it~ object.'' 
See also 
Collier v. United State~, ~55 Fed. ( :2d) 328, 
(5th Circuit - 1~)18). 
In United States Y. :llanton, 10'7 Fed. (2d) 
83-! (~d Circuit - 1938), 
the defendant was charged with the conspiracy to 
obstruct the administration of justice and to de .. 
fraud the United States. Some of the overt acts 
alleged were the acceptance of money. The Court 
pointed out that the charge ''as not a conspiracy 
to accept and secure bribes, but that the bribes 
were only resorted to by way of consummation of 
the conspiracy. The same can here be said of the 
payment of the money by the operators of these 
establishments. Such money wa.'3 paid in consmn· 
mation of the conspiracy to enable them to operate. 
It is well established that it is not necessary to 
allege in an indictment how or in what manner the 
overt acts contribute to the furtherance of the con· 
sp1racy. 
Stevens v. United States, 41 Fed. (2d) 44(\ 
(9th Circuit - 1930). 
Heskett'· United States, 58 Fed. (2d) rrr:. 
(9th Circuit - 1932). 
Lefkowitz v. Schneider, 51 Fed. (2d) 685. 
( 3rd Circuit - 1931). 
On page 30 of Erwin's Brief a contention is made 
that no overt act was proved and points out that 
the only money collected was collected by Abe Stu.. 
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'beck, Golden Holt,_ Abe Rosenblum, Ben Harmon 
and R. 0. Pearce. All of these persons were mem .. 
bers of this conspiracy and the .act of collecting 
done by them if done in furtherance of the con· 
spiracy as alleged was an act of all those persons 
who were members of the conspiracy and as such, 
constituted p·roof of some of the overt acts as al· 
leged in the indictment. This brief further states 
that there was no proof that the money collected 
ever g,ot into the hands of Erwin. Mr. Erwin 
stated; to Mr. Hunsaker in Ogden that he was re· 
ceiving. money from the graft p·ay-off in Salt Lake 
City. This is certainly proof that Erwin received 
some of these monies so collected. 
It is submitted that under the foregoing authorities 
and argument the overt acts alleged were acts wliich 
were separate and apart from the mental activities 
of the defendants in reaching an agreement and 
are acts which were in furtherance of the conspir· 
acy, and that they were sufficiently proved bv tlw 
f'vidence of Holt, Kempner, Hays, Scott, Sadir 
Alder, etc. 
ADMISSIBILITY O·F EVIDENCE 
Counsel for the defendants, Finch and Pearce, has 
attempted to .make a classification of the evidener 
introduced by the State, into four groups,, contend· 
ing, as we understand hiin, that this evidence was 
inadmissible and from the statements and quota· 
tions which he makes apparently confus.es the rule~ 
of admissibility and the rules of sufficiency of 
evidence. From reading his brief, one comes to 
the conclusion that his contention is that before 
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a particular piec.L~ of e\~ideuee 1nay be introduel~d 
it must be consist~nt "ith the defL'~lldant 's guilt and 
inconsistent \Yith his innocenl'e. Sul~h is not a rule 
of the admissibility of t'~Yidence. In 
State v. Inlo"T' -!-! 1Ttah ±83; 141 P. 5~)0, 
(1914), 
the Court states the rule of admssibility: 
'~The rule respecting the admissibility and 
rele\ancy of e-vidence under circumstances 
like those in the case at bar is Yery clearly 
stated by Mr. Justice Straup in a case de-
cided at this term and not yet published, 
namely, State \. Tid"ell, 139 Pac. 863, in 
the follo\\ing words: ·To be releYant and 
admissible, it is not essential that prof-
fered evidence be by itself sufficient to 
establish a disputed point or fact in issue, 
nor is it required to be addressed with pos-
itive directness to such point or fact. It 
is receivable if it by itself, or in connection 
with other evidence, renders probable or im-
probable, or logically tends to prove or to 
disprove, a disputed point or fact in if sue.'' 
As pointed out by this Court, each isolated piece 
of evidence should not be taken alone in deternnn-
ing its admissibility, but when it is fitted into its 
proper background of facts introduced in evidence, 
and it then has some probative value, it is admis-
sible. We will proceed \Yith the discussion of tne 
evidence as classified by counsel for Finch and 
Pearce, noting however that we do not believe that 
this classification is one which covers the evidence 
introduced in the trial of this case. Because we 
believe that this method will be more helpful to the 
Court, we have determined to follow this procedure. 
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.CLAS·SIFICATION 1. 
This classification relates to the testimony of the 
eperation of the houses of prostitution, card games, 
bookma.Icing, lotteries .and dice games as given by 
the witnesses, D. L. Hays, William Scott, Henry V. 
Gosling, Fisher I--Iarris, Sadie Alder, Bobbie Carl-
ton and Margaret Newman. Instruction 9 (bl 
(Ab. 2'66) was as follows: 
''That the operating of gambling, ·pros-
titutionr lotteries., etc., either before or 
after or during 1936 and 1937, in .and of 
themselves cannot be conside:red by you 
as evidence of an agreement of conspiracy 
between the defendants in this cas.e. Such 
conditions may or may not exist by agree-
ment and their operation is consistent with 
the absence of sucb agreement.'' 
The fact that these places operated was not evi .. 
dence of an agreement, but when 've consider that 
evidence with the fact that collections were being 
made, instructions were being given to open and 
close these p~laces, we immediately see that their 
operation does aid us in determining that the agree 4 
ment existed. The Court did not exclude the con· 
sideration of this evidence from the jury, but mere· 
ly told them that if this were all the evidence whicl} 
they believed, then there was no evidence in thi~ 
case which was evidence or an agreement. Courtsel 
has simply misconstrued the effect of the instru(} 
tions, 
CLASSIFICATION 2. 
Under this classification counsel places all those 
facts that the State claimed showed a consciousness 
of guilt on behalf of the defendants. This evidence 
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consisted in both accusations made and not deuit~d 
by the defendant~, and conduct on their behalf 
which showed a con~ciou~ness of g·uil t. 
Considering first the eYidence \Ylrich \\~ls intro-
duced of this kind against ~r,vin it \\·ill be re-
membered that a.~ early a~ June, 1936, reports 
were made to Erwin of the frequency of rumors of 
graft by John S. Early, Au~tin Smith and Golden 
Holt and in each instance he said that he "'"ould in-
vestigate it and on practically every occasion said 
that he had not heard of it before. He was told by 
Mrs. Earle \~an Cott that he and Finch were in-
volved in the pay-off, and that each was receiving 
money from such source-s. Erwin flushed con .. 
::;~derably and stated '· Oh, I am accused of that too1 
am I 1" and then changed the subject. He was 
given a list of the establishments of vice which 
were operating in Salt Lake City and were paying 
protection money by A. :JL J. Pritchard. He told 
Mr. Pritchard that he would investigate this mat-
ter and although Pritchard sa\Y him on several 
occasions thereafter Erwin did not bring up this 
subject again. Knowledge of these operations was 
by this testimony brought home to Erwin. Finally, 
on January 15, 1938, Fisher Harris 'vrote Erwin a 
letter. In considering this testimony we must keep 
in mind that EI\\in was the Commissioner of Pub-
lic Safety and his Department was charged with 
the duty of enforcing the laws of Utah and the or-
dinances of Salt Lake City. Fisher Harris was 
the City Attorney of Salt Lake City, and had made 
::tn investigation into the g-raft situation then ex-
iRting in Salt Lake Qity! He made this report to 
Erwin. Erwin received this letter on a Saturday 
afternoon and was not enough in teres ted in this 
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investigation to ask for an immediate conference. 
Rather he put it off until the following Monday 
afternoon. 
In this later conversation Erwin made the state-
ment that Harris said all these places were operat-
ing and then Erwin wanted to know if Harris 
thought they wanted to pay money to the city for 
the privilege of operating and a conversation was 
had as to what they would be willing to pay, and 
lthen Erwin asked the question : ''They say all 
these peo;ple pay off~'' and Harris replied that 
that was correct. Erwin said: "You don't say, n 
.and then E,rwin wanted to know if it would be all 
right for Finch to start collecting these amounts 
that had been discussed for the benefit of the city. 
One of the significant things about his conversa-
tion, is that Erwin at no time asked Harris the 
extent or scope of his investiglation and how he-
knew the facts which he had purportedly de• 
termined, did not ask who it was who was paying 
off or who was collecting the money or what offi .. 
cials were involved in it. Why \\rould a man who 
'vas CommissioneT of Public Safety take such an 
attitude in discussing matters so important '"ith 
the City Attorney of Salt Lake City~ Was it that 
he was involved in this pay-off and did not need 
the information~ Was it that he \vas afraid that 
by asking- questions in connection with the matters 
above suggested that his O\Vn guilt migl1t come out 
and be discussed~ 
It is the contention of the State that this conduct on 
the part of Erwin was pronerly submitted to tl," 
jury under the theory that it was not the usual or 
ordinary actions of an innocent public official d~ 
siring only to perform the duties of his office whicl1 
in this case was the enforcement of the hnvs of this 
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State and of 8alt Lakt1 City. Er\rin tht\n again 
appeared in Harris' office on the day follo\vlng 
the above eonver~ation and told Harris that there 
were questions he should lu1Y~ askt'd the day be .. 
fore. Yes, there "~ere many questions \\rhirh he 
should have asked the day before, if he \Yere an in~ 
nocent man. Erwin on this oeension said: • ~You say 
you know w-ho is collecting this n1oney? '' and upon 
replying that he did, Erwin asked who it \Ya.s who 
was making the collections. He "~as told by the City 
Attorney, and upon Harris ag-ain saying that these 
places mentioned in the letter paid off, Erwin 
makes the remark: ~'Well, they wouldn't feel 
natural if tl1ey "Weren't paying off to somebody and 
what difference does it make -who gets it~" Here 
again, Erwin did not ask questions which an inJ 
nocent man would ask. He did not ask who ulti .. 
mately got this money. This question would have 
been very pertinent to his own activities. Here 
again, thp State savs that Erwin did not act in the 
usual or ordinary ~anner of an innocent man, and 
agrain his conduct was properly submitted to the 
jury to determine "Whether or not they thought that 
this conduct showed- innocence or guilt. 
We then come to the ~\Ita Club me~ting on Jan .. 
nary 20, 1938. This was participated in by five 
or six persons and a full disclosure \Yas made by 
Mr. Harris of the results of his investigation even 
to the statement that Erwin ''as receiving $750 and 
Finch $500. Upon the making of this accusation, 
11r. Erwin said nothing, althous~:b it appears in 
evidence he had at various times remarked that It 
was the first time that he had heard of any pay-off 
in Salt Lake City. In view of the testimony of the 
witnesses Early, Smith, Holt, Runzler and Pritchard 
how could this statement be made by Erwin? He 
had knowledge of these rumors of pay-off for 
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;practically two years and yet now at this late day 
the says it is the fj rst time he has- ever heard of such 
,a thing. • 
Again, the State asks was. this the conduct of an 
innocent man~ If Erwin were not guilty would he 
not say that he had heard these things for some 
time and that he had made various efforts to trace 
them down or to stamp out the activities of the vice. 
establishments in Salt Lake Crity~ We contend 
:that from this evidence the jury might well infer 
a consciousness of guilt on behalf of the defendant 
Erwin. The evidence ag1ainst Mr. Finch and of 
this same character is also admissible to show his 
conduct .and statements evincing a consciousness of 
guilt. As early as April, 1936, Mr. Finch told 
Austin Smith that the pay-off was approximately 
$2,000 a month at that time and also stated that 
probably Abe Rosenblum would collect it as he had 
operated along those lines. Also in this same 
month information was brought to Mr. Finch by 
Judge Ellett that he was accused of receiving $250(} 
a montp. behind his back. 
After this statement was made Finch said nothing-
for a minute or two, and during this silence looked 
down at his shoes. At various times between April 
of 1936 and January of 1938, Finch was infonned 
of the pay-off and vice conditions, in Salt Lake 
)City. He was informed ·of these by Austin Smitl1, 
Golden Holt, D. L. Hays and E.arly. In the con-
versation with Hays, Finch stated that he knrw 
that gambling was going on in Salt Lake and re-
plied th~t he was not goiilg to do anything about it. 
Just shortly before the middle of January, 193~, 
Finch ha.d a conversation with Harris. (Here again 
it should be kept in mind that Finch "\Vas the Chief 
of Police and charged under th0 ordinances of Salt 
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Lake City ""'"ith enforcing tht\ la""', aJld :b,i~hl\l' Harri~ 
was the attorney for tlll\ City uf Balt Lake). HatTi~ 
reported to ~,inch that tht•re \Yt\l·e all kind~ oi' ilL.\gal 
activities in operation rlulniug in ~alt Lakt\ City in 
connivance ·with the .Police Deparhuent, and that 
public officials "·ere personally profiting fron1 
these activities. All Finch said \Yas that he thoug·ht 
that the town "·as being run pretty \Ye 11, and that 
he didn't see how all of these actiYities could be 
running, sinee about $2,000 was being collected a 
year by Salt Lake City. ~\.t no time during this 
conversation did Finch ask the name of any person 
involved. 
In the ordinary course of events, when a person in 
the position of Fisher Harris makes a report such 
as this and states that the Police Department is 
conninng- with the operators of these activities, 
would not a person in the position of Finch seek to 
find out who it was that was involved and seek to 
find out what evidence the City Attorney had of 
such conni\ance? Could not the jury well infer; 
from such conduct that Finch either knew all about 
it or was afraid to ask such auestions because of The 
fact that he was implicated therein might be dis-
cussed? This was certainly matter that the jury 
,.0nld consider in determining whether 0-r n0t. Finch 
at this conversation, by his conduct, indicated a 
consciousness of ~ilt. 
When considered with the evidence which has here-
tofore been recited, the meeting at the Alta Club, 
in which ::Finch took part, becomes even more per-
tinent and important. In this conversation that 
was had among those present, Finch was accused of 
having received $500.00 a month from this pay-
Dff and he did not deny it, and also during the cun-
Y(}r~ation. Harris told of the illegal activities which 
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were op,erating in Salt Lake City, and at various 
times during the conversation Finch said he had 
never heard of such a thing before.. Mter Mr .. 
Finch had said at least three times that it was the 
first time he had ever heard of any pay-off situa-
tion in Salt Lake City, Harris, told him not to say 
it again. Finch asked "'Why~" And Harris told 
him that it wa.sn 't so, and shortly after that and in 
this conference, Finch s.aid that he would resign. 
Mr. Finch's conduct vvas very much the same as 
that of Erwin ''s-, and the same can he said of it. 
It showed a consciousness of guilt and certainly the 
jury were entitled to consider this evidence to de-
termine whether or not Finch, by his conduct, in-
di,cated that he was connected with the pay-off in 
Salt J_j.ake City. 
Another conversation which is included within this 
classification is the conversation that Harris had 
'vith Pearce in the presence of Harold B. Lee. In 
that conversation Harris told Pearce that he knew 
of his' relation with the pay-off and knew that he 
was involved -vvith Ben Harmon and others. 
After this statement was made Pearce remained 
' silent for two or three minutes and sat there "lick-
ing his lips.'' Pearce's first words were not a de-
,li(1.1 r.f his involvement but the question, "Who says 
that I am involved in thiR thing1~ '' And after pos-
sibly 15 'na,mes were reci t~n, Pearce ~.picks out the 
name of H. K. Record. This point has some sig-
nificance in that H. K. R,.ocord. is perhaps tl1e only 
person outside of those directly involved jn this 
conspiracy who testified to facts tying Pearce 
directly into this conspiracy. Pearce replied that 
he might he ahle to get some information as he 
'vas Ben Harmon's attorney and he did state 
that h0 'vas not involved, hnt this comes a little late 
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statement that he knt'\Y hin1 to be involved in the 
graft pay-off. The day after this eonver~atiou 
Harris oalled Pearce on the phone and n~ked hiu1. 
[or information in connection \Yith thi~ gttaft pay-
off and Pearce wanted to kno,v 'Yhy hl) ~hould talk 
to Harris, and Pearce told Ha1Ti:3 that he 'vould 
call him in the next day or t"~o. Pearce did not call 
Harris, so Harris called Pearce a fe"~ days after 
this and Pearce said, ''I'll talk to you about this 
some other time. ' ' 
\\ e sincerely believe that the failure of Pearce to 
deny his invoh~ement, the fact that his first ques-
tion was who implicated him, rather than that he 
was not implicated, and his conduct of sitting there 
in silence, was sufficient for the jury to determine 
that there was an implied admission or acquiescence 
that the statement of ::llr. Harris was true. Certain_ 
ly his conduct in the subsequent telephone conver-
sation is of value on the question of consciousness 
of guilt in that he did not call Harris as he prom-
ised, put off giving any information and at one 
time wanted to know why he should talk to Harris 
about such a situation. These we believe are sub-
stantially the items which are covered by defend-
ants under their secDnd classification of testimony. 
In TJnderhill we find the following statements on 
this type of evidence: 
Underhill on Criminal Evidence, Fourth 
Edition, Section 250, Page 465: 
''Any statement or conduct of a person in-
dicating a consciousness of guilt. 'vhere at 
the time or thereafter h~ is charged with 
or suspected of the crime, is admissible as 
a circumstance against him on his trial. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
64 
Evidence of circun1stances,. rsdilch are part 
~f a person's behavior subsequent to an 
event with which it is alleged or suspected 
he is connected with or implicated in, is 
relevant if the circu1nstances are such as 
would he natural and usual, assunring the 
connection or imp~lication to exist. This 
rule of circumstantial evidence may he re-
garded as almost universally apptlicable. H 
Also in the same authoritry at Section 259, Page 4: ., 
we find the following: 
''The silence of the accused as regards 
statements in his hearing which implicate 
him directly or indirectly may be proved 
with the statements, and from his acquies-
cence the jury may infer that the state-
ments are true and that they prove his 
guilt., 
About the only cas.e in the State of Utah discussing 
the question of implied admission is the case of 
State v. Mortenson, 26 Utah 312; 73 Pac. 
562 (1903). 
In that case the defendant was charged with mur .. 
der. The father-in-:-law of deceased, while the 
body was lying in the patrol wagon and the defend .. 
ant w;as standing from six to eight feet away, 
stated: ''He murdered you for a receip,t that 'vas on 
your body representing· $3,800 and you never ran 
away nor he never gave you a dollar.'' And it was 
testified that the defendant didn't say anything but 
hung his head and looked on' tlhe ground. •rh9 
Supreme Court quotes from Underhill in mucli the 
~·nm~ lang11a~e as above .appears. Onr Court quotes 
£rom 
Kelley v. People, 55 N. Y. 565; 14 Am. Rep. 
342, as follows : 
'' ,.~lh0n an individual iR eharged with an 
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offense, or declarations are n1ade, in his 
presence and hearing, touching or nffPet-
ing his guilt or innocence of an alleg;t.)d 
crime, and he reinains silent "·hen it 'vould 
be proper for him to ~pt"ak, it is the 
proyince of a jury to interpret such silence, 
· ~u1d determine '" lu~ther his silence was, 
l.mder the circumstances, excused or ex-
plained.·· 
The Court held that the admission of this evidence 
was proper. In 
Kelley \. People, supra, 
one of the contentions of the defendants was that 
the statements there involved were not made 
directly to them but were made to others. The 
Court stated : 
''Although the statements were not ad-
dressed directly to them, they were the 
subjects of the conversation and parties 
to it, in this, that they could with propriety 
and without a breach of decorum take 
part in it. '' 
In Rochia v. U. S., 78 Fed. (2d) 966 (1935), 
a statement by one officer to his superior in the 
presence of defendant that there had been an at-
tempt made by defendant while in custody to secure 
his release by bribery, and that defendant remained 
silent, was properlv admitted in evidence, although 
riot directly made to the defendant. In 
Commonwealth v. Simpson, (Mass.), 13 
N. E. (2d) 939, 
the defendant held up an officer with a gun and 
tnade him get into an automobile. Another officer 
came up to the left hand side of the car and a gir1 
Who had been with the defendant stated to the sec .. 
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ond officer,, ''The man in that car is holding up an 
officer.'' It was held that .this statement, tog~thet 
with the faet that the defendant made no reply, was 
properly admitted in evidence. The Court says: 
''If the defendant heard and understood 
the remark,, it was for the jury to con- . 
sider whether it was made by such a per-
son and under such circumstances as 
naturally called for a reply, and also to 
consider what inference if any, would be 
drawn from his failure to reply, if in fact 
he made no rep~ly. '' 
Thes.e latter cases indicate that although the state-
ment is not addressed directly to the accused, 
nevertheless if he has an op·portunity to reply and 
in the ordinary course of events would make a 
reply, then such evidence is admissible. Apparent-
ly counsel in their brief take the position that the 
law is otherwise. 
Two other cases which support this same prop .. 
osition are 
People v. McCoy, 127 Cal. App. 195; 15 
Pac. (2d) 543 (1927). 
P·eople v. Pi burn, 130 Cal. App. 56; 31 
Pa~. (2c1) 470 (1.934). 
In connection with these conversations had with 
these men, to,vit: Finch, Pearce, and Erwin, it 
appears that they vvere informed of the situation in 
Salt Lake with respect to the illegal vice activities 
that were being operated. Then when told about 
these conditions and it being said to them that they 
were involved, they denied all Imowledge of such 
conditions. They did this instead of telling of the 
infermation that had been brought to them by 
various individuals. It was our contention that 
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this conduct on their part indica ted an intention 
to evade as muc-h as possible the truth surrounding 
the pay-off in Salt Lake City. That th~ telling of 
falsehoods under such cireliDlstances is material, we 
cite the following cases : 
People v. Conroy, 97 X. Y. 6:2 (1884). 
\Yilson '· U. S., 162 lT. S. 613. 40 L. Ed. 
. ' 1090; 16 Sup. Ct. S~)5 ( 1895). 
People v. Zabriski, 135 Cal. App. 169; 26 
Pac. (2d) 511 (1933). 
People \. Peccole. 92 Cal. App. 470; 268 
Pac. ±13 (1928). 
Davidson \. State, 205 Ind. 564; 187 N. E. 
376 (1933). 
Commonwealth'· Jones, 297 Penn. 326; 146 
Atl. 905 (1929). 
State v. Thorp, 86 N". H. 501 ; 171 Atl. 633, 
(1934). 
Peopile v. Sampsell, 104 Cal. App. 431; 
286 Pac. 434 (1930). 
In People v. Conroy, supra, 
the Court stated : 
''The resort to falsehood and evasion by 
one accused of crime affords of itself a pre-
Rumption of evil intentions, and has al-
ways been considered proper evidence to 
present to a jury upon the question of the 
guilt or innocence of the person accused.'' 
In Wilson v. United States, the Court said: 
''Nor can there be any question that if 
the jury were satisfied from the evidence 
that false statements in the case were made 
by the defendant or on his behalf, at his 
instigation, they had the right, not only to 
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take such statements into consideration in 
connection with all the other circumstances 
of the cas,e in determining whether or not 
defendant's conduct had been satisfactor .. 
ily explained by him upon the theory of 
his innocence, but also to regard false 
statements in explanation or defense made, 
or procured to be made, a.s in themselves· 
tending to show guilt. The destruction, 
suppression or fabrication of evidence un-
doubtedly gives use to a prresumption of 
guilt to be dealt with by the jury. 1 
Greenl. Ev., Sec. 37; 3 Greenl. Ev., Sec. 
34. '' 
In People v. Zabriski, supra, 
the defendant was charged with taking and driVing 
an automobile without the o"\vner 's consent. The 
stolen automoEile was seen by a witness with two 
persons in it. He saw it crash into the two parked 
cars, and saw the two defendants attempt to get 
avvay. The 'vitness caught one of the defendant~ 
and told the officers upon their arrival that he had 
hit a couple of autos, and this defendant stated: 
''It ain't so, I never done anything; I haven't even 
been in or near a ear.'' Another witness stated 
that this defendant said that he had not been in the 
car and did not know Zabriski (who was proved to 
be the other person in the car). The Court stated 
that this evidence was admissible: 
''False statements intended to conceal con-
nection ''rith criminal acts tend to show 
cons~ciousneRs of guilt (People v. Cole, 141 
Cal. 88; 74 P. 547) ... " 
f n vie"\V of the other evidence tying the defendant~ 
Pearce, Finch and Er"~in into thiR conspirary, ::n(1 
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thes~ denials of any kno,vledge of the eonditions, 
make tlll.s case particularly applieabll\. ln 
People v. Percole, supra, 
the defendant had been COllYirted OI the Crlllle Of 
assault with a deadly 'veapon. Det eudant had re .. 
ceived cuts and bruises on his head. He told two 
different stories as to ho"~ he had received these 
bruises and cuts. The Court held that evidence of 
these stories was admissible on the theory that ir 
he had believed he was not in the "Tong in the 
trouble between him and the \ictim, he would have 
unhesitatingly told the officers that he received his 
injuries in such fight. The Court held that he 
\\as moth .. ated by the consciousness of haYing com ... 
mitted an unjustifiable attack on his victim and he 
purposely withl1eld knowledge of the circumstances 
of said trouble. The Court said: 
''Being rationally subject to such inter-
pretation, the te~timony of the officers that 
the accused had given to them untruthful 
accounts of how he was injured was 
properly allowed.'' 
In Commonwealth v. Jones, supra, 
the Court stated: 
-"This untrue statement was a circum-
stance indicating guilt. 'The fabrication 
of false and contradictory accounts by an 
accused criminal for the sake of diverting 
inquiry or casting off suspicion is a cir-
cumstance always indicatory of guilt.' 
nom .. v. Spardute, 278 Pa. 37; 122 A. 161. '' 
It must be realized that each case must be viewed 
in the light of its own circumstances to determine 
whether or not the evidence of consciousness of 
guilt is admi~sible. If it is rationally subject to 
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such an inte:rpretation, then the matter should Lu 
filuhmitted to the jury for their consideration. In 
the following cases the Courts have held that con-
duct of the defendants is admissible when they in-
dicate a consciousness of guilt.. In 
State v. Lambert, 104 Mo. 3,94; 71 Atl. 1092; 
15 Ann. Cases 10557 (1908), 
the defendant had been informed that an accom· 
p,lice had been arrested and at the time of the de-
fendant's arTest he had a loaded revolver in his 
overcoat pocket.. The Court pointed out that if 
the defendant had not carried the revolver for the 
purpose of resisting· arrest, he ha.d an opportunity 
to explain it. The Court held that this evidence was 
admissible and it was for the jury to estimate what 
weight and value should be given to the evidence, as: 
an indication of the consciousness of guilt of theo 
defendant. In 
State v. Steinkraus, 244 Mo. 152; 148 S. \Y. 
877 (1912)) 
the defendant was charged with arson,. and his de~ 
fense wa.s that he had accidentally set fire to the 
building. Evidence was introduced to show that he 
made no statement regarding the fire to person8 
~vhom he met immediately after the explosion which 
r-tarted the fire. The Court said: 
''While ordinarily one accused of crime 
has the right to remain silent, yet, in cases 
where his silence is unusual and not in 
:1rcordance 'vith the common experience of 
mankind, it becomes evidence of guilt. It 
"'"ould he but slight evidence, it is true, but 
its weight would be for the jury.'' 
''When told there was a fire in town, he 
pretended to be surprised and asked the 
location of ~the fire. This 'vas as strong 
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zm indication of guilt on his part as the 
fact that he net)dlessly ran fron1 tl1e build-
ing when he sa". it burning.' ' 
- p 1 ' - ) l"al \ 36 •> In eop e Y. Sprague, ;):.. . . .i-1.pp. v·; 
198 Pac. 820 ( 1~121), 
the defendant was charged "rith rape. On coming 
out of the room "·here the crime had been com-
mitted, he met the "·itnes~, "-ho occupied the next 
room. Defendant kne'' that he occupied this next 
t·oom. The witness ~tated that the defendant's face 
was rather disfigured and that he appeared blanched 
and somewhat excited. The Court stated: 
"It was permissible to argue that defend-
ant did or did not behave as would an in-
nocent person under similar circumstances. 
The weight of the testimony ''as for the 
jury, but it \\as not error to ad1nit it.'' 
''The conduct of a suspected person charged 
with crime, when it is snch as to show a 
consciousness of guilt, is al\\ays admiS-
sible. '' 
In State '· Snllig, 97 Ore. 427; 190 Pac. 
580 (1920), 
the defendant wa:-: char%'ed "rith n1urder. Defend-
ant and his wife and two children, age 2 and 4, lived 
in an isolated place. The defendant appeared at 
th~ home of a neighbor and announced that })is wifP 
was dead as a result of gunshot wounds. apparently 
1nflirted by ~orne accident. He stated that he had 
left home after supper to drive the cows to pasture 
and when he returned he met his little hoy carry-
ing a gun and found his wife lying dead. ·The de-
fendnnt stated to several people that he had made 
no effort to get the children to tell what had hap-
pened because they could not or would not talk, 
that they could not speak in sentences so he could 
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get any information from t~en1.. Evidence \\Tas in-
troduced to show that the children were of more 
than ordinary intelligence and that the older on& 
especially was fully able to talk and tell a story and 
give his impressions in a childish \Vay. The Court 
stated: 
.. , .. . . His every word and act in relation 
to the transaction, insofar as it might tend 
to show guilt on his part, was exceedingly 
important. If his actions in relation to the 
occurrence vvere extraordinary or unusual 
rn any regard, or if his explanation of any 
of his actions were unreasonable or im-
p~rob~ahle, it became a circumstance to h~ 
weighed against him, together with the 
other circumstances, by the jury. r, 
Before the trial of this case defendant made \Yritten 
order to two persons directing that the children bo-
t.aken out- of the State. It was held that this evi-
dence was admissible. The Court s.ta ted : 
"It is true that the action may l1ave been 
entirely innoeent on the part of tho defeT'd-
ant and may have been taken for thr h0(~+ 
inte,rests of the children . . . ,. 
However considering this evidence \Vi th the other 
' . 
evidence, the jury may have been iustified in In-
ferring that he sent them away to prevent their 
evidence fron1 being presented to the jury, and the· 
Court stated: 
''·While the circumstance may not havr 
been of great weight, yet it was properly n 
matter for the jury to consider, ~11d to 11r 
presented to them for that purposr." 
While none of these eases are directly in point, they 
indicate the lihera1ity of the Conrt~~ in pern1itting 
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the conduct of an accused to be placed before the 
jury \Yhen it may rationally be interpreted to in~ 
dicate a consciousness of guilt on behalf of the de-
fendants. The general rule is stated in 
16 C. J. 549, as follo,vs: 
"' .. lt least insofar as they tend to connect 
hin1 with the crime, and are not merely 
self serving, the conduct and g·eneral de-
meanor of the accused after the crime, his 
language, oral and written, his attitude and 
relations toward the crime, and his actions 
in the presence of those engaged in en-
deavoring to detect the criminal are al-
'--- ' 
ways relevant.'' 
This indicates clearly that the activities and con-
duct of the three defendants when talking with 
Fisher Harris, the City Attorney, were clearly 
relevant. 
Defendants have stated that there must be a direct 
charge of the crime with which they are being tried 
before evidence of their conduct indicating an un-
plied admission is admissible. This is not the law. 
The rule is stated in 
20 Am. Jnr., Sec. 570, as follo''Ts: 
5 ''As a general rule, when a statement 
tending to incrimirtate one accused of com-
mitting a crime is made in his presence 
and hearing and such statement is not de-
nied, contradicted, or objected to him him, 
both the statement and the fact of his fail-
ure to deny are admissible in a crhnin a 1 
prosecution against him, as evidence of his 
acquiescence in its truth. The basis of such 
rule is that the natural reaction of one 
accnsed of the commission of a crime or of. 
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'implication therein is to deny the accusa .. 
tion if it is unjust or unfounded.'' 
In 20 Am. Juris., Sec. 572,, it is stated: 
"It is not essential that the statement 
assume the form of a direct charge, but 
may be such a.s would lead reasonable men 
similarly situated to construe it as incrim-
inating·.'' 
In Terrasas v. State~ 25 Ariz. 476; 219 Pac. 
226 (1923), 
the- defendants were charged with grand larceny. 
A calf had been stolen, drawn, and butchered. It 
was testified that a person said, "Here is the man 
that put the hide in the ditch.'' The defendant did 
not reply. It was held that this 'vas admissible be-
cause it was of such a nature and made under such 
circumstances that an innocent man would naturally 
have denied it or made some explanation. The rule 
is stated at 
Page 1278 of 80 A. L. R., as follows : 
''Likewise, in order that tl1e failure of an 
accused person to deny an jncriminating 
statement may be admissible as evidence 
against him, it is required that the nature 
of the statement be such as would natural-
ly provoke or call for, a denial from n1en 
similarly situated. It is said that the state-
ment must be a direct charg·e of guilt or 
complicity in the crime in question, but it 
does not appear to be necessary that the 
statement be of such tenor that any 
st:ran_ger hearing- it would understand H as 
such, and the rule to he deduced from the 
substanc~ of the cases is that, if in view of 
all the cirrumstanc<>R and events transpir-
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ing up to the tin1e at 'vhieh the statement 
is 'made, persons sinularly situated would 
reasonably be calcuJ.atlld to undershuld and 
constn1e the :staten1ent a~ incrhninating, 
it is sufficient .. ·· 
\\ e sincerely urge that under the foregoing author. 
ities all of that evidence referred to by the defend-
ants under Classification 2, is ::tdmissible in evi-
dence. 
Now referring to the cases of the defendant, we do 
not think any of them establish that the testimony 
here classified is inadmissible. In 
Tate v. State. 95 ~Iiss. 138; 48 Southern 13, 
~defense counsel states that an incriminating state-
ment involving the accused addressed to by· 
standers when the accused was present did not call 
for an answer, and that there was no admission --by 
!-iilence. This might lead this Honorable Court to 
believe that this case is authority ,for the proposi-
tion that an accusation made in the defendant's 
presence but addressed to another is inadmissible. 
Counsel for the defendant has not told us that in 
the facts of that case the defendant was prostrate 
on the ground, apparently unconscious, and of 
course the Court held that his silence proved noth-
ing, for th€l reason that he undoubtedly did not hear 
the statement. In 
People v. Bissert, 75 N. Y. Supplernent 630, 
the defendant, a police officer, was charged with 
accepting a bribe from one Lena Schmidt uncl er 
the agreement that he would permit her to conduct 
a house of prostitution. An inmate of the house was 
called and these questions and answers occurred : 
''Q. What did you _or Mrs. Schmidt say 
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to Bissert,. and what did you hear Bissert 
say to Mrs. Schmidt at that time~ 
A. She asked him - she says : 'Why did 
you do this t You took money, and now you 
are chasing out the girls.~' 
Q. What did you hear Bissert say, if any-
thing~ 
A. I did not hear what answer he gave.'' 
It was held that this evidence was improperly ad-
mitted, since there was no evidence to show that 
Bissert heard the statement or no evidence to show 
that he made no reply. The Court aiso stated that 
conceding that he did hear and that he made no 
reply, he was at the time in the discharge of duties 
required of him by law and since he 'vas then arrest-
!ng these p,eople, the Court did not think tha.t he-
was hound to reply to charges made against him 
by persons confessedly violating the law. Where-
in this case aids the defendants, we are at a loRs-
to know. 
McCormick v. State, 181 Wis. 261; 194 
N. W. 347 (1923), 
is also cited by defendant. The Court in that case 
pointed out that the only object that Shaw had in 
reading the letter containing the accusatory matter 
was to inform defendant of vvhat he had done so that 
he might he fully advised as to the desirability of 
employing him as an attorn~y. And there is nothing 
in this case that is even remotely analogous to the 
Rituation there presented. In 
State v. Evans, 189 N. C. 233; 126 S. E. 
607, 
the Court held that since no crime had been com· 
mitted at the time of the de,claration to the defend-
ant, that he was under no obligation to deny it. In 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
.-,.. 
l I 
Geiger v. State, 70 Ohio State 400; 71 N. E. 
7~1 (1904), 
it appeared that tht? def(\ndant had ll'Hnl~d over to 
speak to his child and "~as told to \Yait a11d the 
Court said that for this reason the defendant'~ 
silence "~as not voluntary. The Court also points 
out that they did not belieYe the defendant was 
given time for reply or explanation. The Court 
cites 
Murphy v. State, 36 Ohio State 628, 
and holds that is not analogous. In this latter case, 
the two defendants had in their possession stolen 
goods and were apprehended, and one of thm, in 
the presence of the other, made incriminating state-
ments incriminating both, and the other remained 
silent. This was held properly admitted in the 
Murphy case. The Geiger case certainly cannot 
stand for the proposition that a statement made in 
the presence of the defendant to another person 
doeR not call for a reply on his part. In any event, 
the case of 
Commonwealth '· Lisowski, 274 Pa. 222; 
117 A tl. 794, 
is contrary to the holding of the Geiger case. In 
People v. Hartwell, 175 Pac. 21, 
the statements did not remotely purnort to connect 
the defendant with the offense, and in 
People v. Countryman, 195 N. Y. S. 728, 
1he defendant ha.d already denied the accusation 
,and the Court said that he was not called upon to 
get in a controversy with his wife. 
Hoover v. State, 91 Ohio State 41; 109 
N. E. 626, 
is contrary to the Countryman case, if tbe Country-
man case holds that the defendant.was not required 
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·~o deny statements. not involving a direct charge of 
the offense alleged. In 
Hanna v. State (Tex.), 79 S,~ W~ 544, 
the following precedes that quoted on page 64 of 
the Pearce and Finch brief :. 
' 'It seems that all those present were 
negroes, and the~re was nothing in this re-
mark which pointed out or particularized 
appellant, nor was it said in such manner 
as to call it to his attention, or to indicate 
to him that he was the party referred tu 
and called upon to make a statement." 
This clearly indicates that the reason for the hold-
ing that the accusation was inadmissible was not 
that it was made to a by-stander, but on the con-
trary, defendant could not know that it was said to 
him or about him. 
The rule as. stated from 
1272 of 80 A. L. R., 
does not indicate that any of the evidence intro-
duced by the State is inadmissible. This rule is 
set forth on pagle 64 of the Pearce and Finch brief. 
It should be noted that the rule there is that when 
an incriminating statement i"s made in a conversa-
tion between third persons, ''in 1t0hich the accused 
is not included and u;hen the remarks a.re not 
specifically addressed to him,'' it is frequently 
held that his failure to deny does not render t11c 
evidence admissible because he is not afforded an 
opportunity to deny. Counsel states that this rule 
is particularly applicable to the Alta Club conver-
sation. That conversation was one in which both 
Finch and Erwin participated - hence, they were 
included in it. They had participated in the con-
versation at various time-s throughout the recital 
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made by Harris and so it 'vould not have been an 
intrusion into this conversation or an interruption. 
The annotation found at 80 ..:\. L. R. has been sup-
plemented at 
115 ~\. L. R. 1510. 
At pag-e 1519 of this latter annotation and under 
the heading, "'...\.ecusations Made in Conversations 
Between Third Persons,'' the annotator states : 
· · \Yhether the silence of one accused by 
an inculpatory ~tat~ment made in a conver-
sation between third persons is admissible 
as a tacit acquiescence depends entirely 
upon the circumstances, under a reason-
able construction of the rule stated supra 
111, a, 1. '' 
The rule there referred to is found at page 1516 
and is as follows: 
'' ~\s indicated in the earlier annotation on 
this subject, since testimony of tacit ad-
missions constitutes only a circumstance, 
or some evidence, from "~hich a finder of 
fact may deduce acquiescence in a.n accusa-
tion, and is not of itself inculpatory, apart 
from such acquiescence it is essen.tiaJ to 
admissibility that there be a showing that 
conditions existed at the time of the accusa-
tion which (1) afforded an opportunitv to 
reply, and ( 2) naturally called for a reply. 
If the first is satisfied by showing pres-
ence, hearing, understanding, Pte., tre 
question remains as to whether a person 
~imilarly situated would or should have 
£elt Pt liberty or naturally obliged to reply 
to the accusation, jn the event that there 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
80 
was no intention to acquiesce by failure 
to do so.'' 
Cases permitting such accusation have heretofore 
been cited. 
In the case of 
People v. P'age, 162 N. Y. 279; 56 N. E. 
750; 
the Court says that to be eharged of the crime in 
the manner there shown by the evidence was siin-
ilar to that of a defendant being charged in open. 
court with the crime but refuses to speak or plead. 
Wigmore, at 4 Wigmore on Evidence, Third 
Edition, Section 1072, Page 76, 
states that this case 'is unsound. ·What evidence· 
introduced in this ·case is analog-ous to that con-· 
t.ained in the Page case~ Counsel for the State 
do not know. 
Counsel for the defendants cite a nun1ber of cases 
to the effect that where a denial is n1ade, that then 
the evidence of the accusation is inadn1is.sible. \Yith 
re:·;pect to the te-stirnony concerning the conversa-
tion between Harris and Pearce, it is true that 
Pearce, hefore the conversation \\ras over, denied 
his involvement, but at the time he vvas. first 
char~ed, he remained silent for t\vo or three n1in-
utes and sat there "licking his lips." The first 
utterance \Yas not a denial 9 but the question, '' \V1~o 
says that I am involved~'' We believe that t1ns 
conduct on his behalf is admissible as sho,ving a 
consciousn~ss of g11ilt. Befnre thP conver~ation was 
over he may have sufficiently gained his compo~urr 
a.s to plav the part of an innocent man, hut this doe~ 
not c-ha.~g-e th0 fact that in the first instance hi~ 
conduct \\ras that of acquiescencp and indicated n 
conPciousness of guilt. This matter was for the 
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jury, and hence, properly admitted. Counsel for 
the defendant al~o points out thnt li-,inch deniL\d 
knowledge of the pay-off the day bt\Jore the ..:\lta 
Club meeting. This is true, but the eYidence ~ho\v~ 
that on at least three or four pre,·ious oeca8ion~, 
kno·wledge of the pay-off had been hroug·ht home to 
Finch and he "-as not telling the truth when he de-
nied any knowledge of it. His denial at the Alta 
Club that it was the first he had ever heard of the 
pay-off again ,,~as not true, because under his o"·n 
testimony. he had heard something about it a day 
or two before. These cases of denial are not here 
helpful. 
In the case of 
Commonwealth \. Smith (Pennsylvania) ; 
161 Atl. 418 (1932), 
the defendant was charged with arson. In the 
State barr~ks and in the presence of the defend-
ant, a detective, a State trooper, and the accom-
plice, the confession of the accomplice was read. 
It stated among other things that defendant had 
procured accomplice to burn the building and had 
paid him $1,000: 
''. . . There was silence for a moment 
when the detective questioned the alleged 
accomplice, Fisher, as to the details 'an-
alyzing the hig-h spot~;' that Fisher re-
iterated the. trnth of the facts set forth in 
the writing; that the defendant, Molly 
Smith~ asked if the matter could be settled 
out of court; that Bryant, the detective, 
asked defendant if she would if she could 
trust the witness. During the same con-
versation and between 5 and 15 Inin,,+~,... 
after the reading was finished, Mrs. Sn1ith 
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;r:aid Fisher was a rat and a liar, emphasiz .. 
ing the reply with a strong· oath. '' 
"It \vill be noted that the complaint of tho 
appellant is not directed to the ad1nission 
in evidence of testimony showing the re--
action of the defendant to assertions 
eharg1ing her with a crime, but to the ad-
mission and reading of the confession of 
the alleged accomplice. It is a.t this pre-. 
cise point that the lowe·r court fell into 
error. 'The conduct or demeanor of a 
prisoner on being charged ·with the crime, 
or allusion being made to it is frequently 
given in evidence against him.' Com. v. 
Ford, 86 Pa. Supe·rior Court 483, 486. It 
follows that, when this defendant was 
charged with the erime, her inquiry as to 
'vhether the matter could be settled, the-
form of her agitation, and in general her 
reaction or responses were competent evi-
dence. The ·proposition here, however, is 
t~ admit the confession of the accomplice 
on the assumption that she verified its· 
flccuracy by her silence. Unless the de-
fendant assented either by word or con-· 
duct to the accuracy and eorrectneRs of the 
ronfession of Fisher, such evidernee was 
hParsay." 
Other cases permitting thiR type of evid~nce are· 
l{Ylight v. State, 64 Tex. Crim. 541; 144 
s. w. 967 (1912). 
<Jommon,vealth v. Ford, 86 Pa. Sup. Ct. 
483 (1925). 
Commonwealth v. Detwerler, 299 Pa. 304; 
78 A_ 271 ( 1910). 
~~1-atc v. Reed, 62 :hfe. 129 (1874). 
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People v. Dempsey, 63 Cal ..... J\pp. 751; ~19 
Pao. 1041 (1923). 
•rerritory v. Harrington, 17 N. ~l. 62; 1~1 
Pac. 613 (1912). 
Briley ,~. State, :21 ~\la . ..:-\pp. 473; 109 So. 
S-!5 (1926). 
Surber v. State, 99 Ind. 71 (1884). 
Boreing Y. Com., :201 Ky. 47 4; 277 S. W. 
813 (1925). 
Com. v. licCabe, 163 ~Iass. 98; 39 N. E. 
777 (1895). 
McKelvey v. State, 69 Tex. Crim. 538; 155 
- s. \\. 932 (1913). 
It is respectfully submitted on behalf of the State 
that all of this evidence referred to as Classification 
Knmber 2 was clearly admissible under the cases 
above set fort~ especially when it is considered in 
connection with the other evidence introduced in 
this case. To merely take, for instance, the tes.ti-
mony that Early infonned Finch that there was 
talk of a pay-off, does not, standing alone, have 
any probative value, but when we consider that this 
was only one of a number of instances when such 
information was given to Finch, and then when in-
vesti~ation was being made and he was talking to 
the chief law enforcement officer of the city, for 
him to say he had never heard of this pay-off si~ 
nation before, we bP.gin to see that the conduct of 
Finch was that of evasion and not that of an in-
nocent man. In other words, we sincerely hope 
that the Court will consider the probative value of 
all this evidence by looking at its background in 
the other testimony admitted in this case. 
We submit thnt this elridence comes "'nithin ~thP 
general rules heretofore cited and quoted from 
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Underhill American JRrisprudence and Cor.pu.s 
Juris, and that the cases herein cited indicate that 
this evidence was prope·rly admitted. 
CLASSib'IUA'l'ION NO. 3. 
:Co.uns~ 1 for .Pearce .and }finch have picked out 
about seventeen different points of ev1dence and 
classified them under this classification, stating 
that it is their position that none of this eviden~e 
under the rules of permissible evidence tends to 
establish in any degree the existence of the agree--
ment and conspiracy alleg-ed and that it is erron-
eously admitted and highly prejudicial. As indi-
cated by 
State v .. Inlow, supra, 
we cannot take an isolated f.act and then co·-s~(l{,. 
that evidence alone in determining whether or not 
it has any probative value. We must look at it 
in its background of facts contained in the case. 
Counsel for the State will attempt to discuss eacil 
individual piece of evidence noted by the defend-
ant and show "rherein it has probative value. The 
testimony of D. L. Hays was to the effect that he 
told Mr. Finch, "You must kno'v that gambling is 
g-oing on in these places either vvith protection or 
\vithout regard to law.'' Mr. Finch stated that he 
knPW that gambling was going on and when ask.ed 
by Hays what he 'vas going to do about it, smd, 
he wasn't going to do anything about it. This con-
vers.ation took place about November of 1937. Thi~ 
\vas direct evidence, that Mr. Finch was told of 
the prevalency of gambling in Salt Lake City. As 
previously pointed out, Mr. Finch had the duty of 
enforcing the law of this State and of Salt Lake 
City, and yet he states that hP "rasn 't going to do 
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tnrrthin<>' about ga1nbling in Salt Lake City. 'l'his 
.. t) 
is a statement of his attitude and when "··e eon~ider 
the other evidenc-e in the easl~ of his telling 8tnith 
in April of 1936 that 1he pay-ofi <nnounted at tltat 
time to about $2,000 a month and ..:\_be Rosenbhun 
would do the .collecting. He told Holt to see Rosen .. 
blum about making colleetions and shortly berorr~ 
this latter, had told Holt to close the town up, and 
about the first of ~-\.ngnst told hnn to let the places 
open up and when agitation by the "'"on1en 's clubs 
and others became frequPnt he told Holt in Jan-
nary of 1937 to close everything up and see that 
there was no more pay-off. His attitude as stated 
to Mr. Hays corroborates this other evidence and 
we can see why it is he refused to do anything 
about gambling. ~Ir. Finch's attitude in this re-
spect is a material thing for the jury to consider. 
The next testimony referred to is that of Judge 
Ellett ''concerning the discussion as to the pay .. 
tnent of fines of bookmakers so that the city could 
get the benefit of the fine~.'' Of cour:e, this tPsti-
mony now under consideration was involved in a 
conversation had with Mr. Finch and \Va.~ discusse--~ 
under Classification X o. 2. Judge Ellett had re-
fused to entertain jurisdiction of a charge against 
the keeper of a gambling game, stating that r. per-
son committing such an act was subject to a felony 
charge and where that was so, he would require the 
complaint to be t.aken to the Countv Attorney's 
office. Finch wanted to h~ able to . handle th~se 
cases in the City Court where a fine could be im-
posed. He discussed the possibility of thir-; with 
Judge Ellett and the judge told him that he would 
not be a party to such procedure because his friends 
had informed him that Finch was receiving- $2,500 
a month in his hand behind his back and that they 
just couldn't g-et together on such a Bcheme ,as 
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'fha t. Finch said nothing for a minute or two and 
merely looked at his shoes. Under the cases here-
tofore cited in Classification No. 2, this evidence 
is admissible as an implied admission by Finch . 
.. A .. s to whether or not a reply was called for, we mav 
turn to Finch's testimony as shown on Page 18Z 
of the Abstract and we find there that Finch 
E,tated that he told Ellett that he had heard these 
TUlnors an his life. Apparently even Finch be-
lieved that some answer was necessary to this 
accusation by Judge Ellett, but the jury has appar .. 
~ntly preferred to believe Judge Ellett on this sub .. 
ject that no re-ply "\Vas made. Another piece of evi ... 
dence referred to by the defendants is the testi-
mony as to Mr. Finch that l1e did not particularly 
object to vice, but didn't want them to get the best 
of it. Here again "\Ve have a statement of attitude 
by Mr. Finch, that he was not narticularly inter-
ested in enforcing the law which it was his duty to 
do, and his subsequent conduct is in line. 'vith tbiR 
~ttitl~de 'vhich he took in talking to the head of 
his Vice Squad. 
Counsel s.tates that another piece of evidence under 
this classification is that on two or three occasions 
:B-,inch ordered some operators to close and "these 
., a ter re-opened.'' To consider this matter as 
isola ted from the rest of the case does not show 
clear (v just what Mr. Finch was doing, and this 
statement of counsel's is a. nice bit of understate-
ment. Under the evidence as introduced. i~1 ta1e 
latter part of June or the first part of July in 193fi 
after Holt had repor'ted to Finch the· fact that 
peop1le up and down the street 'vere talking of the 
graft pay-off, he told Holt to close up all the places 
in to,vn. Holt visited them and thev were close{1. 
Then hecaus.e Holt knew too much or for some other 
reason best kno,vn to Finch, Holt was called in and 
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told to see Rosenbhuu nnd to do 'vhat Rosenblu1n 
said. Then it ""as that RosPnbhuu dhwus~t\d '.?Ol-
lections for houBPB of prostitution. ~hortly nftPr 
this and about the first of ~\ugust, at ""hich ti1no 
Holt was to commence collections, Fin(•h ealled Holt 
in and told Holt to let the Yarious es tablisJuuent s 
of vice reopen and not to let them run too openly. 
Is this the conduct of an innocent n1an ·? Is this the 
conduct of a person who is not conspiring to per-
mit, allow. assist and enable houses of prostitu .. 
tion and gambling establishment~ to operate in vio-
lation of law! Here he is telling the Chief of his 
Anti-\Tice Squad to permit these places to open and 
run in violation of law. In January of 1937 things 
again became a little hot because of rumors and 
the talk of these women's clubs and again Holt was 
called in and told to close up all the places in town 
and to see that there was no more pay-off. Ho"' 
counsel can glibly say that this evidenee consists in 
Finch ordering on two or three occasions ''some 
operators to close, and these later reopened'' IS 
a mistatement of the evidence. 
Counsel then says that the following evidence is 
under this classification. ''That he (Finch) told 
the witness Holt he was making the town too ho-t, 
the later removal of Record and the later a.ppoint.-
ment of Thacker'' is another outstanding example 
of misstatement. To take counsel's view of this evL 
dence, there is nothing in it. But let's place it in 
its background. It 'vas some time in. February 
that Holt was told that he was making the town ton 
hot. Yes, and why ''Ta.s this~ Holt. had been 
regularly collecting from the prostitutes on the fir~.t 
day of each month since AuQ'ttlst of 1936 and appar-
ently someone was ~etting' close on Holt's trail. and 
that is whv Holt was removed. H. K. Record was 
then made.thP Chief of fhP Anti-Vice Squad. ·While 
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he was serving in this capacity,, Pearce called him 
up and asked him to make collections from gambling 
establishments and other forms of vice. Record re_ 
fused to do this and within fifteen days he was re-
moved and Thacker placed on the squad with Holt 
on there to collect ag'ain from the prostitutes. This 
time it was not under Rosenblum, but under Ben 
Harmon, the man who had been making complaints 
to Finch about Rosenblum's place of business. 
The next bit of evidence that defense counsel tries. 
to pass off is that Holt de,clared that Finch told him 
to see Rosenblum. Of course .. as heretofore pointed 
out, this fitted in perfectly With the scheme of en-
abling these places to operate and by so enabling 
them, to enrich the public officials of Salt Lake 
City. 
Counsel says that the follo\ving testimony comes 
within this classification.' ''The testimony of Holt 
in \vhich he intimated that Mr. Finch had told 
him to quit making collections, but which simmers 
down to the testimony that ~fr. Finch had told 
him to close some p~Iaces up,'' If counsel were 
attempting to deliberately misstate the record, he 
could not have done· it any better. Holt's testi-
mony did not simmer do"\\rn to any such thing. 
I-Iolt's testimony \vas, and remains, that' Finch told 
him. to make absolutely no more collections. 
The testi1nonv of Fishe-r Harris . that Mr. Finch 
had stated on"' two occasions that he did not believe 
that there was a pay-off and had not heard of a 
pay-off and at the Alta Club that he said it was 
the first time that he had heard of the pay-of( and 
Finch's willingness to resign have been considered 
under Classification No. 2, and comes under the 
heading of conduct indicating a consciousness of 
guilt. Mr. Finch's agT'eemernt to resign is 'par-
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ticularly significant in Yie"~ of the charge that "·ns 
~ade against hhu. 
Counsel next includes in tl1is clas~ifieatiou the tp~­
timony of Mr. Hedman that he ru.1d Jlr. :B,inch talked 
in Mr. Finch ~s office of the n1att.er of an arrest 
by Hedman's department. The ::-itua.tion "·a~ 
simply this: gambling establishments had been 
raided bv the Detective Bureau "ithout the knowl-
edge of Thacker w·ho ''as at that tin1e in charge of 
the \"'ice-Squad. Mr. Hedman was called in by 
Finch and there was Thacker. Thacker told Hed-
man that no further arrests were to be n1ade of 
gambling establishments mthout Thacker's knowl-
edge and that if any such information w·ere re-
ceived U> place it in an envelope- on Thacker's desk 
regardless of its ur~ncy, and Finch sat there and 
said nothing. 1! nder the particular circumstances 
of this conversation how could Hedman or anyone 
else come to any other conclusion than that Finch 
was backing no Thacker in his demands, and view-
ing this in the light of the other evidence we can 
wpll understand why Finch would be ba(llrin-v 
Thacker to prevent anyone from upsetting their 
little scheme to enrich them~elve~ by enabling these 
establishments of vice to onerate. The testimo11y 
of 0. B. Rooord of a similar charftcter wifh Mr. 
P~nch ic: merely f11rlhP-r evide11ce of fhi~ ~arne thing, 
that is, preventing- other officers from arre~ting 
;n p]aP-f?S withi11 tl1n n-rotection of the co-nsniratorR. 
The testimony that Finch was seen talking to 
Rm~enhlnm i ~ admi~sihle on the theory of showing 
their association and acquaintanceship. 
Counsel then suggests that the evidence of the pay-
ment to Pearce by Holt of the money collected from 
house8 of prostitution com~s within this classifica-
tion; also the talk bv Mr. Pearce with Holt in Sep-
tember or October ·of 1937 about the collections 
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firom various houses of p-rostitution. How evidenc~ 
eould he any more relevant or more material is hard 
to understand. t,his testimony connected Pearce 
with the collect~ons of moneys from these places. 
that were enabled to operate by police protection 
to enrich the consp~irators. The testimony of Fi~her 
I-Iarris with respect to the conversation with Pearce 
and his subsequent conversation over the telephone 
has heretofore been discussed. Then counsel re-
fe.rs to the testimony of Record that Pearce called 
him into his office and told him that he (Pearce) 
had been authorized by the Mayor to make collec-
tions from gambling establishments and other in-
stitutions of vice, and then requested Record to 
make collections fron1 the gambling establishments. 
Here ag1ain, we have evidence of Mr. Pearce at-
tempting to further the interests of the conspir-
ators by getting a p-erson who could make the col-
lections from those places that were to be pro-
tected from the enforcement of the law. 
It takes no argument to show that all of this evi-
dence was material and tended to establish the con-
nection of the· defendants \vith the conspiracy 
alleged in the indictment. 
fijvery ease cited under this classification is a case 
invo lving1 the sufficiency of the evidence and its ad-
missibility. In 
Wilder v. United States, 100 Fed. (2d) 177 
(lOth Circuit- 1938), 
the appealing defendants and others were charged 
with a conspiracy to commit .an off en~e against the 
United States, that is, to engage in the business of 
distilling whiskey and other distilled spirits wtth-
out registering the still, to carry on the business of 
distiller without giving bond and with the intent .. to 
defraud the government of tax on the spirits d1s· 
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tilled, to n1ake Inn~h fit fo·r di~tillation on prenli~e~ 
other than a di~tillery authorized by bnr, to rt\lllOYL\ 
distilled spirits on ,,-hich the tax. h.ad not been paid 
to a place other tl1an a. distillery \Ynr~hOU8P, ~L\ll 
distilled spirits so ren1oved and to po~~t\~s d.i~tilled 
spirits in containers not bearing the shnups re-
quired by law. The e'idenee ~ ho\Yed a collection 
system created by some of the defendants, \vho 
\\ere sheriffs a.nd deputy sheriffs. 
The Court specifically said that it \Yns nnncee~sary 
for them to express any opinion as to whether the 
e'idence pro\ed a conspiracy to violate the Okla-
homa laws, since it was tbe pronnce of the courts 
of the State to determine that question. The Court 
pointed out that the county officials and their dep-
uties did not bear any· official duties by virtue of 
their offices to enforce the Internal Revenue Laws 
of the United States. and hence their failure to 
enforce snch laws and to prevent a conspjracy to 
violate them was not enough to support a convic-
tion under the Federal Conspiracy Statute. The 
Court held that there was no substantial evidence 
from which it could be reasonably inferred that dP-
fendants formed and furthered an agreement or 
understanding expressed or implied havin<r for its 
object the violation of thP ]a\\~s of t~1e United States. 
The first quotation on Page 78 of thP Finch and 
Pearce hrief relates to those places which posseRs.rv-, 
rlistilled spirits but also had a Federal lic~n~e an•l 
only sold tax paid liouor, and of course, these· in-
dividuals were not violating' the Federal statutes, 
and the only question considered by the Court ,vas 
the insuff]eiency of the evidence. In 
WenjR'er v. United States, 47 Feel. 697, 
Ninth Circuit, (1931), 
rlpfenda.nts were charg-ed with a conspiracy to y·io-
late th~ National Prohibition Law. The case was 
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,reversed because- of the insufficiency of the evi-
dence. The appealing_ defendants are the sher-
iff and his deputy of Shoshone, County. The 
other defendants who did not appeal 1.vere members 
of the Board of Trustees and the police officers of 
the village of Mullan. The conspiracy related 
solely to the liquor traffic in that village. The city 
officials encouraged liquor traffic by the collec-
tion of license fees pursuant to ordinances passed 
py the Board. ThPy agreed that in consideration 
of the payments of these fees they would not inter· 
fere with this traffic. The appealing defendants 
were outsiders, that is, ·with separate and distinet 
functions to perform so far as the village was con. 
cerned. The defendants did not connive with the 
other defendants in the collection of these fee~, 
hence, it became nec0ssary to sho'v that the appeaL 
ing defendants participated in some other way. 
~The evidence \vas to the effect that the 8heriff and 
his deputy felt no interest in and 'vere opposed to 
the enforcement of the N ationaJ Prohibition Law, 
nnd of ·course, 'vhich la.\v he had no duty to en-
force and the Court held tha.t the evidence ·fell 
s.hort of showin~ that the particular conRplirary-
'vhich was orQ"anized hv tl1p citv nffieials of th(l 
I •' o 
villag-e of Mullf!n VJq.~ :ioinPG in b:v tlH~~p. nnn~ellantR. 
ThP Court might \veil make the quotation carried 
as cited in larg-e caps 0n nag-P 80 of t.h~ Fineh fill~ 
Erwin hriPf. The aprnea.ling' dPfendanh~ 'vere not 
under ohl'ig-ation to PnforcP thP National Prnl1ihition 
Act. In any event that. nondition i~ 110t n.nnlicahl(l 
here heca.nsP it 'vas affirmativelv ~hown thflt all 
nf thP defendants very a.cthrely p~rticipated in the 
f'lonspirar.v. In this c:asp one annP11::tnt wn~ cro~c; 
P.xamined rPRPPcting- his knowledrre of the pre· 
va1encv of g-::1mhlinQ' in Mullan. Of course, there 
wns no allP~ation that fhr- clPtPnoantC'! ,vrrr i11 nn' 
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waY concerned in a conspira.ey affe·eting gantblin~. 
Ex~ept for this latter point, the entirp opi1~i~n 1.n 
this case deals with the qut:stion of the sufficlell(ly 
of the evidence. 
The other cases cited by counSl'l for the defendants 
under this classific.ation are good law·, but how they 
have application to the case at bar is difficult to 
see. In fact, they have no more to do "Tith it than 
the cases here discussed. It i~ ~ubmitted that all 
of the endence referred to under this classification 
was clearly adn1is~ible and "~hen considered with 
its backgr~und of other facts, tended to establish 
the guilt of each of these defendants 
CL~SSIFIC .. A TIOX 4. 
Under this classification, defense counsel treats of 
certain acts and declarations made by conspirators 
and it is the contention of the State that these acts 
were done in furtherance of the conspiracy and 
the declarations made concerning it were made 
'vhile it was in operation. 
Counsel has set up four nieces of evidence under 
this classification.- The first one 'vas that Mr. 
Hunsaker testified that Erwin had said ''I now 
' have my Chief of Police,'' and that he might not 
be_ getting his full split, but they conldn 't get the 
chief because he didn't make the collections. This 
testimony 'vas only appHcable to the defendant 
Erwin and constituted admissions on his behalf 
snowing that he was involved in a conspiracv to 
enable vice establishments to operate for his Lper-
sonal benefit. That is., he had some one making 
collections for him. This evidence should not be 
considered under this classification, but is purely 
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an admission against interest by the defendant 
Erwin. 
One of the leading cas.es on this question is the 
case of 
Delaney v. United States, 263 U. S. 586; 
68 L. Ed. 462; 44 Supreme Court 206 
(1924). 
The defendants in that case were charged with a 
conspiracy to violat~ the National Prohibition Act. 
In that case testimony was given by one of the cOIL 
spirators of what another of the conspirators (the 
latte-r being dead) had told him during the progress 
of the conspiracy. The Court held this evidence 
admissible and also stated that the extent to which 
that kind of evidence is. admissible is "ri thin the dis-
cretion of the trial court. There is no staten1ent of 
the evidence which was introducP-d in that casr. 
but in 
International Indemnity Company v. Leh-
nlan, 28 Fed. ( 2d) 1, Seventh Circuit 
( 1928). (Certiorari Denied, 278 U. S. 
648; 73 L. Ed. 561; 49 Sup. Ct. 83). 
the Court made an examination of the record in 
the Delaney case to ascertain 'vhat it was the wit-
ness 'had said and to which objection was made. 
It appears that a co-conspirator said, "He told n1e 
tha.t we could sell whiskey, that it is alright, that 
'Mr. G. had talked with Mr. D. (the Prohibition 
Director and the (lefendant herein) and that we 
could go ahead and sell ",.hiskey." 
The International Indemnity Company Y. 
Lehman, supra., 
discusses rather fully what evidence may be in-
troduced in the nature of declaration~ by a. con· 
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~pirator ''hil~h "'ould be binding on tht' other l'OH-
spirators. In tha~: ease plaintiff sued to recoYt\r on 
a contract of gu,1ranty and defendant couutt\r-
claimed for danul.g\?S in fraud. ..:\s to plaintiff's 
cause of action, there "~as a directed Yerdict in 
favor of the defendant. ... \. Yerdiet 'vas rendered 
for defendant on the counterclain1. The facts in-
volved 'vere these: Plaintiff, throug-h its officers, 
made an excessiYely high appraise1nent on land be-
longing to S.; S. sold this land to defendant, the 
defendant checking on the appraisement made by 
plaintiff; S. had sho"Wn defendant a piece of land 
other than his own and w-hich was worth more than 
S '~ land; one Smith "-as a representative of the 
defendant and testified that he asked S .. referring 
to the fraudhl®t -and oYer- c-~ppraisPment of the 
land by plaintiff, "What did they do that forf" 
It then appeared that Smith testified that, ''He, 
(S.) said Mr. Blackstock (president of plain tilt 
company) was a friend of his and he wanted them 
to put on a big appra~sement on it, so that he could 
dispose of it and he said that was "\Yhat they did. 
I told him that was not the "~ay respectable people 
generally did business." It was held that this was 
admissible 8ince there was proof of a conspiracy 
between S. and the plaintift The Court then 
stated that it could terminate the discussion as to 
admissibility and uphold the_ ruling of the lower 
court on the authority of 
American Fur Company v. United States, 
2 Pet. 358; 7 L. Ed. 450 (1829). 
Nudd v. Burrows, 71 U. S .. 426; 23 L. Ed. 
286 (1875). 
Wiborg v. UnitBd States ; -41- L. Ed. 
289 ; 16 Sup. Ct. 1127, 1197 ( 1895), and 
Delaney v. United States, supra, 
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;but there were so many cases ~ilniting admissible 
acts or declarations to those dt>ne in '~furtherance 
of the conspiracy'' that a consideration of t.llEt 
rneaning of this phrase should be had.. The Court 
said: 
''Some Courts have held the declarations 
of one consp~irator adn1issible vvhen they 
for1ned pal't of the res g-estae, while still 
others have admitted such declarations 
when made 'during the progress~ and in 
the prosecution of, the joint undertaking, 
or accompanying, and explaining acts done 
in furtherance thereof'. '' J ones1 Comm. on 
Evidence, Sec. 943. 
R·eference. is also made by the Court to the case of 
Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Com-
pany v, Hillman, 188 U. S. 208; 23 Sup. 
Ct. 294; 47 L. Ed. 446. 
Of this case the Court stated: 
"Suit vvas upon an insurance policy. De-
fendant denied the death of the insured 
and charg-ed various individuals with con-
spiring to defraud it out of a large su1n of 
money by reporting his death vvhen they 
knew he was alive. The trial court re-
fused to receive the te-stimony of certain 
\vitnesses \Yho would have testified as to. 
conversations had vvith certain of the con-
spirators other than Hillmon, the insured. 
l! 
One witness, Crew, would have testified 
that he was acquainted with Baldwin and 
had several notes for collection against him, 
two of which were secured by a mortg·age 
lH)()11 "~Hi~l1 be "\\""as rontt"'mpl nJing- fore-
closure. B:1ld,Yin told him that a part of' 
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the money represented by his indebtedness 
had been furniwed to in~ure the life of 
Hillman, and tl1at as soon as he could g"et 
it he would be able to straighten up all 
his affairs. The "itness Carr \YOuld have 
te~tified that he and Bald,,·in had been out 
buying live stock, and that Bald"·in stated 
·he"~as under 'brogue' "ith John,,.,._ Hill-
mon, and he said that he and Hilhnon had 
a sehe1ne under ~brogue,' and he said that 
if it worked c.ut all right he was all right.' 
In a literal sense:- it could hardly be said 
that this testimony was in furtherance of 
the conspiracy. The Court, however, held 
tl1at sueh testimony should have been re-
ceived. '' 
The Court then quotes as follows· 
''These questions and declarations of 
Baldwin to the four witnesses above stated 
-were made either just before or just after 
the policy was taken out. They were not 
so much narrative of what had taken place 
n~ of the purpose Baldwin had in view, 
and we know of no substantial reason whv 
they do not fall within the general rule, 
stated by Greenleaf (1 Greenleaf on Ev .• 
RP~. 111), that every act and doolara tion 
of each member of the conspiracy, in pur-
suance of the original concerted plan, and 
with reference to the common object, is, 
in contemplation of the law, the act ancl 
declaration of them all, and is the ref ore 
original evidence. against each of thPm 
The conspiracy then existed and was still 
d. '' n~n 1n~. 
Tbe Court quotes 
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~farron v. U. S., 8 Fed. (2.d) 25~ 
as follows:. 
''It is. elementary that, where there is 
proof of a conspiracy, the act or declara-
tion of one of the parties thereto in ref-. 
erence to the common object may be given 
in evidence against the others '' 
The Court then stated: 
''The rule we deduce from these cases is 
that an admission of one conspirator if 
' made during the life of the conspiracy, is 
admissible against a joint conspirator, 
when it relevantly relates to and is 'in fur-
therance of the conspiracy' reference is 
not to the admission as such, but rather to 
the act concerning which the admission is 
made; that is to say, if the act or declara-
tion, concerning wh:i:ch lthe admission · or 
declaration is ·made, he in furtherance of 
the conRp~ira.cy, then it may be said that 
the admh;sion is in furtherance of t.he ~on .. 
:.-;piracy." 
The case of 
American Fur Company v. United State~. 
supra, 
was a libel for forfeiture of liquor transported ~o 
Indian country for trading purposes, and the Court 
stated the rule as to declarations as follows ~ 
" . . . where two or more person.." are 
assoeiated together for the same illegal 
purpose, any act or declaration of one of 
the parties, in reference to the common 
ohject, and forming a p'art of the re~ geRtae 
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may be g-1Yt:U m L)Yidence against the 
others.' 9 
ln l\udd v. Burro"·s, supra, 
declarations of one conspirator not in the presence 
of the defendants 'vere permitted, quoting the above 
quotation from the Americ.an Fur Company case. 
The endence was not set out. The Court, however, 
did hold that the rules of evidence are the same 
in both civil and criminal eases "There conspiracy 
is involved. In 
Wiborg v. l ... nited States, supra, 
the defendants were charged with setting on foot 
and preparing and providing means for a military 
expedition against Cuba. The defendants were in 
charge of a boat and took it outside the three mile 
limit and a number of persons came aboard from 
another boat and 'vere let off six miles from Cuba. 
Evidence of the declarations of members of the 
party as to their purposes was admitted. The deC-
larations mentioned in the opinion "ere that they 
were going to Cuba to fight the Spaniards. 'fhe 
trial court commented. that if they were in a com-
bination to do an unlawful act what was said by any 
of them in carrying out their purpose was evidence 
against ~them. -The rule as above stated in the 
American Fur Company case was again quoted and 
the Court stated: 
''The declarations must be made in fur-
thPrancr of the common object or must con-
stitute a part of the res gestae of acts 
done in such furtherance. Assuming a 
secret combination between the party and 
the captain or officers of the Horsa had 
been proven, then, on the question whether 
sueh combination was lawful or not, the 
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motive and intention, declarations of those 
engaged in it explanatory of the acts done 
in furtherance of its object came within 
the general rule and_ :w-ere competent. 
The extent to which evidence of this kind 
iB adn1issible is much in the discretion of 
tl;te trial eourt, and we do not consider 
that that discretion was abused in this in-
stance. Clune v. U. S.,. 159 U. S. 590;. 
40 L. Ed. 269 .. ' ' 
In United States v. Gooding, 12 Wheat. 
460; 6 L. Ed. 693 (1827), 
the prosecution was under the slave trade acts. De-
fendant was the owner of the vessel and one Hill 
\vas the cap,tain of said ship. While at St. Thomas, 
Hill talked to one Coit about _joining J!P as mate. 
In this conversation he described the voyage as 
one to obtain slaves. Coit asked who would see-
that the crew were paid in the event of disaster and 
Hill replied, "-Uncle ,John," meaning, as the witness 
understood, the- def~ndant. The Court held that 
this evilence was admissible and the Court said: 
''The testii]Iony went to establish that he 
endeavored to eng'age Captain Coit to go 
as mate for the voyage then in progress, 
and his declarations 'vere all made with 
r0-ference to that object, and as persuasives 
to the undertaking. They were, therefore, 
in the. strictest sense, a part of the res 
gestae, the necessary explanation attending 
the attempt to hire.'' 
In. Jones v. United States, 179 Fed. 584, 
Ninth Circuit (1910), 
the defendants were charged wfth a conspiracy to 
defraud the lTnited. States of certain public lands 
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by establishing a forest reserYe. A number of dec-
larations by conspirators in the abt'ence of other 
conspirator~ were adn1itted in eYidenet\. These 
statement~ "-ere held adnlis~ible against all the con-
spirators. The Court held that since the conspir-
acy was still in existence and although the state-
ments \Yere not strictly in furtherance of the con-
spiracy they related to its object and were adinis-
sible, therefore, as part of the res gestae. One 
Puter had a conversation with Mays and asked hin1 
if he didn ~t expect some opposition in having this 
reser\e established. Mays said not, saying that 
Senator Mitchell (a conspirator) was there to help 
him out ''and you know how Bing Hermann stands 
in." It was held that this evidence tended to show 
that Hermann was involved in the conspiracy. One 
Ormsby was to investigate the advisability of th~ 
reserve and received a letter from Hermann in-
structing him to make this investig'a tion. Ormsby's 
son had a conversation with Ormsby before th@ 
latter made the in\estigation. The son stated tha 1 
he heard there was going to be a reserve established 
or there was a movement to establish one and Orms-
by said, ''Yes, there is going to be.', The Court 
held that the declaration need not be made in fur .. 
therance of the conspiracy, and states : 
'' ... but in the :present case the statement 
was made "~hile the conspiracy was in pro-
gress, related to the object of the conspir-
acy and was therefore part of the res 
gestae.'' 
In People v. W o'ods, 206 Mich. 11 ; 172 
-,N. W. 384 (1919), 
the defendant was charged with arson. The evi-
dence tended to show a conspiracy between defend-
ant, LaFrance and McCauley to burn certain stock 
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and obtain the insurance, the same being the prop-
erty of the defendant. Defendant was to pay La-
France and McCauley for doing the job. A con-
versation, the words of \Vhich are not set out in 
the opinion,. was had between McCauley and ona 
Sullivan. The Court held that this evidence was 
properly .. admitted because it took place in connoo-
tion with work being done in furtherance of the con-
spiracy. The Court states: 
''The general rule is well settled that, 
where several p~ersons are engaged in one 
crime or unlawful enterprise, \Vhatever is 
Raid or done by one of them in the pros-
ecution of the common enterprise, or while 
it is still in p.rogress, is evidence against 
all the parties to it.'' People v. Pitcher, 15 
1\{ich. 396. 
''At the time of McCauley's conversation 
with Sullivan the consp~iracy was in pro-
gress. It took place in conneetion with 
\vor1{ being done to further the conspir. 
ncy, while some of the old livery stock was 
heing moved from LaFrance's place into 
the barn proposed to be burned~ which had 
nttracted Sullivan's attention.'' 
Burns v. State, 8 Okla~. Cr. 554; 129 Pac. 
R57, (1913), states the rule as follows= 
''But the law is equally well settled that, 
vrhere a conspiracy is entered into by two 
or more persons to do any unlawful art 
or to accomplish any unlawful purpose, the 
persons who engag'e therein are respon-
sible for all that is said or done in pur-
suance of such consp[racy by any of their 
co-conspirators nntil the purpose for which 
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the conspiracy "~as entered into has been 
fully accon1plished and that the respon-
sibility of co-conspirators is no~ confined 
to the accompli~hrnent of tl1e connnon pur-
pose for which a conspiracy is entered in-
to but extends to and includes all decla.rn-
' . tions made and collateral acts done In-
cident to and growing out of the common 
design, when spoken or done by a co .. 
conspirator as against all his co-conspir-
ators." 
In Carnahan v. L'nited States, 35 Fed. (2d} 
96, Eighth Circuit (1929), 
the defendants were charged with a conspiracy to 
violate the National Prohibition Act. While the 
defendant DeMayo was waiting for the defendant 
Carnahan to drive up with a car loaded ·with alcohol, 
DeMayo stated to two government witnesses, ''in 
connection with his suspicions because the car of 
Carnahan was being followed:" 
" 'Yon are the first stranger I ever deal 
with;' he says, 'I "Men doing business here 
for a long time, government try to get. 1ne 
for at least 5 years, but they have not suc-
(lreded yet. I told my boy if the govern-
ment wants tn have me- arrested thev would 
arrest me on the first delivery I make.' He 
·says, 'If they would have arrested me look 
what the government will get in my pos-
session' and he pulled out of his pocket 
lwo checks. 'Some money, one check was 
$10,000 and one was $15,000, I savs to Mr. 
DeMayo, ·'You must do 'good business.' 
He says, 'Yes, I make about $10,000 worth 
of business per month'." 
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'The Court held that this was admissible and stated: 
'' 'l'his was a statement by a conspirator 
- concerning the subj.ect of the consp~iracy 
during the existence of the conspiracy. As 
such, it w.as competent against all of the 
conspirators. Lave v. U. S.t 34 F. (2d) 
413. '' 
In Lancaster v. United States,. 39 :E,ed. (2d) 
30, Fifth Circuit ( 1930) ~ 
the defendants were charged with a conspiracy to 
unlawfully import, transport ap.d sell intoxicating 
liquor. The liquor was obtained in Cuba. One of 
the defendants stated to Dep~ew who was then be-
ing employed to make the trip to Cuba that he and 
the other ap,pellants had taken a trip to Havana and 
had made all arrang·ements to get the liquor. It 
\Vas held that this evidence was properly admitted~ 
since the conspiracy then existed. In 
Irvin v. State, 11 Okla. Cr. 301: 146 Pac. 
453, ( 1915) 1 
the defendants were charged with murder. Th~ 
evidence tended to show that the defendant"s ac~ 
tions were motivated by a conspiracy to obtain by 
fraud and forg1ery the land _of the persons killed. 
A witness testified that the defendant Allen stated 
at about the time of the murder that here vvas $5000 
in it to be furnished by a Muskogee man named 
[rvin if they would kill the two -children and n1othct 
with d}rnamite, powder and coal oil. Allen also 
Elaid that if the witness could go to Mexico and 
identify .one Sellers (father and husband of thosP 
killed) there would be expenses a.nd $500. Irvin wa:3 
not present. It was held that this was admissible 
against all of the conspirators, including Irvin. In 
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Kolkman Y. l:leople, 89 Col. 8; 300 I) a c. 
575 (1931), 
it is held that acts and declaration8 nutde by con· 
spirators to conceal and preyent deteetion of erime 
are admissible in eYidence as against its conspir· 
a tors not present. To the sa1ue effect see 
Lew Moy '· l .... S., 237 Fed. 50 (1916). 
In the light of the foregoing cases counsel for the 
State proposes to ~cuss the evidence here r~· 
ferred to by counsel for the defendants. 
The first testimony referred to is that incident 
about the middle of January, 1938 'Yhen Harmon 
called Holt and asked him to pick him up on First 
South and Regent Street. Holt picked him up and 
after driving down onto the West side of Salt Lake, 
Harmon said, ''For God's sake don't take any more 
collections whatever, because l\fr. Harris and ~1r. 
Lee have got hold of Mr. Pearce and accused him 
of being in the pay-off. For God's sake see that 
there is no more- of it. Don't take anything from 
anybody because it might blow over.'' Both Holt 
and Harmon were in this conspiracy and Har1non 
was here doing an act to oonceal or prevent the 
detection of this conspiraey. In other words, he 
was telling Holt to cease the continued collection of 
moneys in hopes that the thing would ''blow over.'' 
The jury could infer from this that he had in mind 
that if these collections were ceased there would be 
no further activity in detecting the existence of the 
conspiracy. .A:s explanatory of his declaration in 
this regard, he stated thaf Pearce had been accused 
by Fisher Harris of being involved. This latter 
statement under the above authorities was merely 
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a part of the res g~estae of this. declaration and as 
said in some of the foregoing cases. it '\Vas a declara-
tion made incident to and gro'\.ving out of the com .. 
mon desiglll and was stated while the conspiracy 
was in progress. So far as the case at bar is con· 
cerned, this is the declaration '\vhich closed the con.., 
spiracy and as app,ears from this staten1ent the 
acts in furtherance ceased '\Vi th the hopes that the 
investigations would ''blow over,'' as they had don~ 
on at least two previous occasions. It is ,sub1nitted 
that this declaration was admissible and binding 
on all persons engaged in the conspiracy. 
The next testimony referred to vvas that of the w-it-
ness Kempner when he rel~ted the trip on which 
Abe Stubeck collected money from three of th<1 
eard games and brought the money to Ben Har1non 
at the Mint. The testi1nony sho,ved that the thrett 
JP'laces visited by St.uheck were eng,aged in gambling 
in violation of law. The testimony of D. L. Hayes 
proved this illegal activity. It is submitted that 
e.ny person "rho was collecting money from these 
places was engaged in the furtheranee of the con· 
spiracy to enable those particular gambling estab .. 
[ishments to operate. While Stubeck was perform. 
rng these acts in furtheranee of the conspiracy and 
as part of the res g:estae and characterizing the acts 
he was doing, he stated that all card g·ames were 
paying off; that he took the. money to Ben Har· 
mon 's place and that Harmon would split the money 
with Erwin and his crovvd. Here ag·ain it is sub .. 
mitted that thes~ deelarations by Stubeck were 
made while the conspiracy was in progress and 
were made in relation to the co.nspira.cy. While 
these declarations were not strictlv in furtherance 
of the conspiracy, they ·come withh; the meaning of 
(-ha.t term as ]aiel rlo,,rn in 
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· Delaney v. l~nited States, supra, and 
International Indemnity Company. v. Leh-
man, supra, and other cases ei ted. 
The next testimony that is referred to as being· "·ith-
in this classification and inamuissible is the con .. 
versation that H. K. Record had "i th Pearce so1no 
time during the middle of ~\pril, 1937 .. A.t that time 
H. K. Record was Chief of the \ ... ice Squad and 
Pearce called him and asked /him to come to his 
office. On his arrival he found Mr. Pearce and 
Ben Harmon there. Pearce told Record that he 
had been responsible for ha,ing him placed as head 
of the ·'\"'ice Squad and Erwin had instn1cted him, 
Pearce, to make collections fro~ ~mbling houses 
and other forms of vice. Record asked them how 
much they wanted or expected to get and Pearce 
replied $1700 per month. Record then asked Pearee 
where he expected to get that much and Pearce out-
lined amounts he expected to obtain from various 
gambling establishments. Record told Pearce that 
he wonldn 't be a party to a thing of that kind and 
Pearce said that if Record would -string along \Vlth 
them .and keep things in line he would give him 
$165 of it. Record again told him that he would 
not be a party to such a thing and Pearce told him 
they would get someone else to handle it. Pearce, 
insofar as he himself was concerned, by this state-
;ment admitted that he "~as working 'vith Erwin. 
_He was here attempting to get' someone to make 
collections in furtherance of the conspiracy alleged 
in the indictment. 
This is very similar to the ca~e of Gooding v. 
United States, where Hill was attempting to get 
Coit to joip i~ the illegal enterprise of obtaining 
slaves. This certainly was an act done ·-in further-
ance of the conspiracy and all statements made in 
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that connection 11nder the foregoing authorities 
which might he considered as res gestae of such 
act are admissible in evidence. The statements of 
Pearce were made while the conspiracy was in pro-
gress and had relation to its objects. Under the 
foregoing this evidence was clearly admissible. 
THE TESTIMO·NY OF THE ACCO·MPLICE 
HO·LT WAS SUFFICIENTLY CORROB· 
ORATED. 
Golden Holt was an accomplice of the defendants 
Pearce, Erwin and Finch, but his testimony was 
sufficiently corroborated. 
Section 105-32-18, Revised Statutes of Utah 
1933, provides : 
''A conviction shall not he had on the tes .. 
timony of an accompl~ce, unless he is cor-
roborated by other evidence, whicli in it. 
self and without the aid of the testimony 
of the accomp~lice tends to connect the de-
fendant with the .commission of the offense; 
~,'"'d thP corroboration shall not be suffi-
cient, if it merely shows the commission of 
the offense or the circumstances thereof.'' 
All the cases which decide th~ problem of whether 
or not an accomplice is surficiently corroborated 
must consist of a construction of the foregoing 
statute. As pointed out in 
PowPll v. State, 177 Ark. 938; 9 S. W. (2d) 
583 (1928): 
''Of the many decisions of this Court pass-
ing on the question of a corroboration of 
an accomplice, not on~ of them is author-
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ity for any other tle(?ision of tha.t. que::;tion, 
because each ease nt\cessa.rily n1u::;t depend 
upon its o''~ pt'Culiar facts, and no cas.e 
ts found "There the facts art\ preci~ely the 
same .. , 
Counsel for the State "ill follo" .. the rule as sug-
gested by this Court in 
S t L • - .., T..,..tah 1 "'•) • •) P ( •)d) •) i -l ta .e v. ariS, 1 ~ u ~v, ..... • ... ....·:b>, 
wherein it quotes fron1 a Texas case to this effect: 
··Eliminate from the case the evidence ot 
the accomplice and then examine the evi-
dence of the other witness or witnesses 
with a vie"~ to ascertain if there be in-
culpatory evidence. ' ' 
Taking first _the endence against Finch whlch was 
testified to by witnesses other than the accomplice 
Golden Holt, we find that Austin Smith testified 
'that about a month after Finch was appointed, he 
ialked With Finch at Finch's home. Finch stated 
that he liked his job alright and when asked approx-
imately what the pay-off \\~as as it existed at the time, 
Finch ans,vered that it \Yas approximately $2000 
per month. Smith then asked him who was getting 
~he money, what became of it and who collected, 
and Finch said that probably Abe Rosenblum would 
collect it as he had had experience alqng those 
lines. Next we have the testimony of A. H. Ellett, 
Judge of the City Court, who had a conversation 
with Finch some time about the middle of April, 
1936. This conversation took place on the same 
day that Jndg~ Ellett had refused to entertain 
charges against keepers of gambling games in the 
City Court, but had .stated that those cases should 
be taken to the County Attorney's office since 
tlw"i" \\ .. r.~'o felony cases. Finch at that conversation 
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asked the judge why they coulcln''t get together on 
the sentencing of these gamblers. and let them pay 
the fine and let the city get the revenue. Judge 
Ellett told him that the reason they couldn't do 
that was because his friends told him that Finch 
was taking $2500 per month in his hand behind his. 
back and that the judge would not he a party to it. 
Finch said nothing for a minute or t'vo but merely 
' . looked down at his shoes. As heretofore indicated 
' l.t is- the- contention of the State that this showed 
t.hat Finch was conscious. of his guilt ana constituted 
an implied admission of the statement made. 
About the 25th day of August 1937, 0. B. Record 
and Officer Burke made an arrest in the basement 
of the Atlas Building for bookmaking. A couple 
of days I~ater Officer Record and Sargeant Pearce, 
a po lj ce officer, made an arrest in the basement of 
the New Grand Hotel of some bookmakers. After 
these two arrests, Record had a conversation with 
Finch and Finch asked him if he had any complajnts 
about these particular places and Record said that 
he ha.dn 't. Finch then suggested that he let Thacker 
handle the arrests and not to interfere and that if 
there were any complaints of gambling to let 
Thacker or Finch know and he '\Yould see that tlwy 
wer~ taken care of. 
D. L. Ha,ys had a conversation with Finch about 
November 1937 at Finch's office. 1-lays told Finch 
' ,that he must know that gambling was going on 
ieither under protection or without regard to law. 
Finch stated that he knew gambling 'vas going on 
and when asked what he was going to do about it, 
J1 e replied that he 'vas not going to do anything· 
about it. 
Soon after Christmas of 1937, Captain Hedman, 
who 'vas in charge of the D0tcetiv0 Bureau, was 
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called to Finch ,s olfice. \\'hen he arrived l~'iuch 
stated that rfhacker ~eelllL\d to have a grit_~\·ance. 
Thacker ~tated that lie ''"~Ultt.•d to kno\v "·hy l1L\Li-
man had ordered a raid on a g·ainbliug .place at an 
address ;,e~t on -±th ~outh and Hed!uan said that 
he hadn't ordered tl1e raid, but that it had been 
made by the Detective Bureau, but eouldn ~t ~ee '"hat 
difference it made 'vho ordered the raid. Thacker 
stated that he had to kno'' about these raids and 
Hedman then wanted to know what Thacker ex· 
pected him to do. Thacker told him to write it 
down and leave it on his desk, that is, any informa-
tion relative to gambling. Hedn1an wanted to know 
what was to be done if Thaeker wasn't there and 
the nature of it was that it had to be taken care 
of immediately. Thacker told him to still put it 
in an envelope and leave it on his desk and he would 
take care of it. Finch sat thP.re and said nothing 
and as pointed out before by his conduct anyone 
would say that he was in favor of what Thacker 
requested. This has also been pointed out to have 
aided them in effecting the object of the conspiracy 
alleged. 
\V e then have the conversations belween Finch and 
Fisher Harris in Harris's office and also at the Alta 
Club. His conduct in this regard was discussed 
1mder that subdivision of the brief relating to con-
duct evincing consciousness of guilt. Then, of 
course, there is the fact that Finch at first agreed 
to resign when Harris told of his involvement in 
the collection of moneys from vice and his subse-
quent refusal to resign. Also in connection with 
his denials of kno,vledge of the pay-off we must re-
member the statemEnts made by Early and by Smith 
telling him of these conditions. These again were 
oonsirlered in that part of the brief relating to con-
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~ciousness of guilt and this CoU!rt' is respectfully 
a·eferred to that sundi vision for the contention of 
;the State as to force of this testimony. Does this 
testimony in itsel:t tend to connect the defendant 
"\Vith the commission of this offense~ This testi .. 
mony shows that he knew the amount of the pay-
off, knew that Abe 1-tosenblum did take care of the-
collections; that he impliedly admitted he was re .. 
ceivingi $2500 per month behind his back~ that he-
was telling some officers not to make an arrest, but 
to let others do it;. .ana then impliedly admitted at 
the Alta Club that he 'vas receiving $5000 per 
month, and then vvhen faced in the involvement of 
:the houses of prostitution, he agreed to resign. 
Of course, in addition to Holt's testimony, is tho-
testimony that these gambling places were opetat 
ing \vide open; that the houses of prostitution were-
~n op·eration; that P'earce attempted to get Record 
to make collections; and then 'vithin two weeks. 
,after Record's refusal to take part in the collection 
of money, Finch removed him as head of thP. Vice-
Squad. It is submitted that this testimon) tnn·ls. 
to connect th~ defendant Finch with a conspiracy 
to permit, allow and enable houses or ill-fame and 
gambling establishments to operate in viola· 
tion of law. 
"raking next the tostimony against P0:1 ree \Ye find in 
April of 1937 he called H. K. Record into his offire 
and while in the presence of Ben Harmon told 
Record that he "\vas responsible for having him 
placed as head of the Vice Squad and that Erwin 
ha.d instructed him, Pearce, to make collections 
from gambling houses and other forms. of Yice. 
This testimony lras been rerpe-a;ted twb o.r ~three 
times in the course of the brief and a further de· 
tail shouJd not here he necessary. 
We then have the testimony of Fisher Harris in 
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,vhich he told 1\•aree that he knl\\\. of Pearce's in· 
yolven1ent in the pl.1y-of.f and hi~ relation~hips '"ith 
Ben Harmon and the testimonY of 1 )earee 's eon-
duct which as heretofore arg:ued iudie.atPd an iiu .. 
plied adnris~!ion of lYi ~ inYoh·(\lnent and ~~lunyed 
conduct on his part indicating a et)nsciousness of 
guilt. It is submitted that this evidence in and of 
itself tends to connect Pearce "-i th a conspiracy to 
permit. allow, assi~t and enable houses of ill-famo 
and gambling establishments t{) operate in viola .. 
tion of law. 
As to the defendant Erwin, we ha¥e the evidence of 
Ben Hunsaker in which Erwin as early as ~larch of 
1936 fold Hunsaker that he had his Chief of Police 
and e~ected him to bring in good money, and fur-
ther told Hunsaker that he "'"as going to g.et his 
''bile he had a chance. Then there is the conversa .. 
tion of July 3, 1936 -with Hunsaker in which he told 
Hunsaker that he had had a hell-of-a-time getting 
things lined up and that he only had a few gambling 
and a few bootlegging places going, but that 
he wa.S getting the women of the under-
world lined up and that he expected quite 
a lot of money to be coming in. Then ag1ain a con .. 
versation was had in the summer or fall of 1936 in 
which Hunsaker asked Erwin why he didn't \vrite 
out a check and mail it to him and Erwin stated 
that he was not crazv enough to take $200 in curJ 
rency and take it to the bank and get a check for it 
each month; that he didn't intend to let "those 
fellows know what he was doing and that he would 
take care of the note in his own way. '' Then a 
similar conversation when Erwin asked Huns.aker 
whether he was making a report on his income of 
the $200 ner month and when Hunsaker stated he 
WaR no+.~ Erwin said that he wonJd not rep·ort it. 
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Then on another occasion Erwin stated that he had 
his Chief of Police in there and that it was bring .. 
1ng him in very good money, hut not enough and if 
J1e had gotten the fi_nancial end of the city, he would 
he making plenty of money, and when Hunsaker told 
l1im they would get him,, Erwin told him that some~ 
body had to see him take the money; that they would 
l1ave to prove he took it and this they couldn't do. 
;because he didn't collect. He stated :B'inch was the 
man they would get) but then he didn't think they 
would be able to g,et Finch because he didn't do. 
the collecting hin1self, he had his n1en collect for 
lhim. 
In the summer of 1937 Er\\rin told Hunsaker that 
things had tightened up and that he vvas having a 
hard time, especially vvith the Women's Better-
rnent League in Salt Lake City. He stated they 
were after him and giving him a lot of trouble. 
Another conversation was had in 1937 in which l1e' 
told Hunsaker that he thought the Chief of Police 
vvas taking in a lot of money, but that he didn't 
kno\V whether he \Vas getting his right split. Then 
further conversations 'vere had in December of 1937 
~n which Erwin said tha.t if they got hot on his trail 
'be-eause of the things he was doing in Salt Lake, he 
'vould resign as 1vfayor. Then, of course, as against 
Erwin there was the testimony heretofore referred 
Ito under the subdivisjon of this brief relating to 
1conduct showing consciousness of guilt and implied 
admissions. That is, the testimony relating to the 
jnformation which Erwin. received of the pay-off 
(•xisting in Salt r~ake. His conversations with 
Fisher Harri~, thR nrohative value of vvhich has been 
heretofore mentioned, and two resignations which 
'vere handed in and which gave different reasons 
for his resjgnation. These resignatio11s were made 
nt n t11nr- 8hortl_\" nftcr I-!arris had marle the charges 
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!hat Er,vin 'yas involYt:·d in the eollection of tribute 
from yice establislnuents in Salt Lake City. 
It is respectfully subnri t ted that this evidence iu 
and of itself tends to connect Br"in "ith a con~ 
~piracy alleged in the indichnent. Of course, as 
pointed out before, there is the evidence of the oper-
ation of these places and the activity of the others 
which did not come from the lips of Unlden Holt. 
E·rE~ THOl~GH E\J:DEXCE " .... ..\.8 ADMITTED 
OF DIFFEREKT . ..\.XD SMAI~J,ER, CQN .. 
SPIRAClES, KO ERROR \VAS COMMITTEp 
The contention of counsel for the defendant that 
there was more than one conspiracy here involved 
is not conceded. It is the contention of the State 
that the same conspiracy existed throughout the 
tenure of office of Erwin and Finch and that vari .. 
ous persons had various parts to play in effecting 
the object of this conspiracy. The witness Holt 
was in it during almost all of the time of its exist-
ence. Rosenblum was in it at first, but was re .. 
placed by Harmon. Pearce also came into it at a 
later time, but it was still the same con~piracy that 
had been originated by Erwin and Finch when they 
took office, but for the purpose of argument, let u~ 
concede that smaller conspiracies were proven. 
Certainly they were conspira~~s to permit and 
allow houses of ill-fa~e to operate or gambling 
establishments to operate. 
Most of the cases cited on this subject by defens~ 
counsel have been overruled by the case of 
Berger v. United States, 295 U. S. ~7R; 79 
L. Ed. 1314 (1934). 
The only count that was really involved in that case 
was one charging a conspiracy to utter counterfeit 
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notes of one federal reserve bank each calling fur 
$100. Among the persons named as defendants 
were Katz, Rice and Jones~ Katz pleaded guilty to 
the conspiracy and testified for the Government. 
The evidence tended to establish not the one con· 
sp~iracy char.g1ed,. but two conspiracies. One oo .. 
tween Rice and Katz and another between 
Berger, Jones and Katz. The only connecting 
link between the two was that Katz was ill 
both. The Court points out that certiorari 
-was granted because of conflict among the 
circuits on the question of variance. The Court 
states that the law is well established that although 
an indictment cha,rges conspiracy amongr several 
persons, but the proof· established a conspiracy 
among only a fe\\r of them, the variance is not 
material or fatal. The Court then ·points out that 
several circuits have held that where one conspiracy 
was charged and the p~oof splits it into two, the 
variance is fatal. The Court states: 
''This view, however, ignores the question 
of materiality and should be so qualified 
as to make the result of the variance de. 
pend upon whether it has substantially in 
jured the defendant." 
The Court relies upon a state~ent directing it to 
enter judgment ''after an examination of the entire 
record before the Court, \Vi thout regard to tech~ 
nical errors, defects, or excepitions- ~hich do not 
affect the substantial rights of the party." Thi~ 
is similar to 
Section 105-43-1, Revised Statutes of lJtah, 
1933. 
The general rule that allegation and proof must bo 
the same is baRed upon the obvious require1nents, 
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(1) that the accused shall be_ ~~finitt)ly informed a~ 
to the charges again~t hiln so that he 1nay prt)sell t 
his defense and not be taken by surprise; and ( ~) 
that he may be protected against another prosecu· 
tion for the same offense. 
The proof was that the conspiracy bet"·een l{atz 
and Rice was with the purpose of uttering the notes 
to buy rings and the conspiracy bet." .. een Katz, Jones 
and Berger was to pass the notes to tradesmen. 
The Court stated that the evidence as to the con-
spiracy with "-hich the defendant " .. as not connected 
might be assumed to be incompetent, but nothing 
there appeared to prejudice his case. The Court 
held that the effect of defendant's objection was not 
that the indictment did not describe the conspir~ 
acies that the defendant -was convicted of, but that 
it described more. Under the authority of this 
case, it is submitted that if more than one conspir .. 
acy was shown, the conspiracies were within the 
allegations of the indictment and there was no pre .. 
judice to the defendants. This Berger case is also 
reported 
73 Fed. (2d) 278, (Second Circuit, 1934). 
The case of 
United States v. 1[anton, 107 Fed. (2d) 
~34 (2d Circuit - 1940) 
follows the Berger case. The defendants were 
charged with a conspiracy to obstruct the admin-
istration of justice and to defraud the United States. 
The indictment alleges that the de:Dendants con-
spired to obstruct justice in suits pending before 
certain courts of the United States to defraud the 
United States of the right to have the judicial 
function exercised vvithout lawful impairment. It 
is further alleged that one Fallon would seek out 
litigant~ and obtain money for judicial preference 
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to be given by Manton who .accepted money for such 
purpose. Twenty-eig)ht overt acts were alleged~ 
each act being in connection with a case on which 
Manton had received money.. 'l,he Court in that 
case held, as we think the Court should hold here, 
that the conspiracy was a continuing one and that 
there was only one consp·iracy. covering a consider-
able p.eriod of time. The defendant Spector was. 
only connected with one case,_ that case involving 
an infringement of a patent by the Packard Razor 
Company which the Schick Razor Company relied 
upon. Spector made the same contention which 
the defendants make under this subdivision of their 
brief. The Court stated: 
''In a case like this, it is enough that a con-
victed defendant knew he had connected 
himself .with a criminal conspiracy, even 
though he was unaware of its full extent.'' 
The Court then points. out that even though the 
evidence connected the defendant Spector with a 
smaller conspiracy, there was no fatal variance. 
The Court a! so stated: 
''If then, the view be adopted that Spector 
was not a party to the general conspiracy 
alleged the effect of the evidence 'vould he 
to split the conspiracy. so far as Spector 
alone is concerned, into two: One the gen-
eral conspiracy and the other, a ~nnaller 
one, confined to the Schick ca.se. Some of 
the Circuit C1ourts of Appeal have held 
that this would constitute a fatal variance, 
but the Supreme Court in Berg'er v. United 
States; 2·95 U. S. 78; 55 S. Ct. 629; 79 L. Ed. 
1314, rejected that concept, holding that it 
ignored the ques.tion olf mate·riality and 
'should he so qualified as to make the re-
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suit of the ya.riance depend npon "·hetlu.\r 
it has substantially injured t hl' defend-
ant'." 
Another case which follows the Beregr case i~ 
Kopold-Quinn & Co Y. United States, 101 
Fed. (2d) 628 (5th Circuit - 1939). 
In that case the defendants ''ere charged with a 
conspiracy to violate the Securities Exchange Act 
and the nfail Fraud Statute. The defendants, Rice-
baum & Gould & Company were in a conspiracy 
with Mendelson~ Sueterman & Sherman to sell 
worthless stock and Kopold-Quinn & Company were 
in a conspiracy with the latter three to sell such 
stock. In other words, the first two named defend-
ants and Kopold-Qninn & Company were not in a 
conspiracy together at all. The Court said: 
''As to the conspiracy count, though not-
withstanding the fact that one conspiracy 
is charged and two proven "e think that 
under 'the Berger' case the conviction 
should be affirmed.'' 
Martin v. "Lnited States, 100 Fed. (2d) 491, 
(lOth Circuit Court - 1939), 
involved a contention that the indictment charged 
a nation-wide conspiracy and that the proof was 
of several small and jndependent conspiracies. The 
Court, in line with the Berger case, held that such 
variance was not fatal and affirmed the conviction. 
In the case of 
United States v. Weiss, 103 Fed. (2d) 348 
( 2d Circuit - 1939), 
one of the defendants clajmed that he was not a 
member of the general conspiracy to use the mails 
to defraud but his only connection related to get-
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ting m<?ney from one insurance company. The 
Court held that from his relations with the others 
it might be held that he was in the general conspir-
acy. See also 
Allen v. United States., 4 Fed. (2d) 688 
(7th Circuit Court). 
This latter case sustains the proposition that there 
was only one conspira.cy here proved. 
It is resp,ectfully submitted that in tl1e first place 
the conspiracy alle-ged and the conspiracy proved 
was one continuous conspiracy, and that while vari-
ous individuals had diverse parts to p,lay in its 
accomplishment, it nevertheless remained but one 
conspiracy, and it is also submitted that even though 
this Court finds that there were more than one con-
spiracy p~roved, nevertheless under the authority 
of 
Berger v. United States, supra, 
and other cases de,cided in line with that case, there 
was no fatal variance and defendants. are not en-
titled to a reversal for such reason. 
THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA IS NOT 
APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS IN TIDS 
CASE. 
Defendants Pearce and Er,vin contended that the 
doctrine of res judicata is applicable to this case 
based upon the proposition that the said defend-
ants had heretofore been charged with a violation 
of 
Section 103-51-10, Revised Statutes of 
Utah, 1933, 
in that they did wilfully, knowingly and feloniously 
accept, receive, levy and appropriate money without 
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consideration from the prot~t\t'd~ of the t\arnings of 
women engagt'd in pro~titution and \\"l\ro aequitted 
on such charge. ln tilt\ trial of thi~ la t tL\r ca~e, the 
evidence of l:iolt tak.1ug the money tl) l\.1aree on or 
about the fir~t of June, 1~1~) ·,- \\-a~ introdueed in evi-
dence. It ::-hould be noted that the verdict of • "not 
nuilty"' 'YaS a 2"eneral yerdirt. In that case it \VHS to • '-' 
nece~sary for the jury to find beyond a reasonable 
doubt e.ach of the follo"~mg elements: 
{1) That the defendants accepted, received, levied 
~tnd appropriated money: 
(:2) That the said money was from the proceeds 
,)f the earnings of -women engaged in prostitution; 
(3) That the- defendants knew that said money 
was receiYed from the proceeds of the earnings of 
women engaged in prostitution; 
(4) That said money was so received without 
consideration. 
The question of whether or not Holt as an accom-
plice was sufficiently corroborated as to his de-
livery of this monev \\as also involved. From look-
ing at the general .. \erdict rendered in that case it 
is impossible to determine ·w·hether or not the jury 
reached its verdict based on t!Je proposition of 
whether or not that one or more of the elements 
heretofore set out \Yas not p.roved to their satis-
faction beyond a reasonable doubt, or whether it 
was ha~ed on their h~lief that there was a lack of 
corrobo-ration. If it was hased on a lack of evi-
dence with respect to the elements of the offense, 
it is impossible to determine which element was not 
nroved to their satisfaction bevond a reasonable 
doubt. If it was based on thP .lack of corrobora-
tion, they well might have believed that all of the 
elements heretofor-e set out ,yere proved to their 
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$atisfaction beyond a reasonabJe doubt. Holt's 
corroboration in the conspiracy ease need not be 
the same as the corroboration in the pandering 
case. In the pandering case, it \Yas necessary that 
the evidence tend to connect Pearce with the re-
ceipt of money on June 1, 1936. In the present case 
the corroboration evidence must tend to connect 
Pearce and Erwin with the conspiracy charged in 
the indictment. From the foregoing, it becomes 
very clear that this general verdict did not neces-
sa.rily adjudicate and determine ~ny element of the 
p-resent conspiracy charge. In the case of 
Woodman v. ·united States, 30 Fed. (2d) 
482 (5th Circuit - 1929'), 
the first count charged a conspiracy to violate the 
National Prohibition Act by the unlawful posse~­
sion and sale of liquor and alleged overt acts. In 
the next 23 counts of the indictment, the defendant 
was charged with various substantive offenses. 
The first overt act was the securi:J!g and equipping 
of certain premises for the purpose of the sale of 
liquor. The other six ove-rt acts were substantive 
offenses and were each alleged in the other counts. 
On the first trial of this case, the appealing defend-
ant was found not guilty on all the substantive? 
offenses and the jury dis.agTeed on the conspiracJ1 
count. He and others in a sjmila.r situation were 
tried a second time. The defendant contended that 
his acquittal under the counts 2 to 24 iR a final de· 
termination that those acts were not committed and 
hence evidence to prove any of them was not nd-
Inissible to prove the commission of any of them 
as a circumstance from which the jury might find 
that the conspiracy had been committed. The Court 
stated that there might he much force to this con-
tention if all the overt acts had been the basis of 
the substantive counts, but points out that the first 
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cient upon which to base a eq_n~pi racy. The Court 
said: 
•'It is a fundamental principle of re~ ad-
judicata that the ean~e of action n1ust be 
the same. Thn t is not ~o in this ease. The 
:...1r~t. eount rhargt::·~ a conspiracy to eommit 
an offense against the l~nited States in vio-
lation of Section 3 4, Criminal Code ( 18 
:\.S.C. 8S; IS U.S.C.-6-\.. Sec. 88) which 
is not the same as the offense charged 
in the succeeding counts. U. S. '· Rabon-
. h, ·)'1~ TT s -:'") 3- s Ct 68') 59 
-0Wl.C -VL L· • • I ~ ; t) • • ... ; 
L. Ed. 1211. Therefore acquittal· of the 
substanti\e offenses was not a bar to pros-
ecution for the conspiracy.'' 
The Court also said: 
"\\e are not advised of any case holding 
that a party is estopped to prove a dif-
ferent cause of action by the same evidence 
offered in another case in which an ad-
Terse judgment was rendered. There are 
many cases to the contrary. It is well 
settled that a person may be acquitted of 
a criminal charge, yet recovery m3:y be 
had against him for damages caused by 
his act. This would necessarily require 
the use of some or all of the evidence ad-
duced in the criminal case, but the rule is 
the same when the State is the plaintiff. 
Stone v. U. S., 167 U. S. 178; S. Ct. 778; 
42 L. Ed. 127. 
Evidence tending to prove any violation 
of the National Prohibition Act by any of 
the conspirators connected with the con-
Rpiracy, whether alleged as an overt act or 
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not, was relevant and .admissible to prove 
the intent and common purpose of the 
alleged conspirators.' 1 
The Court quotes from 
Wharton on Griminal Evidence,. (lOth Edi-
tion), P·aragraph 48, as follows: 
' ' The question has been raised in criminal 
trials whether a previous indictment fo.r, 
or acquittal or conviction of, the other 
crime, has any effect upon the adinis-· 
sibility of the evidence of such other crime. 
It may be safely- stated that the almost 
universal judgment is that neither of these 
circumstances will op~rate to the rejection 
of such evidence.'' 
In State v. Coblentz, 169 ~ld. 159; 180 At1. 
266· ( 1935)' 
the defendant was charged with signing a state-
ment for a corporation, which statement contained 
false reports as to the assets and liabilities with 
a view to enhancing the market value of its shares. 
The defendant entered a plea of res adjudicata 
alleging that he had been charged \vith accepting 
a deposit when the banking institution was known 
by him to be insolvent, that in Raid trial the deposit 
of money was admitted and the only issues were 
whether the bank was insolvent and 'vhether de· 
fendant knew it to be insolvent and from this. con· 
tended that the State was estopped from asserting 
either o~f these two propositions against the de-
fendant. 
Freeman on Judgments, 5th Edition, Sec. 
648, 
is quoted to the effect that there is no reason for 
a difference in the rule of res adjudicata between 
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criminal and ciYil cases but recognizes this limita-
tion: 
·'But un<1er such circumstance~, the prl~­
vious judgment is conclusive only as to 
tho~e matters ''hich ''ere in fact in issue 
and actually and necessarily adjudicated.'' 
1n this quotation from Freeman_, "·hat he says of 
the case of 
Jay v. State, 15 .. -Ua .... \p. ~55; 73 S. 137, 
is set out as follows : 
'' Thu~ an acquittal of the charge of Beduc-
tion does not adjudicate the question of 
sexual intercourse, although that "·as one 
of the issues in the case, since the acquittal 
might ha-\e heel). due to the failure to estab-
lish other facts essential to a conviction.'' 
The Court then states: 
"'The opinion in that case is to the effect 
that all of the elements necessary to a con-
viction in one case must be present in the 
subsequent case where the former adjudi-
cation is pleaded, otherwise the plea is not 
available; in other 'vords, the offenses must 
agree in all their essential facts . . . '' 
The Court points out that· an acquit tal does not 
ascertain any precise facts. There may be an in-
sufficiency of proof of one fact where several were 
necessary to make a case : 
"In other words, the evidence necessary 
to produce a conviction in one case muRt 
be adequate to sup-port a conviction in the 
other.'' 
The CouFt held that defendant's contention was 
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properly overruled by the trial court and that there 
was nothing in the f~rst case. to preclude this 
prosecution. 
State v. Heaton, 56 N. D. 357; 217 N. W. 
531 ( 1928) ,. 
is directly contrary to the case of 
State v. Hopkins, 68 Mont. 504; 219 P. 1106 
(1923), 
which latter case is relied on extensively by the de-
fendants. As shown by Wharton the weight of' 
authority supports the Heaton case. In the Heaton 
case the defendant was charged \vith making a false 
entry in the books of a bank to s-how knowledge, in-
tent and motive, evidence was admitted proving a 
large number of embezzlements. The defendant ha.d 
previously been charged with the embezzlement of 
$78,000 and that charge involved this same evidence. 
In the embezzlement case he \vas found guilty of 
embezzling less than $20. Defendant argued that 
such evidence was not admissible and if it was ad-
missible he should have been permitted to prove the 
verdict of acquittal in order to rebut the inference 
of guilt. He' offered the judgment roll and the ver-
dict in the first case. The Court pointed out that 
the previous offense was not an essential part of 
the offense for which the defendant was tried in 
the instant case, and in referring to the verdict and 
assuming that it was an acquittal, the Court states: 
''What determined this conclusion does not 
appear from the record, and cannot be 
RhO\VIl. '' 
T n People v. Rogers, 170 N. Y. S. 86. (1918) ~ 
the dpfendant was charg,ea·,vith attempted robhery. 
At the time and place of this offense, defendant had 
robbed another, lu1d been charged- V\rith this latter 
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robbery and had been aequittPd. His defense in 
both cases "·as that of alibi. Defendant contended 
that the former acquittal constituted l'L)s adjudicata 
on the question of alibi, and he the ref ore should be 
acquitted in the present casl:\ The Court 8tated: 
· .. At the threshhold of the inquiry it should 
be borne in nrind that the Yerdict of the jury 
\Yas uot acquittal of the crin1e; it \Yas that 
the evidence before the jury was insuffi. 
cient to prove defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. This was the fact 
necessarily detennined in defendant's favor 
and no other fact. '' 
Defendant argues that alibi "Tas his defense; that 
a question of fact "·as thereby raised and the ver-
dict "W·as conclusive, but the Court points out that 
this is false because it cannot be said that the ver-
dict was based on the evidence of alibi. Such evi-
dence was not necessary to a determination of the 
issue although it was relevant thereto. 
Rudd v. Cornell, 171 K. Y. 114; 63 N. E. 
823, was quoted a~ follows : 
"A judgment is conclusive in a second 
action only ·when the question "\Yas at issue 
in a former suit . . . and that the con-
clusive character of a judgment extends 
only to the precise issues which were tried 
in the former action . . . and the party 
seeking to avail himself of a former judg-
ment must show affirmatively that the 
question involved in the second action was 
material and actually determined in the 
former, as a former judgment will not oper-
nte as an estoppel as to immaterial or un-
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essential facts, even though put in issue 
and directly decided.'' 
Patterson v. State~ 96 Ohio St. 90; 117 N. E. 
169; L. R. A. 1918A 583- 1917, 
is a case very closely similar to the case at bar. 
Defendant there was charged with the larceny of 
an auto belonging to one Wherry. It appeared that 
defendant and another were in a conspiracy to steal 
automobiles and three automobiles had been stolen. 
Defendant had been previously charged with the 
theft of a car belonging to one Clock and had been 
acquitted on that charge-. Defendant objected to 
any testimony relating to the theft of tlie Clock car 
and it was overruled. In his defense, he offered the 
record of the indictment, trial and acquittal of the 
Clock deal but the lower court exclgaed the same. 
These rulings of the lower court were upheld and 
many cases are cited. The syllabus in this case 
properly reflects the holding: 
''Upon the trial of tlie accused upon an in~ 
dictment for larceny of ·Wherry's auto-
mobile, where the State relies for convic-
tion upon proof of such criminal plan to 
steal various automobiles, belonging to 
Wherry, Clock and others, and offers evi~ 
dence of such criminal plan and the lar-
cenies of cars other than charged in the 
indictment, the fact that the accused at a 
former trial had been acquitted of the lar-
ceny of Clock's car does not conclude the 
State from provingi th~t su:ch plan em.-
braced the larceny of Clock's car~ although 
the evidence offered at such second trial 
was substantially the same as that produced 
bv the State on the former trial ,vhich re-
~~1lted in a verdict of acquittal. Nor can 
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the record of such for1ner acquittal be 
offered by the accused either as a bar to 
the offense cl1arged in the second indict-
ment or as an adjudication of the fact that 
the accused was innocent of the theft of 
C 's car and that the criminal plan did not 
f\Hlhrace the larceny thereof. • · 
Other cases which uphold the oon~tion of the 
State that res adjudicata does not apply to the pres-
ent case are the following: 
Duvall '· State, 111 Ohio 657; 141 N. E. 
90- 19Z4. 
Seymour '· Commonwealth, 133 Va. 775: 
112 S. E. 806- 1922. 
McCartney v. State. 3 Ind. 352: 56 Am. 
Dec. 510. 
The case of 
State '· Cheeseman, 63 Utah 138; 223 P. 
762, (1924), 
sustains the position of the State on this proposi-
tion. In that case defendant was charged with in-
voluntary manslaughter arising out of an auto-
mobile accident. The defendant entered a plea of 
a former acquittal. He produced evidence that he 
had been charged with failure to immediately re-
port the details of an automobile accident and had 
• b~en found not guilty of such charge. The accident 
was the same one as that involved in the present 
case. Defendant contended that this former ver-
dict was conclusive evidence in behalf of the defend_ 
ant since it was adudged that there was no accident. 
From the case if does not appear that the defendant 
relied upon his plea of former acquittal, but upon 
his plea of not guilty and upon the above evidence 
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as sustaining said plea. The Court points out that 
the defendant might have been acquitted in the tor. 
mer case because he did not know there was an 
accident. The Court quotes from 
Bur len v. Shannon, 99 Mass. 200; 96 Am. 
Dec. 733, 
to the effect that a verdict or judgment is only con .. 
elusive as to those facts which were necessarily in ... 
volved. It was quoted to the effect that if it was 
Left in doubt on whieh of two grounds a party had 
prevailed, res adjudicata could not appJ.y. 
Robinson & Company v. Marr, 181 Ill. App. 
605, is there quoted as follows : 
''For a judgment in a former suit to oper-
ate as an estoppel, there must be no un-
certainty as to the precise question raised 
and determined in such suit; and it must 
appear upon the record or l)y extrinsic 
evidence that the precise question is a con-
trolling issue in the s.ecorid suit.'' 
Russell v. Place, 94 U. S. at Page 608, 
24 L. Ed. 214 is qoted as follows: 
"It is undoubtedly settled la"r that a judg-
ment of a court of competent jurisdiction, 
upon a question directly involved in one 
suit, is conclusive as to that question in 
another suit between the same pa.rties. But 
to this op.eration of the judgment it must 
appear, either upon the face of the record 
or be shown by extrinsic evidence, that the 
precise question was raised ana determined 
in the former suit. If there be any un-
certainty on this head in the record - as, 
for example, if it app.ear that several dis-
tinct matters may have been litigated, up-
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on one or 1nore of "·hich the judc,o-ment may 
have" passed, "ithout indicating "·hieh of 
them \\-as thus litig-ated, and upon ". hich 
the judgment \\·as rendered - the whole 
subject-matter of the action "·ill be at 
large, and open to a new co~tention, unh~s~ 
this uncertaintt be removed bY extrinsic 
~ . 
evidence sho"-ing the preci~e point in-
volved and determined. To apply the 
judgment, and gi\e effect to the adjudi-
cation actually made, when the record 
leaves the matter in doubt, such evidence is 
adnll ssible."' 
It cannot be said from the indictment or verdict in 
the former case against Erwin and Pearce that a 
fmding was made that Holt did not receive this 
money, and if this be true, under the Cheeseman 
case, res adj"!Jdicata is not here applicable. The 
jury in said former case might not have believed 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the money was re-
ceived without consideration. 
With respect to the case of 
State v. Hopkins, supra, 
it is respectfully pointed out that there the ~vidence 
ftought to be introduced in the second trial was evi-
dence of a prior offense, admissible for the pur-
pose of showing that defendant acted with a felon-
ious intent in committing the robbery charged in 
this case. In cases of p.rior offenses, under th~ 
rule, it is usually essential to make out all the 
elements of the prior offense - hence, this case 
is not applicable to the case at bar for the reason 
that the testimony relative to Pearce receivin~ the 
tnoney without consideration and knowing it to be 
from the proceeds of women eng-ag-erl in prostitu-
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tion is not an element m this caseM As pointed out 
in the citation from vVharton on Criminal Evidence 
quoted above and from 
2 Wharton on Criminal Evidence, 11th 
Edition, Sec. 363, 
the Hopkins case is a minority holdin()' o· 
m the case of 
State v. Creechley, 27 Utah 142; 75 Pac. 
384, ( 1904)' 
cited by counsel for the defendants, the jury failed 
to find a verdict on defendant's plea of former 
acquittal. Ho\vever, in that case the record was 
not before the appellate court and therefore the 
Supreme Court held that it appeared there were 
the two issues raised by the defendant by his pJea 
of not guilty and his plea of for1ner acquittal, and 
that the jury had not made any finding with rela· 
tion to the plea of former acquittal and hence ha 
was entitled to a new trial. 
In the present case the evidence is before this Court 
and it conclusively appears therefrom that there 
\vas no evidence on the question of former acquittal 
sufficient to be presented to the jury, and further, 
it ap,pears that the Court as to this matter directed 
a. verdict for the State. (A h. 279}. The prior 
charge upon 'vhich defendants here rely for their 
plea of former jeopardy was a charge that the de-
fendants had knowingly accepted money without 
consideration from the proceeds of the earnings of 
women engaged in P'rostitution. The charg-e now 
made against the defendants is that they were in 
a conspiracy to enable houses of pros.titution ano 
giambling est a h1i 8hments to operate. The ~(·re 
statement of the tvlo charges sho\VS that they were 
not the sa1ne. In 
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Durke Y. 8tatt', :!W: Ind. 370, 183 N. ~. 97 
{193.2), 
the defendant "'a~ l'harg;ed \Vith tht.' eruue of cou· 
.spiracy to commit a felony, to,Yit: .Burglary. He 
had pre,ionsly been acquitted of the burglary. The 
Court he1d there "\Yas no forn1er jeopardy. See al8o 
~tate Y. Blackledge, 216 Io,va 199; 243 
X. 'Y. 53± (1H3:.!). 
In Hilt_ v. U. S., 12 Fed. (2d) 504, Fifth 
Circuit (1926), the Court stated: 
'~Of course, it is not true, as contended, 
that a eonspiracy to commit an offense is 
in legal effect the same thing as the sub-
.stantive offense itself. )Ioorehead Y. U. s.~ 
270 Fed. 210. '' 
"rhe case of 
Oliver v. Superior Court, 92 CaL .App. 94; 
267 Pac. 764, 
is not applicable here. The overt acts as alleged 
were the substantive crll:nes contained in the other 
counts and on which latter offense the defendants 
had been acquitted. The allegation in the present 
indictment is that the overt acts consisted in col-
lecting, or causing to be collectP-d, money from 
houses of ill fame. The substantive offense, pre-
viously charged and the acquittal of \Ybich counsel 
'Claims to be conclusive, was of kno,Yingly accepting, 
without consideration, money from the proceeds 
of women engaged in prostitution. 
It is respectfully submitted that under the fore-
going arguments and authority the doctrine of res 
!adjudicata is not here applicable. We cannot tell 
from the general verdict rendered upon what pre-
cise facts the former jury held that Pearce and 
Erwin rwere not guilty of the crime there charged. 
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,~HERE WERE NOT IMPROP·ER STATE-
¥ENTS OR CO·UDUC.T OF THE DISTRICT 
ATTORNEY CO:M:M:ITTED OR ALLOWED,. 
AND EVEN THO~UGH SUCH IS FOUND 
TO EXIST THEY WERE NO·T PREJUDI-
CIAL ERROR OR REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
Counsel for Finch and Pearce in his brief has set 
forth 30 matters which he claims constitute mis-
conduct on the part of the District Attorney. Most 
o£ these relate to statements made in the opening 
statement. The balance refer to statements made 
during the course of the trial, · which covered a 
period of a month. Seated on one side of the coun-
sel table were H. L. Mulliner, attorney for defend-
ant Pearce; Burton W. Musser, attorney for E. B. 
Erwin; Frederick C. Loofbourow, attorney for 
Harry Finch, and Willard Hanson
4 
D. N. Straup 
'and St~wart M. Hanson,, attorneys for Frank 
Thacker. The State was represented by Calvin W. 
Rawlings, District Attorney, and his assistant, 
B·righam E. Roberts.. This case was ho~ly contested 
from the moment of its beginning, to its end. Dur .. 
ing the heat of battle in a case contested as this 
one was, statements were made by all ~ . tton1eys 
pres,ent which probably should not have been n1ade. 
As poi~ted out in case after case, these things will 
be considered bv the a;ppellate court in looking over 
the conduct of .counsel on both sides. No one will 
deny that the attorneys for th~ defendants did 
have sufficient ability to cope with anything tl1at 
took place during- the trial of this law Rnit. anrl th~ 
record amply hears out the fact thftt thev gar~ 
more than thev took. Sn far aR the o1"enin~.?: state· 
ment was con~erned, there is no qne~tion hut what 
the Di~trict Attorney made a v0ry full stntement of 
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the facts which he anticipated he would prove, and 
in almost every instance the evidence was finally 
introduced in the trial of the case and certainly 
effort was made to introduce eYerything stated in 
the opening statement. 
In the case of 
People v. Tenorowicz, supra, 
the attorney for the State made a very full opening 
statement. The Conrt stated that in view of th~ 
type of case there involved and the mass of facts 
which were introduced, the District Attorney was 
entitled to make such a statement. 
Upon a perusal of the entire reoord, it appears 
that the court instructed the jury time and time 
again that the remarks and statements of counsel 
were not to be considered by them as evidence in 
the case. He did this on a number of occasions 
during the opening statement of the District Attor-
ney, and upon its completion, he made a very full 
statement to the jury with respect to the fact that 
only evidence which came from the lips of witnesses 
on the stand was to be considered by them, and in-
structed them that statements of counsel were not 
evidence. 
In the cases considering misconduct of the State's 
attorney in the presentation of what he expects to 
prove, it is universallv held that it must be shown 
that there was bad falth on the part of the State's 
attorney in making the statements complained of. 
In 
State v. Olivieri, 49 Nev. 75; 236 Pac. 1100 
(1925), -
the defendant was charged with an assault with a 
deadly weapon. On the opening statement the 
State-'s attorney made the -statement that the de-
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fendant, shortly before shootingr the p-rosecuting 
witness, was intoxicated and was. in a reckless or 
vicious humor, desired trouble,. and was armed. The 
proof offered at the trial did not measure up to 
this. The Court stated: 
''It is the duty of couns,el making a state-
ment to state the facts fairly, and to re-
frain from stating facts which he cannot 
or will not, be permitted to prove. People 
v. Stoll, 143 Cal. 689; 77 Pac. 818. Yet 
the mere ~iola tion of thP rule by a pros-
ecuting attorney is not itself evidence that 
he acted in bad faith, and reversible error. 
People v. Wong Hing, 176 Cal 699; 169 
Pac. 357; People v. Davis, 26 Cal. App. 
647, 147 Pac. 1184. '' 
Nothing in the record in that case, as is also true in 
the case at bar, indicated an intentional disregard 
of the truth or an intent on the part of the District 
Attorney to influence the jury by a false statmnent 
of the facts which he expected to prove. In 
People v. Donaldson, 26 Cal. App. 63; 171 
Pac. 442 (1918), 
the prosecuting attorney in the opening staten1ent 
stated that he would prove a conspiracy between 
the defendant and another, giving the details of 
such conspiracy. The Court stated: 
''It app,ears that the prosecution, through 
inability to prove the conspiracy, offered 
no testimony thereon; and the defendant 
no'v claims that the refPrencP. to Rnch mat .. 
ters constituted misconduct for ,yl1ich the 
~11dgment P11onld be reve~rsed. TherP. is 
ahsolnt.ely nothin.g in the record indirating 
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that the ~tatenH)nt of the District Attorney 
"\Va~ made in bad faith, and thert:~fo re it did 
not con~titute n1isconduct. People v. (lira# 
.., 1-1- C· l •)•)·) · 59 P :"' q·) '' :son, -~ a . 0-0, ac. ;:> .. -· 
In both of these ca~es the appellate court refused to 
reverse the conviction. Coun~el quotes from 
State Y. Distefano, 70 Utah 3So; :262 Pac. 
113 (192.). 
The follomng quotation should precede that set 
forth on page 1 56 of the Pearce and Finch brief: 
''In the opening statement to the jury 
counsel may properly fully state all of the 
material facts which the evidence will 
establish.'' 
It is submitted that there was no misconduct in the 
opening statement and in any event, the jury were 
fully, completely, and -thoroughly instructed upon 
the <;>ffice of an opening statement, and that the 
remarks of counsel were not to be considered by 
them as evidence. In some instances the evidence 
\d1ich came from the lips of the witness was slightly 
different from that stated by the District Attorney. 
An example of this is the statement in which the 
District Attorney stated what Judge Ellett would 
testify. The District Attorney stated it would be 
to the effect that Finch said to Judge Ellett, ''Why 
can't we let these tftings run on?" In fact, the tes-
timony was that Finch stated, "Judge, why can't 
we get together on the sentencing of these 
gamblers?'· 
The case of 
State of Utah v. Martin, 78 Utah 23; 300 
Pac. 1034 (1931), 
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is particularly applicable to the case at bar. The 
Court there stated: 
''But as a general rule remarks· of a pros-
ecutingJ attorney which ordinarily would 
he imp,rop·er are not ground for exception 
if they are p·rovoked by defendant's coun-
sel and are in reply to his acts or state-
ments, unless such remarks go beyond u 
p~ertinent reply and bring before the jury 
extraneous matter touching important 
issues. 
. . . the rule is that an app~ella.te court is 
not required to pass on such an objection 
to rerr1arks of counsel in argument, where 
no motion or request is made to the trial 
court to have the remarks "\vithdrawn from 
the consideration of the jury or to instruct 
the jury not to consider the same. 16 C. J. 
~)15; 17 c. J. 71. ,, 
Starting on page 159 of the Pearce and Finch brief 
counsel details a number of things which he cla.ilns 
are misconduct. When the entire record is con-
sidered, it becomes clear that this is not so. The 
first instance there pointed out occurred duriug 
the testimony of Judge A. H. Ellett. The proceed-
ings are partially contained at .pages 77 and 329 of 
the Abstract. As reflect~d by the record, the fol-
lowing transpired: · 
Q. Now will you tell the court and jury 
\vhat happened, what in your court re1ativr 
to these gamblers, that were mentioned over 
the telephone~ 
MR. MULLINER: I will object to it a~ 
incompetent, irrelevant and imn1aferial un-
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til so1ue foundation ~ho"ing it happened 
in the presence of the defendants or thl\Y 
had something to do \Yitll it. 
MR. R.~\.WLIXGS: It \Yasnl.entioned, Yotu· 
Honor, over the telepholll\ and it is the 
basi~; "Te are laying a basi~ to explain the 
conduct of the conspirator that afternoon. 
~ t will have a tendency to explain the con-
duct, and it is a basis for the conYersation 
that -we are going to bring in. 
MR. MULLINER: :llay I say, Your 
Honor, these n1a.tters are yery important. 
We are going to have some more of them 
this afternoon of alleged admissions by 
failure to deny something. Now, these 
statements made by anybody are hearsay 
statements ordinarily, but they are let in 
as an exception to the rule where they point 
directly to guilt so as to require or de-
mand a denial and a denial is not given. 
H general hearsay statements are made 
that do not call for such, of course, it is 
very prejudicial testimony. N O\Y, this 
doesn't even get to the conversation, but 
it is some circumstance again from which 
it is hoped that some detrimental inference 
will be drawn of something that happened 
"
11t of the presence of the defendants. Now, 
if Mr. Finch said something that is admis-
sible here, it isn't necessary to go into a 
1ot of things in order to get up to that. 
MR. RAWLINGS: Your Honor, we just 
desire to show what happened relative to 
the gamblers that were in the judge's cour1 
that day immediately-prior to the conversa-
tion had with Chief Finch, and it 'vas-those 
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cases of what happ·ened there which predi-
cated the conversation and will explain the 
conduct of the chief and what wa.s said 
and done at that time .. 
MR. MULLINER: Now, it couldn't pos-
sibly get into this case properly and any 
inference be drawn from the knowledge. 
If Mr. Finch was told anything about it, 
that can p~roperly be recited here. That is 
the only thing, and that is the only way 
anybody can know whether Mr. Finch knew 
anything about it, unless it is shown he was 
there and knew what happened. 
THE CO·URT: It rather seems to me -
MR. RAWLINGS: I think l)is conduct -
MR. MULLINER: And at this tirne that 
wouldn't he as against anyone else except 
Mr .. Finch, if it amounted to something that 
required a denial from Mr. 'Finch. 
:\1R. RA·WLINGS: Well, of course, in .re~ 
gard to matters of denial I think the jury 
will be asked to determine whether or not 
i·hese statements would require a reason-
able person to deny them. 
MR. MULLINER: I object to that. I ob-
ject to counsel fa.cing the jury and making a 
statement of that kind to the jury, and I 
assign it as prejudicial error in this case. 
MR. RAWLINGS: The fact that I faced 
the jury~ 
MR. MULLINER: Yes, and made the 
statement that you did to the jury. Coun-
sel has made an opening statement here 
that ought to be sufficient to satisfy him 
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without 1uaking thl)~(~ repeated statetuents 
during the course of the tJ:inl. 
1IR.. R .... \. ,,~LIXGS: Of course, Your 
Honor, I think I haYe t\xpla.ined \rhat \\·e 
desire to do, and I reiteratt) that the jury 
here is the person and institution that "·ill 
be called upon to determine "~hether or not 
such a statement as "'ill be introduced 
would be denied by a reasonable person. 
\Ye reiterate that. 
THE COURT: I am in doubt about per-
mitting you, however, to show the acts that 
transpired in the Police Court. N o'Y I am 
inclined to think that I ought to limit you 
to -conversation he had with the chief. I 
doubt very much if -
~IR. RA\VLIKGS: The only thing about 
it, it explains the conversation. 
THE COURT : Well, there is no evidence 
that he knew ac{)ut what happened. 
}fR .. LOOFBOUROW: Purely hearsay. 
MR. RA \\LINGS: ~.\11 right, I'll with-
draw the question at this time. 
All arguments here made were pertinent to the 
issue then before the court and it should be noted 
that counsel did not ask that the jury be instructed 
to disregard the statement nor was there a motion 
for a mistrial. 
The next statement complained of is the one made 
by Mr. Rawlings that he would be pleased to in-
troduce a certain conversation, but ·that he was 
afraid there would be an objection. Th~ record on 
this is fully set forth on page 978 of the record (par-
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tially set out at page 101 of the Abstract), as 
follows: 
MR. MULLINER; Now, just a minute. 
I move to strike out that he met Gus Cap-
tain and had a conve-rsation with him and 
how long he knew him. It is just another 
of those things, Your Honor, to show what 
happened the next day, and it will all be 
argued in here as evidence when we get 
through. 
MR. , RAWLINGS ~ Oh, no it won't. 
MR. MULLINER: If he wants to show 
something that happened after that, why 
doesn't he go to it and show it' 
MR. RAWLINGS : Yon wouldn't let us. 
lVIR. MULLINER: Well, he said he had 
a conversation with Gus Captain, but he 
hasn't asked him what was said; but they 
would be claiming something for it. It is 
conduct entirely outside of the knowledge 
of any defendants. 
MR. RA·WLIN GS : We would be pleased to 
introduce that conve·rsation, but w.e \;are 
afraid there would he an objection. 
MR. MULLINER: I assign counsel's state-
ment as prejudicial error. 
THE COURT: I don't quite see the im-
portance of having it in the record, the 
talk 'vith Gus Captain. 
!IR. MULLINER: That there is no point 
to referring to it at all. That is what I 
am objecting throughout the case. Just 
tl1ings from which inferences can be drawn 
·1 
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·without any testimony being introduced 
'Yith regard to them. 
THE COURT: I "?ill order ~t1·icken the 
statement that he had a c.onYersation \vith 
Gus Captain.. 
Q. ,, ... ell, after you sa""" Gus Captain I 
think :-ou said you sa"· Ben Ha1·mon ~ 
A.. Yes. 
~\gain it appears that the defendants failed to ask 
the court to here instruct the jury or declare a mis~ 
irial, and it further appears certainly· that this was 
not misconduct on the part of the District Attor-
ney, even mthin the cases cited in the Pearce and 
Finch brief. It should further be noted that as to 
the last question, there was not even an objection 
by defense counsel 
The next happening which counsel clanns to be mis-
conduct is the statement by the District Attorney 
to the effect that the City Attorney, the chief law 
enforcement officer of the city, was making charges 
against the mayor. Such conduct comes in the 
middle of an argument "-hich extended from page 
1295 of the Record to pag-e 1304. Certainly argu ... 
ments were made by defense coun~el during this 
time which would pennit statements to b~ made by 
the prosecuting attorney expressing- his theory of 
the relevancy of this evidence. 
The next happPning which counsel cite~ as mis-
conduct relates to the statement of )fr. Rawlings 
that ignorance of the 1aw is not justified. The 
statement of the court to the effect that the jury 
had been instructed to Oisregard all statements of 
counsel on these matters appearing on Pa21e 194 
:111d B32 0£ the AbstrRrt Rnd Pagp 164-8 of the R~cord 
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was a substantial compliance with the request of 
the defense counsel. 
The next misconduct cited by the defense counsel 
is that in connection with the question asked the 
witness, 0. B. Record on Page 2027 of the Record, 
also pointed out at Page 3.33 of the Abstract.. The 
state1nent made by Mr. Rawlings to the effect that 
all of these matters were prejudicial to the defend-
ant and just as prejudicial as indicated and as 1\tir. 
Mulliner thought it was, was not at any time during 
the trial objected to as appears from Page 2028 of 
i:.he Record. Also it carne at a time when Mr. Mul-
liner accused the District Attorney of attempting-
to bolster up testimony. 
The remaining acts of misconduct had relation to 
statements made in the closing arguments to the 
jury. It will he noticed that in not one instance 
does defense counsel request the court to make any 
rulings on the statements made by the District At· 
torney. That is, the court was not asked to instruct 
the jury to disregard the statement nor was a mis-
trial requested. Under 
State v. Martin, supra, 
these matters even though they would eonstitute 
misconduct were not prop~erly raised. The State 
,contends with respect to these matters that the evi· 
dence introduced during the trial of the case justi-
fied each and every statement it made. 
In the case of 
People v. Grossman, 82 P. (2d) 76, 
and cited by counsel for the defendants, the ruling 
of the Court that the statement of the District At-
torney was not reversible error was based upon the 
fact that thP jury were instructed not to consider 
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bt~use this stood alone cannot be found any pltwe 
in the decision. 
The case ,of 
State v. Soloman, 96 Utah 500; 87 P .. (2d) 
807, 
has nothing in it "·hich could pos~ibly b~ helpful 
in a determination of this case. In 
State v. Barone, 92 Ut. 57J ; 70 P. (2d) 735, 
(1937), 
the Utah Supreme Court refused to revers.e th~ 
case because of the conduct of the District Attor-
ney, although he had brought to the attention of 
the jury on the State's main case, a prior convic-
tion of a felony by the defendant. 
In none of the other cases cited by defense counsel 
is there anything 'v-hich is helpful in determining 
this objection now under discussion. It is respect .. 
fully submitted that there \\as no misconduct on the 
part of the District ..._-\ttorney, and if such existed, 
it either was not properly raised in the trial court 
or was not sufficient to constitute prejudicial error. 
The following statement from 
State v. l\Inrphy, 92 Ut. 382; 68 P. (2d) 
188, (1937)' 
is applicable to thiR case: 
''The record before us contains consir1er-
able argument of counsel for both sides, 
relating to the admissibility of evidence 
and objections to questions asked. But 
there is nothing to indicate that such argu-
ments were unfair, were dishonestly mad.,, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
146 
or were, not in the main, ·pertinent to the 
issue under discussion.'' 
Also the statement .conta.in~d in the concurring 
opinion of Mr. Justice Wolfe is applicable: 
"It is obvious from the record that the 
prosecuting and defense counsel, a former 
prosecuting attorney, both pre-eminently 
able to handle themselves in the trial of 
cases,, asked and gave no quarter. The 
fact that there were exchanges and sallies 
between them, that there was loaded into 
the arguments made to the court some re-
marks by both which app·ear to g:o beyond 
thos.e necessary to support the arguments 
and which mayhaps intend to carry over 
to the jury, does not p~resent suff'icient in 
this case upon which to ground prejudicial 
Prror. '' 
THE COURT DID NOT AD1\fiT IM,PROPER 
MATTERS OF E,VID~ENCE. 
In the Pearce and :Finch brief, commencing at page 
166, counsel points out generally that the court 
erred in admittingt certain improper matters of evi-
dence. The ones specifically mentioned therein are: 
(1) Fisher Harris getting in the contents of the 
letter~ Exhibit R; 
(2) That counsel for the defendants were accused 
of trying to suppress facts; 
(3) Harris' conversation 'vith the judge in 'vhich 
Harris stated, in addressing himself to the court, 
.:that there had been an offer to prove that some· 
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thing he had done \\~as a result of bias or prejudice 
and that he \Yould prefer that the matter be gone 
into; 
(4) The cross-examination of Finch concerning 
certain information 'Ylrich "·a~ broug·ht to hin1 by 
newspaper reporters and to ,v·hich he made replies, 
and 
(5) The statement made by the court to Mr. Mul-
liner that no one was involved but Thacker on cer .. 
tain evidence. 
It might be stated generally as to all these matters 
that even though it be conceded they were error, 
there was nothing in them which would in any 'vay 
constitute prejudicial error. However, certainly 
there i~ no error in¥olved. As to the letter, Exhibit 
R, defense counsel kept this letter out of evidence. 
However, certain conversations had by Fisher 
Harris with Mayor Erwin were pertinent in show-
ing his conduct when speaking 'Yith persons 1n .. 
volved in the investigation of the pay-off in Salt 
Lake City, as well as ~ther matters heretofore n1en ... 
tioned. These conversations of necessity concerned 
the contents of this letter and before this Court 
can reverse this case on this point it must hold 
t.hat the introduction of evidence with respect to 
these conversations was immaterial and prejudicial 
~rror, which under the authorities heretofore 
cited, were properly admitted in evidence. 
So far as any accusation being made that defense 
counsel were trying to sup~press facts, there is no 
instance of it in the record unless it is the sing]e 
one referred to by counsel for defendant wherein 
the District Attorney stated, after a suggestion by 
defense counsel that he had not gone into a con-
VPrsation, that he had not gone- into it because ob-
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jection would undoubtedly he made. The annota-
tion in 
78 A. L. R. 766, 
and the cases therein mentioned show that it is re-
versible error only when repeated and continued 
accusations are made that counsel are trying to 
suppress the facts. 
The first quotation on page 167 of the Pearce-
Finch brief is not complete. It should continue as 
follows: 
"It does not follow, however, that all re-
marks of this character constitute grounds 
for reversal. The appellate court must be 
satisfied from the record not only that the 
statements of the offending attorney were 
such as were likely to mislead or prejudice 
the jury against the appellant, but that, 
after objection, the court by failing to apply 
appropriate disciplinary measures or to 
give suitable ins,tructions, left the jurors 
\Vith wrong or erroneOUS impressions, 
which were likely to influence them im-
properly or to prejudice them to the dis-
advantage of the appellant.'' 
Harris' convers.a tion with the judge was only a re-
quest by him to p1ermit couns.el to go into the ma.t-
ter of bias and prejudice~ which defense counsel 
was apparently a.ttemp·ting to bring out. This con-
versation of Harris' was undoubtedly brought about 
by the imputation counsel was seeking to effeet that 
Harris was in fact biased and prejudiced in his con-
duct in this investigation. 
So far as the cross-examination relative to conver-
sations had by Finch with news1paper men, this 
\va.s only to bring out the knowledge of Finch that 
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vice establishments 1v-ere in operation. Otht'r PYi-
dence ·was introduced to this ~an1p efft'ct and this 
evidence "~as only cmnulative. In any eYent, Finch 
\vas asked four questit)ns. and he ~tatl'd in Pnch in-
stance that he would not or did not re1uember any 
such conversations, and in one instance he said that 
the conversation did not take plac.e. 
\\~ith reference to the staten1ent by the court to 
:\lr. Mulliner that the matter then before the court 
did not inYol\e anybody but the defendant, Thacker, 
it should be pointed out that the record reflects 
that counsel for defendant lfr. Thacker, stated that 
he had no objection to the testimony. The testi-
mony was only sought to be introduced as against 
Thacker. Yr. Mulliner continued to make objec-
tion and then the court made the statement set out 
on Page 1·70 of the Finch and Erwin brief. ~ee 
Record, 2041 to 2046. 
THE COL"'"RT DID XOT E~R IX REFL~SING 
REQUESTS AXD IX GDnNG CERTAIX 
INSTRUCT! OKS. 
Both briefs filed by defense counsel ~ontain argu-
ments that error was committed in refusing certain 
requests and then in giving instructions~ Counsel 
for Finch and Pearce divide this discussion into 
four parts and we will here notice them in the order 
in which they appear in his brief, starting at page 
173. . 
The first subdivision refers to certain requested ilL 
structions on the subject of admissions by silencr 
and consciousness of guilt. It involves defendant 
Pearce's requests Numbers 6, 8, and 11, found on 
pages 287, 288, and 292 of the Abstract. Request 
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Number 6 did not contain a correct statement of law 
in that it is there stated, ''You are further in-
structed that there was. no-thing done or said by 
Pearce in those conversations which was or which 
can be considered by you as an admission on his 
part of guilt o.f the offense here charged or of guilt 
of any offense." · 
We have heretofore pointed out in this brief the 
fact that Pearce's conduct at this time would con-
stitute ·an admission, and under the argument and 
authorities there cited, it is submitted that request 
Number 6 does not state the law. 
Request Number 8 is also faulty in that it is too 
broad and does not relate to any specific testi-
mony other than the mention of that given by Fisher 
Harris. It is also too broad because it would ex-
clude statements acquiesced in by defendants, and 
certainly such statements are admissible in e~­
dence. For instance, the statement made by Fisher 
Harris at the Alta Club in a conversation with 
Finch and Erwin, wherein he··. said that Finch and 
Erwin were receiving the sum of $750.00 and 
$500.00 resi{)lectively. If this were acquiesced in, 
then certainly it would be some evidence of the 
truth therein contained. Said instruction is also 
misleading. 
Request Number 11 states the la'v to be that there 
is no admission by silence unless there is a direct 
accusation of the charge made in the ca.se and it 
must be made to the defendant himself. It is sub-
mitted that under the authorities heretofore eited, 
this instruction does not correctly state the law, 
and therefore was properly refused. 
Under the second subdivision of the Pearce-Finch 
brief on this particular subject, counsel complains 
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.of failure to make instructions ou lai~g-er and SllU:tller 
conspiracies. UnJl\1' the cases heretot'ore cited on 
the subject of Yar1ance, certainly the court wu::-~ 
under no obligation to giYe such instructions. 
Counsel made no requests on this subject to "··hich 
he was entitled. Some of those requested were 
giYel.i. as requested or in substance. He refers to 
Pearce~~ rL•quest ~ lunber 3 .. :\. found at page 28-! of 
the .. \bstract. That request states that the testi-
mony of H. K. Record relatiYe to the conversation 
between himself and Pearce is not to be considered 
by the jury as any evidence or as tending in any 
way to prove the existence of the conspiracy here 
alleged. That conversation as heretofore pointed 
out was to obtain the services of someone to effect 
collections in furtherance of the conspiracy. Said 
request further states that such eonversation in 
any new is as eonsistent with the absence of thE:-
eonspiracy here alleged as it \\as \Yith its exist-
~nce, and \\as in nc way in furtherance thereof. 
Pearce in that conversation stated that he bad been 
authorized by Erwin to make collections from 
gambling establi~hments and other fonns of VIC~. 
Certainly this request was properly refused 
Counsel then notes the failure to give the first part 
of request Number 4, found on fYage 285 of thP 
Abstract. This portion of the request seeks to 
have the jury exclude from their considerations 
the collections made by Holt and by Abe Stubeck. 
Certainly if these collections were made, then they 
are some eYidencp that the houses of vice were oe 
ing protected, and when considered with other evi~ 
dence heretofore related, aid in the proof that a 
conspiracy to pennit thef:e places to operate ex .. 
i~ted. The second part of said request wa~ g-iven 
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by the court,. it being instruction Number 15, found 
at Abstract 271. 
Counsel next states that Pearce's Request No. ~ 
( .. A.b. 2'o6) should have been given and that it was 
error not to give it. A number of instructions 
were given requiring that the jury find beyond ·a 
reasonable doubt that the conspiracy as alleged 1n 
the indictment existed. See instructions 4 (a), 4 (b), 
4 (e), 4 (g), 9 (a) and 12 (a)~ In any event, as in-
dicated by the case of 
Berger v. United States, supra, 
the fact that two or more smaller conspiracies arP 
proved is not such a varianGe as will result in a 
reversal. 
Counsel set out Instruction Number 7 a.s given, but 
just what his criticism is of that instruction we arr 
unable to determine. That instruction merely tells 
the jury that it is not necessary that the State prove 
that the defendants actually met or came together 
and expressly agreed to commit the conspiracy al~ 
leged in the indictment) but that the conspiracy may 
be shown by circumstantial evidence and that such 
circumstantial evidence must exclude every reason· 
able hypothesis of innocence and must convince 
said jury beyond a reasonable doubt. This certain .. 
ly is a correct statement of the law. 
In instruction Number 12, the instruction is to the ef-
feet that if each of the defendants., Erwin, Finch and 
Thacker wilfully failed to perform their duties and 
in that manner knowingly, enabled the operation 
of vice establishments, then such facts could be 
taken into consideTation by the jury. Of course, 
t·.his in and of itself, is not sufficient, but as in-
dicated in other instructions there must be a par .. 
ticipation in the conspiracy. Counsel has not cited 
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any case which sho\\·s that this eYidence can not 
be taken into consideration. 'l'he tase of 
0 'Brien v. Lnit.ed States, 01 .b\\lL ( :2J.) 
~ 674, 
indicates that this eYidence mny be taken into coll-
sideration. 
Instruction 12 (a) ( .... \bstract 269) is an instruction 
requested by defendant, Frank Thacker. Counsel's 
objection to this instruction seems to be that' the 
jury was not instructed that it " ... as necessary in 
order to convict the defendants to find that they 
knowingly participated in the conspiracy. 
Instruction Xumber ± (b) and Xumber 4 (c) points 
out to the jury this requirement. Here again 
counsel criticizes an· instruction because it does not 
contain all of the law on the subject of conspiracy 
and as has been held many times by this and other 
Courts all the instructions must be looked to. The 
instruction does not say that if they find certain 
facts they are to :fmd the defendants guilty, out 
merely says that before any verdict of guilt may 
be rendered certain things must be found. There 
is no attempt to state all the things that must be 
found before conviction wonld be justified. 
In the third subdivision of this point, defense coun-
sel criticizes Instruction Number 13 and states that 
the quoted part of the instruction refers to any 
conspiracy, but they leave out the first part of the 
instruction \\hicl1 states that they must find be-
yond a reasonable doubt that a conspiracy as al-
leged in the indictment existed. This is the. con-
~piracy that the la~t of tbe instruction refers to as 
''said conspiracy'' and "such conspi-racy.'' 
Counsel next claims that in the request found on 
page 282 of the Abstract they sought to have the 
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jury instruc~ed that they were- n€lt to consider as 
proof of the conspiracy any statement, declaration 
or admission made by any conspirator. Such an 
instruction, of course, would exclude for example, 
the declaration of Pearce made to H.. K. Record 
in attempting to find a collector, which certain!) 
was materiaL 
As to the next instruction considered to the effect 
that the existence of the conspiracy could not 
be established against any alleged conspirator b-y 
evidence, of acts or declarations of any other al-
leged conspirator done or made in the absence of 
the conBpirator sought to be cliarged, Instruction 
Number 14 covers this matter. It might be pointed 
out that the request found on Pag~ 282 of the Ab. 
stract contained statements which are not the law 
It is submitted that Instruction Number 14 also 
fully covers the matter contained in that portion of 
Request Number 11 quoted on page 180 of the Fincl'l 
and Erwin brief. · 
Counsel next finds fault with Instruction Number 
16, but does not quote enough to show that the inat· 
ter complained of is fully covered in that instruc. 
tion. Counsel states that the follo,ving part of In-
struction Number 16 is error "you must find from 
fa.cts in evidence, from which it may be reasonably 
inferred that the offense was committed.'' In the 
first place couns.el made no exception to this por· 
tion of the instruction. Counsel states that this 
aprplies to the entire instruction. In this we submit 
he is in error. The folloWing is the introduction 
to Instruction Number 16: 
"Before you can find the defendants, or 
any of them guilty of the offense charged in 
the indict.m~nt, you must find from the 
f~ts in evidence1 from which it may be 
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rL'aSOIUlbly inieiTl'd that the oft\)use 'Yas 
committed in Salt Lake County, Utah, and 
vou Illn~t find beYond a reasonable doubt 
ol .. 
each and eYery one of the following elP-
ments,'' 
and then sets out fiYe rubdiYisions. In the first 
place let it be said that there \Ya~ never any con-
tention made that venue was n.ot proYen in this 
case. In the second place, this certainly required 
the proof of the element~ thereafter set out to be 
beyond a reasonable doubt before a conviction could 
be had. 
In Subdivision Xumber ±of Instruction Xumber 16, 
the word ''or'' is used, but certainly from reading 
the instructions, it becomes clear that the jury 'va~ 
instructed more than once_that they n1ust find beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the conspiracy, as alleged in 
the indictment, existed. Subdivision Number 5 of 
Instruction X umber 16 is not the only instruction 
given on overt acts. It merely sets forth the overt 
acts which were alleged and one of ''"'hich must have 
been committed. Instructions Numbers 22 and 24 
sufficiently set forth the law when coupled with 
Subdivision Xmnber 5. These instructions point 
out that any overt acts mu~t he done by fellow con-
~nirator~ or ry tbP dPfendants themselves. 
Under the fourth subdivision of this point, counsel 
confidently relie~ on a misstatement containerl jn 
Instruction Number 15. Instruction Number 15 is 
Pearce's Request Number 4.- Counsel has already 
assigned as error the failure to give his Request 
Number 4. HowPvPr, it was given. Certainly~ de-
fendant Pearce can claim nothing for this mis-
statement. The onlv misstatement in Instruction 
Number 15 was that the witness, Stuheck. testified 
that he collectPd money. Of course, the testi~ony 
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was by l(empner that Stubeck collected it. How-
ever this instruction does. not assume a fact neces-
sary to he found. It is only a statement that Stu· 
beck testified to a certain thing and if they believe 
that certain thing then they might ·not consider it 
was proof of an agreement unles.s certain other 
things were found. In 
State v. Hanna, (Utah)~ 21 P. (2d) 537, 
(1933), 
the following instruction was given. 
''And you are instructed in t4is connection, 
that if the evidence offered and received in 
this case raises in your minds a reasonable 
doubt as to the presence of the defendant 
at the place where the offense was con~­
mitted, at the time of the comm-ission 
thereof, then your verdict should be for 
the defendant, not guilty." 
Of course, in this ins.tance, the court assumed that 
the offense had been committed and it was held 
reversible error. This case is in no way coinpar-
able to the sligrht misstatement made in Instruction 
Number 15. 
The instruction quoted from 
Holland v. State, (Texas), 206 S. W. 89, 
was in effect covered in Instruction Number 22. 
In the Erwin brief starting at page 64, counsel dis-
cusses certain instructions as being erroneous. He 
also criticizes Instruction Number 16 hecaiUse it 
doer, not state that the overt acts must be done by 
one of the cons~pirators. As heretofore pointed 
out, Instructions Number 22 and Number 24 make 
this a requirement. Co-unsel also criticizes Instru?-
TnBtructions Number 22 and Number 24. In th1s 
tion Number 18 but aga1n we refer the Court to 
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connection "~e particularly eall thl) l\nu··t ·~ al.ll)ll .. 
tion to the languagt.) l)l ln~truetiou Xmnbel' :2-± tv 
the ettect that the jury was t urt tll)r llistrul'll)d, "'in 
addition to c.dl llHlt tilt.) eonrt has hPrL~lot'orl) lll-
structed you. ' ' 
Instruction 9 \n) ha~ been herl)totore lh~·u~~l)d and 
is not ~e only instruction on the subjL)el therein 
contained. The jur~? eonld not convict on just one 
instruction and the neee~sity for the elen1ent of 
knowledge is \ery tully pre~ented in lustructiun 
Number 4 (b). Counsel criticizes Subdivision 3 
(d) of Instruction Xurnber 16 a~ pern1itting the 
jury to speculate as to "What act n1ight Le therein 
included. Under this subdivision of the instruc .. 
tions, if a party to the conspiracy permitted, allowed, 
enabled and assisted a house of ill-fame to operate 
in violation of the State statutes and the ordinances 
of Salt Lake Cit:. then the same was a sufficient 
overt act. ~\.s pointed out in the case of People v. 
Tenorowicz, this is such an act, and if it "~as com-
mitted then the verdict "Was justified. 
Erwin's request, Instruction Xumber 19, seeks to 
exclude from the jury's consideration the testimony 
of Ben Hunsaker. Certainly this evidence \vas ad-~ 
missible and constitutes an admission on behalf of 
Erwin that he was a party to the conspiracy alleget i 
in the complaint. 
There was no error in the refusal of R~~Cf!Jest .Numbe;· 
22 because this sought to exclude from the con .. 
sideration of- the jury any evidenee with relation to 
the conversation bet'.\~een Harris and Erwin. As 
heretofore pointed out, the statements of Erwin at 
this convers-ation were admissible to show a con~ 
sciousness -of guilt on his part and to prove certain 
statements made by Erwin, admitting his compli-
city in the conspiracy. If the evidence of these con-
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versations was properly admitted, then certainly 
Instruction Number 22 was properly refused. 
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
:Counsel for defendants insofar as the sufficiency 
of the evidence is concerned have taken an isolated 
fact and stated, this fact does not prove anything 
so we will disregard it. They then move on to the 
next fact and say the same thing and by this pro· 
Gess eventually eliminate all the evidence in the 
ease. After this elimination they say, there is no 
evidence. 
On questions of the sufficiency of the evidence, 
cases usually stand or fall upon their own fa.cts 
and circumstances. By this, counsel for the State 
means that after looking at the facts we must asl\ 
ourselves, ''-.;,vas a conspiracy proved in this case 
as alleged in the indictment?'" To again re-argue 
and re-state the facts heretofore set forth would 
not be useful, however, it is submitted that when 
we consider all of this evidence together, we can-
not help but come to the conclusion that all of the 
defendants were working together and to a common 
end. that is, p~ern1itting, allowing, assisting and en-
abli~g vice establishments to operate in violation 
of la\V for their own personal gain. Finch dis .. 
cussed the -activities of Holt in opening and closing 
the vice establishments and also guided him to the 
persons who were to receive the moneys he col· 
lected. Pearce attempted to get s.omeone to 1nake 
the necessary collection and to keep the plners of 
·vice "in line,'' and the defendant, Erwin, admitted 
his participation in this conspiracy. This evidene(l 
irresistibly draws ns to the conclusion that the~P 
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acts as allegeti "-ere ronnnittPd. In the ea~l\ of 
U. S. Y. Mel~l'e, ~ti Fl\d. Ca~. ~\ o. lJ,t)~u 
(1S76) 3 Dill ~~1) ( l'ircuit Ct., E. D. 
Mo.), 
instructions are set forth at length directing thl~ 
jury as to the n1anner in \\·hich they are to con-
'-1ider the e\idence. The instruction is as follows: 
''\\hen a conspiracy is sho\\11 to exist, the 
rule of la"- is that all acts done in further-
anee of the conspiracy by any of the con-
spirators. though not in the presence of 
others. and all declarations made bv anv 
" ~ . ., 
of the conspirators to advance the con1mon 
cause, or z~n conneqtion -zcith acts done in 
the pro1notion of the conspi·racy, though 
not made in the presence of the other con-
spirators. are evidence against all of the 
conspirators. One conspirator in such 
cases is bound by all the acts and declara-
tions of his fellow conspirators done and 
made to promot-e the common object; but 
mere declarations, that is, statements of 
real conspirators, that some one else is 
a member of the conspiracy is not evidence 
to establish that fact. It must be estab-
lished by- independent evidence ;f the acts, 
conduct or admissions of the person him-
self, who is soug-nt to be implicated; but if 
it is. hv ~11ch other jndependent evidence, 
once established to the satisfaction of the 
i11rv that a. pPrson is a member of a con-
spiracy, then the rule above stated applies, 
and he is bound by the acts and declara-
tions of his co-conspirators, done and made 
1-:1 fnrtherance of the illegal srheme, thnu:._~·1 : 
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not made or done in his presence. This 
u1stinction is plain enough and when once 
clearly apprehended by the jury, not diffi-
cult of application." 
The rule in determining whether or not sufficient 
evidence has been produced to permit the case to g-o 
to the jury for its consideration is considered and 
sta,ted in 
State v. Llewellyn,. 71 Ut~ 331; 226 Pac. 261 
(1928): 
''The rule is controlled by the same prin-
ciples in criminal cases as in .civil pro-
cedure. And in a civil case, Starn v. Ogden 
P. & P. Co., 53 Ut. 2'48; 177 P. 218, this 
Court said: 'It is. fa:miliar doctrine in 
this jurisdiction and perhaps in nearly 
every other where the- jury system pre-
vails, that, if there is any substantial evi-
dence whatever upon which to base a ver-
dict, the court will not withdraw the case 
from the jury or direct what their verdict 
should be.n 
The Court further states: 
"Our conclusion is that upon a motion for 
a directed verdict of acquittal the province 
of the court is to consider and determine 
as a matter of law \Vhether or not there 
is substantial evidence of the guilt of 
accused sufficient in law to support a con-
viction, and,. if there is, to deny the mo-
tion and submit the· case to the jury. If 
the C011rt is dissatisfied with the weight and 
credibility of the evidence, he may after-
'vnrdR, upon that ground, set aRide the vrr-
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dic.t and grant a new· tJ·ial, but such is uo 
grounds for directing an acquittal.'' 
The rule is not as indicated by counsL\1 that the eourt 
must find the defendants guilty in hi~ own 1niud. 
He should only determine 'Yhether there is ~'any 
substantial evidence whateyer upon 'Yhich to base 
a verdict.'' This. is the rule which should govern 
this Court. In 
Helton v. Commonwealth, 245 l{y. 7; 5:3 
S. \Y. 89 (1932)~ 
the defendants -were charged "·ith a conspiracy. 
The Court there stated : 
'LA conspiracy is almost necessarily estab-
lished by welding into one claim, circum-
~tances which when considered separately 
are of themsel\es insufficient and incon-
clusi\e, but when connected and examined 
as a whole, are sufficient to sho\v it. 
The question whether there is a confedera-
tion or conspiracy, if there is any evidence, 
is in eYery case for the jury.'' 
In 0 'Brien v. United States, 51 Fed. 67 4, 
(Seventh Circuit, 1931), the Court 
stated: 
''The support "~hich one may give to an 
unlawful conspiracy naturally differs. 
There are leading and minor roles to be 
played. One actor is active, another non-
active. Omissions may, under certain cir-
cumstances, be tantamdunt to acts of com-
mission. Guilt may in some instances be 
estahlished by non doing, as well as by 
affirmative acts, provided the intended 
and actual effect of such non action is 1 ') 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
162 
advance or consummate the object of the 
conspiracy.'' 
It was also pointed out by the court in this case 
that a defendant need not know the full extent of 
the conspiracy, nor the names of those participat-
ing. In 
Breiner v. United States, 54 Fed. (2d) 
1045 (Seventh Circuit - 1932), 
the Court held that a defendant need not know all 
those person8 participating in a conspiracy. In 
Blanstein v. United States, 44 Fed. (2d) 
163 (1930 - Third Circuit), 
the Court stated that a conspiracy may be shown 
by direct and positive evidence, by declarations or 
writings, or by circmstantial evidence, such as 
show that the parties acted together or in concert~ 
or in _a manner warranting belief that their acts 
were the result of a previous agreement. In 
Richards v. State, 43 Oliio App. 212; 183 
N. E. 36 ( 1932), 
the charge was forgery. However, a conspiracy 
\\.,.as proved in connection therewith. The Court 
states that a conspiracy is usually proved by sep-
arate acts of several persons concentrating toward 
the same purpose and states as follows: 
'' . . . the greater the secrecy that is ob-
served relative to the object of such con-
cnrrence, and the more apparent the sim-
ilaritv of the 1neans employed to effect the 
o hject, the stronger is the evidence of the 
conspiracy, and~ wnere it is proved by their 
conduct that alleged conspirators, were pur-
suing the same object by the same means 
each performing a different part of the 
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1CJ3 
~ct "ith a Yie"y to its attainm..ent, it 1uay be 
concluded tlu1 t the parties \Yl\ l'l\ engaged 
in a conspirac_y to effect that object, and 
a jury 'Yould be justified in so finding.·' 
In State Y. Thompson, 69 Conn. 7~0; 38 ..L\tL 
868. 
\Yhich is a case of conspiracy, the Court stated~ 
"The agreement to a.ct in concert for the at-
tainment of the fraudulent purpose is sus-
ceptible of proof in different ways . There 
may be· direct evidence of the actual meet-
ing' and agreement to pursue the common 
object. The joint :participation of ail tb~ 
persons charged, in the acts by which the 
common purpose is to be accomplished,' 
may be shown by direct evidence. The 
combination may be established by proof of 
the admissions of -each of the accused con-
spirators, who are parties to the action, 
made either during or after the accomplish-
men{ of the common purpose, proof of each 
admission being received in evidence only 
against the person making it. It may be 
ptove<fbycirCUffistantial eViden~, by proof 
o~ the separate acts of the individuals~ and 
of circum~tances from which the illegal con-
federation may he inferre'd. From the na-
bire of the offense itself, Ruch corrupt 
agreement of the parties, entered into in 
~~cret c::tn onlv in exceptional cases be es-
tablished in any other manner. (19 Conn. 
23'3, 237). '' 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
164 
The rule as stated in 
People v. Goldaher, 17 Cal .. App. (2d) 195 ~ 
61 Pac. (2d) 675 (f936),_ 
is that where the acts of the conspirators support 
a logical inference ,of conspiracy, that is suffic1ent. 
In People v. Van Tassell, 15.6 N. Y. 561; 
51 N. E. 274 (1898), the Court stated: 
''It is -vvell settled that -vvhere there is suffi-
cient evidence to justify the conclusion that 
different persons charged with a crime 
were acting with a common purpose and 
design, although it does not appear there 
has been a previous combination or confed-
eracy to commit the particular offense, yet 
acts and decl~arations of each, from the com-
mencement to the ~')nsummation of the of-
fense are evidence against the others. A 
.conspiracy may be proved by circun1stan-
tial evidence, and parties performing dis-
connected overt acts, a.ll contributing to the 
same result, may, by the circumstances and 
their general connection or oth0rwise, he 
satisfactorily shown to be confederators in 
the commission of the offense.'' (cases 
cited) . 
In Garland v. State, 112 Md. 83; 75 Atl 
631 : 21 Ann. Cas. 28 ( 1910) : 3 Green-
leR f on Evidence, 16th Ed. 101, is 
quoted as follows : 
'' . . . . If it be proved that the defend-
Rnts pur~ued by their acts the same objert, 
often by the same means, one -pPrforming 
orie part and another another part of the 
Rame so as to complete it, vvith a view to 
th0 attainment of that same ohj0rt, th0 j11ry 
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"~in be ju~ti:fied in th~-." e•.nJelu~ion that tlll\Y 
,\·ere engaged in a evn~11ifal)· to P l'feet thn t. 
object.'' 
\\ e respectfully r~1ll the Court·~ ntt~-.'nt.ion to the 
case of 
Allen v. United Statt:•s, 4 Fed. (2d) li8S 
(Seventh Circuit. 19~7). 
This case is probably as close as any to the evidence 
introduced by the State in tllis case. 
The case of People v. Tenoro\\-irz. supra, is another 
case to which we re~pertfully c-all the attention of 
the Court. The ease of 
People \. Collier, 111 Cal. .6.\.pp. 215; 295 
Pac. 898. 
contairhl;) an excellent discussion as to the distinction 
of rules as to the weight and to the admissibility of 
evidence, and also as to general principles of law 
relating to conspiracies. An opinion on rehearing 
of this case is found in 
People'· Shurtleff, 133 Cal. App. 739; 299 
Pac. 92 (1931). 
"-hich affirms the conviction of one of the defend-
ants whose conviction was reversed in the Collier 
case. 
Under the rules heretofore set out, it is submitted 
that there is substantial evidence in this case upon 
which the jury could well ha,~e returned a verdict 
of guilty of the conspiracy as alleged in the indict-
ment, and as pointed out in the above cases we mus.t 
look at all of the evidence and not isolate the testi-
mony of each witness or each fact. 
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IN" ORDIER TO JUSTIF1Y A REVERSAL THE 
.till-tH,OR l\1. U ~'1; A.UTU A.L,LY P]i.hlJUDlO.hl 
'l'HE DE]iENDANT. 
Utah has a number of statutes relating to this 
subject. 
Section 105-53-2, Revised Statutes of Utah, 
1933, provides a.s follows: 
''Neither a departure from the form or 
mode prescribed by this code in respect 
to any pleading or p,roceeding nor any 
error or mistake therein shall render it in-
valid unless it shall have actually pre-
judiced the defendant in respect to a sub-
stantial right.'' 
Section 105-43-1, Revised Statutes of Utah,. 
1933, provides as follows : 
''After hearing an appeal the court must 
give judgment without regard to errors or 
defects which do not affect the substantial 
rights of the parties. If error has been 
commit(ed, it shall not be presumed to 
have resulted in prejudice. The court 
must be satisfied that it has that effect be-
fore it is warranted in reversing the judg-
ment.'' 
Numerous cases have been decided under these stat-
utes and in all cases a substantial prejudice to the 
rights of the defendant is required to justify a 
reversal of the judgment. It is respectfully sub-
mitted that if there were any error:;; committed in 
the trial of tblis lawsuit that those errors were 
harmless and under the foregoing statutes affirn1-
ance by this Court is necessary. 
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Counsel for tlte .stale bc·lit:Y(\ that tlle dl\l'l\u~.ia11L~ 
.and each of thmn reeeiYt)d a fair trial and 1ltat u 
just \erdict. "~as rendered by the juror~ in finding 
the three appealing defendants guilty. The indiet-
ment stated a public offen~e. Th~ Bill of Pal'tic-
nlars gave to the defendants in adYance of the trial 
more of the endenee than they """ould haYe been en-
titled to under the old fonn~ of pleadings. ThP 
testimony which wa~ admitted in evidence before 
the jury was material. relevant and eompetent in 
every respect, and that evidence was sufficient to 
justify a verdict finding the defendants and each of 
them guilty of the crinle of criminal conspiracy, in 
that they c~nspired to pf'lrnlit, allo'v and ~assist 
]louses- of ill-fame and gambling establishments to 
operate in violation of law. 
It is respectfully submitted that this H:onorable 
Court should affirm the judgment appealed from. 
Respectfully submitted. 
JOSEPH CHEZ, 
~-\ ttorney General. 
GROVER A. GILES, 
Dnputy Attornev General 
C}~L~ ,V. RA\VLIKGS, 
District Attorney, 
BRIGHA~f E. ROBERTS, 
.1\Bsistant District P.1.ttorney, 
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